On Friday, July 12, the first parts of Turkey’s new Russian-built air defense system arrived at Murted airbase, northwest of Ankara. The US has repeatedly warned Turkey that it would be expelled from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program if it did not cancel the S-400 delivery by July 31.
Although Turkey is now taking delivery of the S-400, it is unlikely to actually activate the system for at least another few months, giving Ankara considerable time before threatened US sanctions are actually imposed on it.
Turkey could well face sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), a US federal law that imposes sanctions on any country that buys Russian military hardware.
Turkey is also set to lose its opportunity to field a large fleet of the fifth-generation F-35s – which it purchased to replace its fleet of F-16s – as well as a lucrative role in manufacturing 800 of the aircraft’s parts for operators around the world.
The US opposes Turkey fielding the S-400 alongside the F-35, fearing the latter’s capabilities could be compromised if they are operated together. Washington says it is unacceptable for a NATO partner to operate such a sophisticated Russian system.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has dismissed the possibility of sanctions and Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 program on numerous occasions. He appears to be hedging his bets on US President Donald Trump’s apparent sympathy with Ankara’s position. In their last meeting, for example, Trump criticized the Obama administration for allegedly refusing to sell Turkey American Patriot air defense missiles, but did not rule out the possibility of sanctions over the S-400 delivery.
The first S-400 delivery directly coincided with a new Turkish military build-up along the Syrian border. Ankara is once again positioning itself for a potential operation against the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in the Syrian Kurdish heartland.
The US military is closely monitoring the situation along the border. The primary fear among US defense officials is that the US military contingent in Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) will be “caught up in a potential cross border Turkish military operation targeting Kurds in the coming days”.
There are approximately 2,000 US troops in Rojava along with much smaller numbers of British and French special forces, who have helped the YPG and the larger Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) battle the Islamic State (ISIS).
Trump announced a complete withdrawal of US troops from Rojava last December, but then settled for maintaining a much smaller residual force. The US has since sought to convince allies to send troops as it draws down its own. Germany recently turned down a request to do so while Britain and France only agreed to a “marginal” 10-15 percent increase in the number of their forces.
In January, Trump threatened to “devastate Turkey economically” if it attacked the Kurds following a US withdrawal. He also spoke of establishing a 32 kilometre deep ‘safe zone’ all along the border to prevent war from breaking out.
Over six months later there has been no headway in establishing any such zone.
Most of Rojava’s major Kurdish-majority cities, including the capital Qamishli and the iconic city of Kobane, sit directly over the Turkish border.
If Turkey does launch a major operation east of the Euphrates in the near future it will most likely begin by seizing territory in the Arab-majority Gire Spi (Tal Abyad) region that sits between Rojava's main cantons, Kobane and Jazira.
This would likely be Turkey’s first step toward separating those two cantons before then invading them.
According to Turkey’s pro-government Daily Sabah newspaper, Turkey has so far deployed more than “50 tanks and artillery batteries” just over the border from Gire Spi, which suggests it might well launch an incursion into that area.
An attack on Rojava shortly after taking delivery of the S-400 would mean Turkey will have flagrantly violated two established US redlines.
Erdogan’s aim might simply amount to creating new facts on the ground in Rojava before the US begins imposing sanctions on Ankara over the S-400 delivery. Then, confident that he has Trump’s ear, he would launch a diplomatic effort to salvage US-Turkish relations after attaining these two key objectives.
This is unlikely to work given the widespread opposition in the US government to Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 and any Turkish attack on America’s Syrian Kurdish allies. However, Trump’s recent bypassing of Congress to sell more arms to the Gulf states and Jordan suggests Turkey might be able to avoid any serious reprimand from Washington for its actions for the time being.
