Deal or No Deal on Nukes, the US Should Change Its Policy Toward Iranian Kurdish Opposition Parties

Sierwan Najmaldin Karim

Following the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, the United States government ceased its relationship with all Iranian opposition, including the Kurdish-led parties. Kurds in the country have strongly opposed the Islamic Republic of Iran since its formation in 1979 and are fighting to establish a free and democratic society that respects their ethnic rights. When Iranian authorities held a referendum seeking the establishment of an Islamic Republic in 1979, not only did Iranian Kurds protest by boycotting the referendum, they confiscated and destroyed all of the ballots in Iranian Kurdistan. This area continues to pay the price for its opposition to the Iranian regime and remains neglected, undeveloped, and has the highest unemployment rate in Iran. 

Though the Obama Administration hoped the JCPOA would encourage Iran to take a softer stance at home and abroad, it did the opposite. Iran, a US-designated state sponsor of terrorism, used the billions of dollars released by the JCPOA to drastically increase its support for its proxies in the Middle East. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was able to expand its influence by forming new militias and bolstering aid to existing proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq remain a destabilizing force and continue to attack Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and US diplomatic as well as military facilities. Naturally, this outcome was unsurprising, as US policymakers, including then-Secretary of State John Kerry, acknowledged Iran would use windfalls from sanctions relief to fund terrorism.

In addition to repeatedly attacking American troops and diplomatic facilities, Iran’s proxies in Iraq fan the flames of sectarianism that have fueled the Islamic State’s (ISIS) reemergence. Iranian-backed militias’ atrocities against Iraq’s Sunni population, coupled with the Iranian-influenced Iraqi government’s discriminatory policies, drive Sunnis into the arms of groups like ISIS and have hindered US efforts to stabilize the country since 2003. Iran’s Iraqi proxies and the IRGC have also targeted the Kurdistan Region, the US’ most reliable partner in the country since 1991, with ballistic missiles and drones. In Syria, the IRGC and its proxies have committed war crimes and remain devoted to supporting the Assad regime at all costs. Concurrently, Iran’s Houthi allies in Yemen have perpetrated attacks on the Gulf states that threaten US interests and create gaps between the US and its Sunni partners which can be exploited by American adversaries such as Russia. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has ruined the country's economy and continues to pose a major threat to America’s closest ally in the region, Israel.

 After President Trump annulled the JCPOA, the Biden Administration did not hesitate to launch a new round of talks in Vienna. At this point, however, a new deal seems more difficult to achieve for Democrats advocating for a softer approach towards Iran than Trump's "maximum pressure" policy, which sought a “better” deal via regime change. 

The 2015 Deal and Its Effect on the Iranian Opposition 

 
Given the Iranian regime’s autocratic nature, all of Iran’s opposition parties have been exiled for more than four decades, including the Kurdish ones who rejected the Islamic Republic’s foundation during the infamous 1979 referendum. Iranian Kurds are fundamentally at odds with the regime of the mullahs and more inclined towards Western values. Iran’s Kurds are committed to the establishment of a free, secular society where ethnic and religious minorities, are equal, and Iranian Kurdistan is still the only place in Iran where genuine grassroots political parties exist. 

Needless to say, the regime does not share the vision of the Kurds. In addition to repressing domestic political activity, the regime targets opposition movements on foreign soil. On September 8, 2018, the IRGC struck the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran (KDP-I) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) in Iraqi Kurdistan with ballistic missiles, killing and wounding dozens.

 

The Iranian regime has been assassinating dissidents abroad since 1979. In 1989, Iranian agents assassinated KDPI Secretary-General Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and several of his colleagues in Vienna. Ghassemlou’s successor, Sadegh Sharafkandi, was assassinated in Berlin in 1992. Despite the regime’s efforts and political disagreements, Iran’s Kurdish parties are united in their dedication to shaping the future of Iran and, in 2018 established an organization called the Cooperation Center for Iranian Kurdistan’s Political Parties (CCIKP). The CCIKP aims to facilitate the cooperation and dialogue essential to the foundation of a democratic state. 

Iran’s Kurdish leaders are not against a revival of the nuclear deal if it improves economic conditions, raises living standards, and ends human rights abuses. That said, they stressed a deal with the current regime is unlikely to do any of those things and would probably fail to convince the regime to curtail its support for terrorism or address the nation’s endemic corruption. The JCPOA failed spectacularly on all of these accounts. What was most discouraging following the JCPOA, however, was how the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations pursued a policy of disengagement with the Iranian opposition, including the Kurds. This policy is interpreted by many in Iran as an attempt to appease the regime and is liable to hinder the US' ability to influence events in a post-Islamic Republic Iran.   

 

Thus, the US should not base its approach toward the Iranian opposition on securing a new Iranian nuclear deal. Appeasing the Iranian regime is detrimental to US interests in the Middle East and unlikely to secure rapprochement with a regime birthed in anti-Americanism. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei approved of the JCPOA and viewed the agreement as transactional. Furthermore, offering concessions to the Islamic Republic is unlikely to woo it away from Russia or China, both of whom share its goals of eroding US influence and advancing authoritarianism. On the other hand, rekindling ties with Iran's Kurdish opposition is a low-cost move that can reassert the US' commitment to democratic values while serving its national interests.

Sierwan Najmaldin Karim is the president of the Washington Kurdish Institute (WKI). The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.