Kurdistan is better off without Mullah Krekar
Krekar, the Kurdish radical cleric and founder of the al-Qaeda affiliated Ansar al-Islam in the village of Biara -- responsible for kidnappings, suicide bombing and terrorist acts in Kurdistan -- happened to have lived in my hometown of Halabja for some time, though he is not originally from the city.
Krekar, who is also on a UN terror list, was released from prison in Norway at the end of January, after a two-year sentence for threats against Prime Minister Erna Solberg, before she came to office, and three Kurds. Images published on his release – all smiles and no sorrow – appear to suggest that he took well to prison life, although he likened the Norwegian jail to a North Korean gulag.
During his time in my city I was a child, but old enough to remember an event where hundreds – if not thousands – of passionate people listened to one of his speeches. They were too many to fit in the city’s largest hall. The overflow seated itself in the playground and a park outside. Even the streets were filled with people. It was the same during his Friday congregations at a mosque in Sulaimani.
The situation is now certainly much different: the support for any Islamic group or political party is at its lowest level in the Kurdistan Region, especially since the Islamic State (ISIS) is surprising the public with the most barbaric acts against humanity every now and then. The beheading of a Peshmerga soldier, followed by a captive Jordanian pilot burned alive, were just two recent acts. This is not to say that people do not differentiate between the Islamist parties and ISIS. Yet, the public impact on the Islamist parties after such acts is undeniable.
Mullah Krekar’s personality is a complicated one. He is not just a regular Islamic preacher; he is an intellectual: besides knowledge of Islam, he has great knowledge of modern world history and of Kurdistan in particular. He knows the flows and faults, and how to best manipulate public dissatisfaction and grievances for the sake of radicalizing the youth. He is a poet, too. Unlike his little English – and I guess his Norwegian -- he is a master of the Kurdish language. That is to say he sounds convincing even to the educated, let alone ordinary people. His Islamist charisma makes him one of his kind.
The Norwegian government has for long shown interest in deporting him to his country of origin. But the existence of the death penalty and worries over torture in Iraq stopped Norwegian authorities from going forward with this plan. Instead, a court in Oslo ruled that Krekar be sent to a remote village for posing a threat to national security, at least up to the end of 2015.
Since reports of his release, and much before that, his return to Kurdistan has been a popular topic for the media and people in Kurdistan. Lack of the death penalty in the Region -- except for very rare cases -- and the credibility the Kurdish authorities have gained in the fight against ISIS, makes the possibility of Krekar’s return even more likely. As far as the Norwegians are concerned, the farther he is the better.
But for the Kurdistan Region, allowing him back would be a fatal mistake.
There are only two scenarios for his return: either he will be deported to Kurdistan and will be tried for terrorism charges for his involvement in founding Ansar al-Islam, or the charges will be dropped and he will walk a free man, as was the case with Dilshad Garmiani, a member of the Kurdistan Islamic Group who was wanted by the Americans.
The three main Kurdish Islamic parties -- namely the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, Kurdistan Islamic Group and Kurdistan Islamic Union -- to varying degrees support securing the cleric’s safe return. None of the Islamic political parties see him as radical or a threat to a free society, at least not publicly. The fact that these parties sometimes lobby for his return shows how much support he has among the Islamists' constituency.
Krekar is not seen by them in the same light as the leaders of ISIS or al-Qaeda, against whom there is almost a consensus by the Kurds that they don’t represent Islam. In fact, those leaders are seen as the enemies of Islam and Kurdistan.
But Krekar does have some support. For that reason, should the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) jail him upon his return, it will have to deal with a significant number of Krekar sympathizers, large enough to cause trouble. Even tens of followers would be a security concern. I personally estimate his supporters to be in the hundreds. It is equally dangerous for the KRG to offer him his full freedom: that would be like a green light to his ideology of threatening politicians and writers, as he did in Norway.
Krekar in both scenarios would remain a security concern for Kurdistan. He is nowhere close to the Islamic State, or its ideology, at least based on my knowledge of him. But keeping a close eye on him does no harm.
On January 25, the day he was released from jail, he said he would break his boycott of the Norwegian media. I believe that giving a platform to people like him there in Norway or here in Kurdistan is definitely a security concern for both nations: it is known that he considers himself a preacher, not a fighter. Therefore, he does his harm through delivering speeches and fatwas. Before his prison term, he also used to convey his messages through the Internet. He must be thrilled with the jihadists nowadays and their keen interest in social media.
The Kurds say they are fighting the Islamic State on behalf of the free world. On that note, the Kurds should ask the Norwegian authorities to do their part in this particular case: please keep him in Norway. We have had enough of him.
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.