Why isn’t Israel doing more to help the Kurds?

Over the last several years, the State of Israel has become the strongest supporter of Kurdish rights and independence – in a rhetorical sense if not a practical one. 

At the time of the Iraqi Kurdish referendum on independence in September 2017, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went on record as officially supporting an independent Kurdistan. He was the only national leader in the international community to do so. 

When Turkey invaded northern Syria in early October, the Israelis once again delivered the strongest rhetorical condemnation of the attack, warning “against the ethnic cleansing of the Kurds by Turkey”.

Among the Israeli public, there exists widespread support and sympathy for the Kurds. Israelis see Arab, Turkish, and Iranian refusals to allow for the emergence of even one Kurdish state as resembling the hostility towards the existence of just one single Jewish state in the region. 

While many Israelis do not sympathize with the Palestinian need for a state, reasoning there are already some 22 Arab states around the region, they agree with the Kurds’ desire for independence.

From a realpolitik point of view, it also makes perfect sense for Israel to support the Kurds – for autonomy, statehood, or anything else that improves the position of Kurds vis-à-vis Baghdad, Damascus, Ankara, and Tehran. None of these capitals are friendly towards Israel. Damascus and Tehran remain officially at war with Israel, while Baghdad increasingly looks like an Iranian client.

So why have Israeli sympathies and interests not translated into practical support for the Kurds? 

Until the rise of Erdogan and his party, most observers argued that Israel’s relations with Turkey prevented Israeli support for the Kurds. That argument now barely holds water, however, with Turkey hosting Hamas offices in Ankara and Istanbul and Erdogan regularly brandishing the most provocative invective against the Israelis.  

If Turkey supports Israel’s Hamas and Hezbollah enemies (amongst other jihadist groups), then surely the Israelis should feel no compunction about supporting Kurdish parties – including those fighting Turkey?

To some extent, the Israelis and their allied lobby groups in the United States and Europe have begun backing the Kurds – diplomatically if not in a more practical sense. 

Behind the scenes, they have been trying to convince the Americans and Europeans not to abandon the Kurds in Syria. They also argued forcefully for more Western support of Iraqi Kurds. What effect the Israeli diplomatic entreaties have had remains difficult to gauge. 

Many Kurds wonder if rhetorical and diplomatic support from Israel does more harm than good, given the penchant of Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian leaders to accuse Kurds of being Zionist stooges. Every time the Kurds get closer to independence, their enemies in the region decry the possible emergence of “a second Israel”. 

Practical Israeli support – in contrast to rhetoric – would help Kurds in Syria right now as they continue to be targeted by Turkish drones, air strikes, and armor. Military hardware – particularly anti-aircraft missiles, jammers to counter deadly enemy drones, anti-armor weaponry and the like would help a great deal.

If Israel was providing these items covertly, we would have some indications of such – via downed Turkish aircraft, disabled drones, and destroyed tanks, for instance. Instead, the Israelis only promised “humanitarian assistance for the valiant Kurds”. Why?  

To answer this question, one need only look at the last time Israel provided tangible military aid to the Kurds. 

During the 1960s and ‘70s, Israeli advisors worked with Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan in their fight against Baghdad. Whole platoons of Israelis were stationed with the Peshmerga in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan at the time. 

That assistance came to an end when the Shah of Iran signed the Treaty of Algiers with Saddam in 1975. Although the Israelis wished to continue assisting the Kurds, they could not do so once the Shah forbade them using Iranian territory to access Iraqi Kurdistan.

Kurdistan’s landlocked status remains a problem for the Kurds today. Israel and other non-neighboring powers cannot get aid to the Kurds without going through Turkey, Iran, Iraq, or Syria. 

Significant amounts of military aid would require regular flights and supply convoys. The Americans can do this because they have permission and access from Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government. 

Although the Israelis no longer care too much what Turkey thinks, the same does not hold true for Washington. Turkish sensitivities thus prevent the Americans from heavily arming or backing the Kurds in Syria (a similar logic based on American faith in Baghdad applies to the Iraqi Kurds).

Without American willingness, the Israelis simply cannot deliver their hardware to the Kurds. Where would their supply planes land in Syria without American acquiescence? Besides running the risk of angering the Americans, covert overland Israeli deliveries could not supply enough hardware to make a significant difference. 

Items that would really make a difference, such as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons, also remain very sensitive, as these can be used to shoot down civilian aircraft. If they fell into the wrong hands, the results could be devastating.

For good or for ill, Israeli aid to the Kurds is highly unlikely to amount to more than mere rhetoric and diplomacy.

David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.

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