Mosul is more complicated than just expelling ISIS
As we are getting closer to the Mosul operation there is a continued traffic of international, regional and local delegations to Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region. Erbil has become a hub for meetings and discussions on the future of Mosul. This is telling us that Erbil is a neutral and reliable actor in the saga of Mosul and its possible liberation. Although Mosul is an Iraqi city because of its biased position Baghdad does not seem to be the preferred choice of planning.
In a meeting hosted by the Erbil-based Middle East Research Institute (MERI) last month representatives of the US, UK, EU, UN, KRG and Mosul provincial council discussed and exchanged views on the final operation and what the future Mosul should be like. All participants agreed that such gatherings were crucial especially on the issue of the future administration of Mosul.
All members of the international coalition appear committed to this cause. To participate with advanced military technology, support for Iraqi and Kurdish forces and direct role in the planning and preparation. Aid agencies will tend to civilians and the UN is already bracing for waves of refugees.
A big part of all the discussions is the political, economic, security and social aspects of the Mosul affairs and concerns of the future rise of similar groups like the Islamic State (ISIS) from sleeper cells and supporters.
Since Mosul is one of Iraq’s Sunni cities they too have their own concerns. Who is going to take part in the final military operation against ISIS? Mosul MPs and members of the provincial council have already said time and again that they want the main role in liberating their city and that is to happen through the Sunni Hashd al-Watani militia force.
They reject any participation by the Shiite Hashd al-Shaabi.
Second, they want to know what kind and how much authority they will have in governing their province. This especially is a major concern since they lost their city to ISIS in the first place due to public grievances and terrible relations with Baghdad.
The Kurdistan government too has its own concerns. Peshmerga forces have already liberated vast swathes of land in Nineveh province near Mosul. They don’t consider some of it part of the Kurdish land and they want to be sure that forces that are going to be in control after ISIS will not create trouble for the Kurdistan Region.
Before falling to ISIS, Kurds were part of the Mosul administration and the Kurdish government wants—as a condition—that after the liberation the Kurds will regain their posts and have a say in affairs of the province. Erbil also wants guarantees that it will not be left alone to deal with large waves of refugees that are expected to flee when the Mosul offensive kicks off.
Third, the Kurds want to make sure that the future administration in Mosul will be a good and friendly neighbor due to its closeness to the Kurdistan Region.
Among the regional players Turkey seems the most interested in Mosul. The two have historical ties as the city was once part of the Ottoman Empire and it is home to a Turkmen community. Ankara has also been training the Sunni Hashd al-Watani since December by sending an army contingent to Bashiqa much to the dismay of Baghdad.
Iran, for its part, hasn’t enjoyed the kind of influence and presence in Mosul that it has in the rest of Iraq. But now Tehran is trying to achieve this through Baghdad and especially the participation of the Shiite militia in the coming battle. Obviously Turkey and Saudi Arabia are and will be against this.
Regional actors aside, it begs the question as to how ready or willing are the people of Mosul themselves to handle the security of their province and make sure it will not fall to another extremist group in the future. Will they be able to form a joint multiethnic force? Iraq may insist that the army will be in charge but there is a Sunni fear that the army has been infiltrated by and is under the command of Shiite militia leaders.
In light of these worries, the United States should consider very seriously the concerns of Mosul’s population, the KRG and its regional allies such as Turkey about the future of this province. Any arms and military support for Baghdad should come with tough and clear conditions from Washington that the Shiite militia will not take part in the battle for Mosul and that Baghdad will give the province the administrative authority it needs to manage this volatile province.
Ali Kurdistani is a Rudaw reporter based in Erbil.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.