Erdogan’s Migrant Weapon and Burden
After the death of more than 50 Turkish soldiers in clashes with the Assad regime in Syria, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey would no longer prevent migrants from moving on to Europe.
“What did we do yesterday? We opened the doors," Erdogan said, speaking to television cameras on Saturday.
Thousands of migrants promptly appeared at Greece’s land border with Turkey, demanding entry. Still more boarded overcrowded dinghies to attempt the sea crossing to nearby Greek islands. Television footage showed the Greek coastguard trying to push back the migrant boats, and one refugee child drowned on Sunday when the boat they were in capsized.
How did refugees threatened by the Assad regime in Idlib make it to the European Union’s borders so quickly? They did not, of course. The refugees who showed up on the border following Mr. Erdogan’s announcement had been in Turkey for some time. Many were not even Syrian, but rather Afghan, Iranian or from other areas in Asia.
Those showing up on the border did so for a chance at a better life in Europe or elsewhere. Jobs have become increasingly scarce in economically distressed Turkey. With some 3.6 million Syrian refugees in the country and more from elsewhere, the Turkish welcome mat for these migrants has also grown threadbare. Turkish public opinion has turned against the migrants, and the prospect of more streaming in from Idlib in the near future aggravates the situation further. Hundreds of thousands more might flee Idlib if the Assad regime retakes the entire province.
Erdogan and his government are right to demand more assistance from Europe and the rest of the international community to host the refugees in Turkey. Since 2016 Europe provided Turkey some 6.7 billion Euros to help with the refugees (and keep them from Europe’s borders), but Ankara claims to have spent some $40 billion on the migrants.
Erdogan and his government commit a grave sin by using the migrants as a weapon, however. During Turkey’s invasion of northeast Syria in October of 2019, Erdogan even threatened European states that if they dared to call the Turkish action an invasion, “'We will open our borders and send 3.6 million refugees your way.” At the time, Ankara claimed that the invasion of northeast Syria would create a “safe zone” to resettle Syrians in. The action only created more displacement from a previously stable and safe part of Syria, however, and next to no Syrian refugees in Turkey seemed to want to be resettled in a part of Syria they did not originate from.
This week Erdogan therefore saw fit to make good on the threat, or at least provide Europe a better taste of it, because of Turkey’s isolation while fighting Assad forces and Russian air power in Syria. The migrants thus became hapless tools for leaders in Ankara experiencing frustration in their plans to overthrow Assad or effectively annex Syrian territory.
It is hard not to sympathize with people who simply want to escape Syria (or Afghanistan or other places) and find a better life for themselves and their families. The photos of migrants on Greek beaches, having just barely survived the sea journey, remain heart wrenching.
Having already taken in a fair number of refugees from Syria during the past few years, at great political cost to ruling moderate governments, countries in Europe – especially Germany, Greece and Italy, all of whom have taken in a great many – simply do not want more. The Syrian refugees in particular share a lot more culturally with their Turkish hosts than they do with European societies, and taking in too many too quickly causes political backlashes and social problems. Reports this week in the Greek press even showed a church on the island of Lesbos vandalized by young male refugees. Some areas in Europe lack the ability to cope with so many new arrivals.
Things might also get worse before they improve. If Erdogan insists on reneging on his 2016 deal with Brussels over migrants, Europe likewise holds a lot of economic cards over Turkey. An end to financial assistance to Turkey and even sanctions could emerge from the European repertoire of responses, which would devastate Turkey’s fragile economy. If Turkey were to fall into an economic crisis, however, its ability and willingness to host refugees would decline still further – leading to a vicious circle of sorts wherein nobody, least of all the migrants, wins.
Before it comes to that, leaders from Ankara and Brussels need to return to the negotiating table and renew their 2016 arrangement. Erdogan should also consider that carrying out a threat expends the power and leverage one originally enjoyed in making it.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.