Has the US Betrayed the Kurds Again?
Since the Turkish invasion of Afrin and the Iraqi government’s takeover of the disputed territories in October 2017, many of this columnist’s Kurdish friends speak of “America’s betrayal of the Kurds.”
Online memes and monologues ask why the Kurds have been betrayed after they “fought ISIS for America and the world.” They talk as if this is the latest betrayal akin to 1975, when Henry Kissinger encouraged Mullah Mustafa Barzani to rebel against Baghdad but then abruptly withdrew American aid when the Shah of Iran reconciled with Baghdad.
Even interpretations of the events of 1975 seem overdone. Neither the Americans nor the Israelis were in much of a position to continue providing military aid to Kurdish rebels in Iraq after the Shah of Iran forbade them from using Iranian territory to do so.
While there was genuine consternation in Israel about this, it remains debatable what Washington could have done to continue supporting the Kurds at the time – even had they wished to. Air drops of supplies have limited utility, and as occurred in Kobane in 2014, they also have a chance of landing in enemy hands.
Regarding more recent events, however, readers need to consider the following. In the case of the September 2017 referendum and subsequent events, the Americans did not hide their opposition to Erbil’s move towards secession. They clearly said they would not support it, just as they clearly said they opposed any unilateral attempts to settle the disputed territories issue.
Officials in Washington have also never failed to mention their support for Iraqi unity – almost every statement they ever make includes “We support a strong, unified, democratic and federal Iraq.”
When Iran’s General Soleimani unraveled a portion of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in October 2017, which precipitated the route that allowed Baghdad to regain Kirkuk and other disputed territories, it was therefore not surprising that Washington would not back the Kurds in fighting Baghdad. Even had they wished to, there was hardly time to help Erbil, so rapid was the retreat from these territories.
Of course Washington could have made stronger statements warning Baghdad against any military moves on the Kurds, as this columnist and other observers suggested at the time, but that would have very much looked like support for the Kurds’ aspirations for independence – which for whatever misguided reasons, Washington still opposes. Sticking to their declared policy thus hardly makes the Americans’ actions amount to “betrayal.”
The Americans, in fact, probably warned Baghdad in private not to continue military moves against the constitutionally recognized territories of the Kurdistan Region (meaning the territories it controlled in September 2005 when the Constitution was drawn up). This was the commitment Washington had always made to the Kurds, and it seems to have kept it so far.
As for the Islamic State (ISIS), the Kurds in Iraq and Syria hardly fought these jihadists “for America and the world.” They fought them for themselves. When ISIS first took Mosul and other Arab cities from Baghdad in June 2014, in fact, authorities in Erbil showed little interest in helping Baghdad fight ISIS. Only when they themselves faced an ISIS onslaught in August 2014 did the Iraqi Kurds join this war.
This was no case of heroic altruism therefore (although much Kurdish heroism did occur in the war). The Kurds fought ISIS for their own reasons, which coincided with the interests of America and much of the world.
The situation was similar in Syria. After finding themselves targeted by various jihadist groups and especially ISIS since 2011, Kurds in Syria had every interest in destroying these groups. For once, this provided a welcome confluence of key interests with the United States, which responded by supplying the fighters of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) – first in Kobane, and then in general.
This too was no altruistic war by the Syrian Kurds. While America and the world should be thankful to them for defeating ISIS, let us at least be clear that no one volunteered to fight anyone else’s war here.
Finally, let us look at Afrin and the Turkish invasion there. Afrin was never in the American orbit of operations, unlike Kobane and Jazira. Rather, the Russians controlled the air space over Afrin and had troops present on the ground there. What was the US therefore supposed to do when Turkey got the green light from Moscow to invade the area? Fight Russian and Turkish planes in the sky above Afrin, an area Washington had never promised to protect? No, the betrayal in Afrin, if any, came from the Russians.
