Despite Turkey’s launching of a major military operation against Syrian regime forces in Idlib, experts are doubtful that a large-scale war between Ankara and Damascus is likely.
Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar announced on March 1 that Turkey had launched its ‘Operation Spring Shield’ in response to a Syrian airstrike that killed at least 34 Turkish soldiers in Idlib on February 27.
The announcement coincided with Turkey shooting down two Syrian Air Force Su-24 Fencer bombers over Idlib, shortly after Syria shot down a Turkish drone over the province. Footage released by the Turkish Ministry of Defense also show Turkey’s military destroying several regime targets in recent days.
Russia is providing military support for the Syrian regime offensive, leading some to fear that Ankara and Moscow could clash in Idlib. However, Nicholas Heras, the Middle East Portfolio Manager at The Institute for the Study of War, told Rudaw English: “It is in neither Russia nor Turkey’s interest for a major conflict to break out between the Turkish military and Assad’s forces.”
On March 2, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced he will visit Moscow to discuss the Idlib situation and expressed hopes that his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin “will take the necessary measures there, such as a ceasefire, and that we will find a solution to this affair”.
According to Heras, “Erdogan is seeking to use the Turkish military to push Assad’s forces back to the September 2018 Sochi lines.”
These lines were put in place after the Turkish army established 12 observation posts around Idlib under the Russian-sponsored Astana peace process. These were supposed to prevent conflict from breaking out between the Syrian regime and the militants, namely the jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, which controls the province.
However, Turkey failed to rein in the HTS as it was obligated to do under its September 2018 Sochi ceasefire agreement with Russia.
Max Hoffman, associate director of national security and international policy at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, where his research focuses on Turkey and the Kurdish regions, also anticipates Turkey will halt its offensive “if and when it reaches what it considers to be the agreed-upon line – where its observation posts per the Sochi agreement were located.”
“After all, Turkey was willing to accept everything up to the latest stage of the regime and Russian offensive,” Hoffman told Rudaw English.
“But Ankara could not accept the final collapse of Idlib and the ensuing human displacement into Turkey, as the refugee issue was already a near-existential domestic political threat to Erdogan,” he added.
For years, Turkey has feared a major regime offensive in Idlib would displace millions and add to its enormous Syrian refugee population. Since the present regime offensive began in December, it has displaced at least 900,000 people, according to the United Nations.
“Erdogan is seeking to reset diplomacy with Russia in the context of the Astana process by reversing Russian-backed Assad regime military gains on the ground in Idlib,” Heras said.
Turkey – which has the second-largest army in the NATO alliance backed by hundreds of tanks, fighter jets, drones, attack helicopters, and modern artillery – is capable of afflicting severe damage on Assad’s far inferior forces, most of which are equipped with antiquated Soviet-era military hardware.
“The Turkish military has a qualitative advantage over Assad’s forces in airpower, especially the use of advanced armed drones, that when combined with Turkish military advice and assistance to Syrian rebels, is a major military challenge for Assad,” Heras said, referring to Turkey’s tens-of-thousands of Syrian militia proxies that fight under the banner of the self-styled Syrian National Army (SNA).
“Erdogan is carefully and skillfully managing the escalation chain in Idlib to use military momentum to build more leverage on Putin in the Astana process,” he said.
Moscow may not move to hinder Operation Spring Shield – although it has closed Syria’s northwestern airspace – provided Turkey’s objectives are limited to reversing recent Syrian advances.
“If Russia stands aside – as appears to be the case thus far – the Turkish military is more than capable of handling the Syrian regime forces,” Hoffman said.
However, he doubts that the present clashes will lead to “a major sustained conventional war” between Ankara and Damascus “beyond the hundreds of strikes and casualties we’ve already seen”.
This is because “neither side has the interest in a formal, drawn out conventional war, and the regime does not have the resources to sustain such a fight”.
“Ongoing clashes, hit-and-run attacks, and regime-sponsored bombings and assassinations in Turkish-controlled territories are possible,” Hoffman said, referring to other parts of Syria Turkey invaded and occupied since August 2016, including the Kurdish enclave of Afrin which neighbours Idlib.
“But Russia will seek to calm things down eventually, and Ankara’s primary goal is to reduce violence and the accompanying displacement, so it has no interest in a long conflict,” he concluded.
Iran, the staunchest supporter of the Syrian regime and the third member of the tripartite Astana peace process, might also exert its influence in Syria to prevent this conflict from escalating any further.
Turkish strikes in Idlib have already killed at least nine fighters belonging to the Iran-backed Hezbollah group and wounded 30.
Hassan Danaefer, a foreign policy analyst and former Iranian ambassador to Iraq, told Iranian media all efforts should be made to prevent the conflict from escalating, insisting that this is the “wise policy that we all need to follow”.
He said Iran seeks to prevent further conflicts from breaking out in the region and is capable of acting as “a benevolent mediator” in Idlib.
Since a full-fledged war between Ankara and Damascus would likely severely weaken the latter, Iran may well also push for de-escalation in Idlib in the coming days before the situation spirals out of control.
