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In most democratic systems, parliamentary immunity protects legislators from prosecution for a host of possible offences. Offences which parliamentarians cannot be prosecuted for include defamation, libel, “supporting terrorism” and a host of other possible transgressions. These do not generally include criminal acts committed as private citizens or crimes in which someone has been caught “red handed” with clear evidence.
Democracies need the system of parliamentary immunity in order to prevent politically-motivated harassment of and attacks upon serving legislators. Without such a system, ruling parties could go after pesky members of the opposition via judicial and police forces they usually control. For a good example of such, one need look no further than Iraq: starting with Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi (one day after American forces completed their withdrawal from Iraq), Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki went after a number of high-ranking Sunni Arab politicians via dubious charges of terrorism.
When Nuri al-Maliki declared open season on Sunni Arab representatives in the country, an already shaky political system completely broke down. No one can function or represent their constituents while under threat of prosecution via trumped up charges overseen by sycophantic judges and praetorian security forces. The end of parliamentary immunity usually comes as a clear symptom of the end of democratic politics and the rise of authoritarianism.
When Turkey’s three non-Kurdish parties (President Erdogan’s ruling AKP, the Ataturkist CHP and the far-Right MHP) voted on May 20 to remove parliamentary immunity from almost all of the pro-Kurdish HDP deputies, the alarm bells in Europe and the United States should have thus rung more loudly than ever. Instead the world heard “statements of concern” if they turned to back pages of various newspapers.
The HDP deputies will now face prosecution on thousands of charges that pliant Turkish prosecutors prepared, from insulting Erdogan to terrorism and “undermining the unity of the Turkish nation and state.” No serious observer of Turkish politics doubts Mr. Erdogan’s political motivation for this witch hunt – with HDP parliamentarians out of the way, he may be able to clear the path towards constitutional change and the Putin-style presidential system he appears obsessed with.
What surprised your humble columnist (at least a bit) was that the other opposition parties in Turkey – the CHP and MHP – went along with this. Although both also asked that AKP parliamentarians accused of corruption in the money-stuffed “shoe box scandal” have their immunities lifted as part of the package, the AKP of course refused. The CHP and MHP nonetheless voted for the lifting of immunities of only HDP parliamentarians, strengthening Mr. Erdogan’s drive towards a presidential system and a castrated parliament.
populations who see no place for their leaders in “their” political system tend to turn towards violence and actors operating outside the system.
Democracies need the system of parliamentary immunity in order to prevent politically-motivated harassment of and attacks upon serving legislators. Without such a system, ruling parties could go after pesky members of the opposition via judicial and police forces they usually control. For a good example of such, one need look no further than Iraq: starting with Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi (one day after American forces completed their withdrawal from Iraq), Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki went after a number of high-ranking Sunni Arab politicians via dubious charges of terrorism.
When Nuri al-Maliki declared open season on Sunni Arab representatives in the country, an already shaky political system completely broke down. No one can function or represent their constituents while under threat of prosecution via trumped up charges overseen by sycophantic judges and praetorian security forces. The end of parliamentary immunity usually comes as a clear symptom of the end of democratic politics and the rise of authoritarianism.
When Turkey’s three non-Kurdish parties (President Erdogan’s ruling AKP, the Ataturkist CHP and the far-Right MHP) voted on May 20 to remove parliamentary immunity from almost all of the pro-Kurdish HDP deputies, the alarm bells in Europe and the United States should have thus rung more loudly than ever. Instead the world heard “statements of concern” if they turned to back pages of various newspapers.
The HDP deputies will now face prosecution on thousands of charges that pliant Turkish prosecutors prepared, from insulting Erdogan to terrorism and “undermining the unity of the Turkish nation and state.” No serious observer of Turkish politics doubts Mr. Erdogan’s political motivation for this witch hunt – with HDP parliamentarians out of the way, he may be able to clear the path towards constitutional change and the Putin-style presidential system he appears obsessed with.
What surprised your humble columnist (at least a bit) was that the other opposition parties in Turkey – the CHP and MHP – went along with this. Although both also asked that AKP parliamentarians accused of corruption in the money-stuffed “shoe box scandal” have their immunities lifted as part of the package, the AKP of course refused. The CHP and MHP nonetheless voted for the lifting of immunities of only HDP parliamentarians, strengthening Mr. Erdogan’s drive towards a presidential system and a castrated parliament.
The demonization of Kurds and their representatives must run as deep as ever if neither the CHP’s Kemal Kilicdaroglu nor the MHP’s Devlet Bahceli felt they risk accusations of being “soft on terrorism.” In other words, Mr. Erdogan once again brilliantly pushed the opposition into a box, forcing them to support his latest stratagem. Their own lack of imagination and courage helped dig their own political graves along with that of the pro-Kurdish legislators who now face decades-long prison sentences.
Tragically, this sequence of events brings Turkey closer not only to authoritarianism, but also to more of the entrenched, brutal civil conflicts that presently bedevil Iraq and other states in the region. One need only remember that it was after Mr. Maliki pushed out the Sunni Arab parliamentarians that the Sunni population there began to see the likes of the Islamic State as a lesser evil. As a result, the oft-repeated and absurd claim of Turkish leaders that “ISIS and the PKK are the same” might turn out to be true in at least one sense:
populations who see no place for their leaders in “their” political system tend to turn towards violence and actors operating outside the system.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
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