All of which takes us to this week’s announcement from President Trump that “the United States will be leaving Syria very soon.” This comment came shortly after Mr. Trump’s phone call with Turkish President Erdogan.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
Online memes and monologues ask why the Kurds have been betrayed after they “fought ISIS for America and the world.” They talk as if this is the latest betrayal akin to 1975, when Henry Kissinger encouraged Mullah Mustafa Barzani to rebel against Baghdad but then abruptly withdrew American aid when the Shah of Iran reconciled with Baghdad.
Even interpretations of the events of 1975 seem overdone. Neither the Americans nor the Israelis were in much of a position to continue providing military aid to Kurdish rebels in Iraq after the Shah of Iran forbade them from using Iranian territory to do so.
While there was genuine consternation in Israel about this, it remains debatable what Washington could have done to continue supporting the Kurds at the time – even had they wished to. Air drops of supplies have limited utility, and as occurred in Kobane in 2014, they also have a chance of landing in enemy hands.
Regarding more recent events, however, readers need to consider the following. In the case of the September 2017 referendum and subsequent events, the Americans did not hide their opposition to Erbil’s move towards secession. They clearly said they would not support it, just as they clearly said they opposed any unilateral attempts to settle the disputed territories issue.
Officials in Washington have also never failed to mention their support for Iraqi unity – almost every statement they ever make includes “We support a strong, unified, democratic and federal Iraq.”
When Iran’s General Soleimani unraveled a portion of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in October 2017, which precipitated the route that allowed Baghdad to regain Kirkuk and other disputed territories, it was therefore not surprising that Washington would not back the Kurds in fighting Baghdad. Even had they wished to, there was hardly time to help Erbil, so rapid was the retreat from these territories.
Of course Washington could have made stronger statements warning Baghdad against any military moves on the Kurds, as this columnist and other observers suggested at the time, but that would have very much looked like support for the Kurds’ aspirations for independence – which for whatever misguided reasons, Washington still opposes. Sticking to their declared policy thus hardly makes the Americans’ actions amount to “betrayal.”
The Americans, in fact, probably warned Baghdad in private not to continue military moves against the constitutionally recognized territories of the Kurdistan Region (meaning the territories it controlled in September 2005 when the Constitution was drawn up). This was the commitment Washington had always made to the Kurds, and it seems to have kept it so far.
As for the Islamic State (ISIS), the Kurds in Iraq and Syria hardly fought these jihadists “for America and the world.” They fought them for themselves. When ISIS first took Mosul and other Arab cities from Baghdad in June 2014, in fact, authorities in Erbil showed little interest in helping Baghdad fight ISIS. Only when they themselves faced an ISIS onslaught in August 2014 did the Iraqi Kurds join this war.
This was no case of heroic altruism therefore (although much Kurdish heroism did occur in the war). The Kurds fought ISIS for their own reasons, which coincided with the interests of America and much of the world.
The situation was similar in Syria. After finding themselves targeted by various jihadist groups and especially ISIS since 2011, Kurds in Syria had every interest in destroying these groups. For once, this provided a welcome confluence of key interests with the United States, which responded by supplying the fighters of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) – first in Kobane, and then in general.
This too was no altruistic war by the Syrian Kurds. While America and the world should be thankful to them for defeating ISIS, let us at least be clear that no one volunteered to fight anyone else’s war here.
Finally, let us look at Afrin and the Turkish invasion there. Afrin was never in the American orbit of operations, unlike Kobane and Jazira. Rather, the Russians controlled the air space over Afrin and had troops present on the ground there. What was the US therefore supposed to do when Turkey got the green light from Moscow to invade the area? Fight Russian and Turkish planes in the sky above Afrin, an area Washington had never promised to protect? No, the betrayal in Afrin, if any, came from the Russians.
All of which takes us to this week’s announcement from President Trump that “the United States will be leaving Syria very soon.” This comment came shortly after Mr. Trump’s phone call with Turkish President Erdogan.
This possibility, in contrast to the events discussed above, would amount to a crass betrayal of Kurds in Syria. The US has made commitments to the brave fighters in Kobane and Jazira, commitments Washington would be very ill-advised to throw out of the window – especially for the sake of the Islamists in Ankara or the dictator in Moscow.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.