The invitation by factions of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) for Iraqi, Iranian, and Shiite forces to enter Kirkuk in October 2017 likewise reinforced the feeling that Kurdistan remains insufficiently inited to become an independent country. And with Kirkuk and other disputed territories with large Kurdish populations reclaimed by Baghdad in October 2017, the prospect of Kurdistan seceding from Iraq quickly receded. The leadership in Erbil as well as Sulaimani would not seek an independent state without Kurdish majority-areas such as Kirkuk (and its oil).
Since the difficult events of October 2017, the people and the leadership of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) have attempted to reconcile themselves with remaining a part of the country. They sought new ways to advance cooperation with Baghdad and to compromise on the various issues dividing policymakers in Baghdad and Erbil. With the election of Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi in late 2018, they seemed to have found a more accommodating partner. Movement on Erbil-Baghdad negotiations regarding the national budget, oil sharing, responsibilities for security forces, and even the disputed territories seems possible again.
In this vein, the University of Kurdistan – Hawler (UKH) held a conference this week with a theme of “The KRG’s Emerging Strategy for Stability in Iraq and the Region”. Newly appointed KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani opened the conference with a hopeful message about the new spirit of cooperation between Baghdad and Erbil. “The government in Baghdad has been receptive to our concerns. They have listened. And they have been open to making changes. And in these discussions we know that neither side will get everything they want; that is the nature of negotiation of course,” he said.
One of the alternatives to Kurdistan’s divorce from Iraq, therefore, obviously revolves around building a truly federal, democratic, and functioning Iraqi state. In such a state, the Kurdistan Region could retain a secure and productive place in much the same way as Quebec remains a part of Canada, Scotland a part of Britain, or the Basques areas a part of Spain. Reforms to make the Iraqi federation work would be akin to marriage counselling in this scenario, removing the impulse for or need to divorce.
One of the speakers at the UKH conference, however, spoke a good deal about the continuing lack of an Iraqi national identity. Professor Mehmet Gurses provided examples of how Kurds, Shiites, Sunnis, and others in Iraq still tend to prioritize other aspects of their identities ahead of their “Iraqiness”. This led a member of the audience to ask: “What does this mean for Erbil-Baghdad relations?”
His answer proved interesting. “There are more ways than one to end a relationship,” he replied. “Divorce might not always be an option. If the other party to the relationship dies, however, then you are left alone. While I am not advocating for the death of the other party, it does look like a definite possibility. All the Kurdistan Region has to do in such a scenario is build up its own governing capacities and power.”
In this scenario, for reasons having little to do with Kurds, Iraq as a state simply fails. As I write this column, protests again rock Baghdad. Several protestors have been killed and many more wounded. Mass protests against corruption, unemployment, and the lack of basic services have spread from Baghdad to other provinces, with security forces firing live ammunition, rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons to disperse the crowd, according to Rudaw’ reporters.
With most Iraqis assigning themselves other identities and the political leadership in Baghdad failing to provide even basic services to its people, the viability of the Iraqi state remains an open question. Although the political leadership in Erbil suffers many shortcomings of its own, a lack of basic services, high levels of unemployment, corruption as bad as that of Baghdad, and insecurity are not among them.
If leaders in Erbil can up their game just a bit, therefore, they might prove ready when independence comes to them.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
