ERBIL, Kurdistan Region—Since the collapse of the Iraqi army and the takeover of Mosul and much of Iraq’s Sunni heartland by the Islamic State (ISIS) two years ago, one question has been asked frequently and it is when and if this army is ready to expel the extremist group from Iraq’s second largest city.
“For a year now the Iraqi army has been restructuring itself, changed commanders and appointed professional military personnel and officers,” says Ahmed Shawqi, an Iraqi Military Analyst. “They are more equipped now. From all aspects the army has been improved.”
Despite the improvements, believes Shawqi, the army’s capacity still remains limited.
“For the Mosul operation the Iraqi army needs to depend on Peshmerga participation, and there should be coordination with them until liberating the center of the city,” he told Rudaw English. “Plus they should collaborate with the Peshmerga on intelligence, logistics and other issues.”
A Washington-based Iraq expert believes that if ISIS is going to fight back during the Mosul operation, then Iraqi forces are not ready.
“The Iraqi security forces are not ready to conduct the Mosul operation should ISIS stay and fight,” Ramzi Mardini, Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council‘s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East told Rudaw English. “While ISIS will eventually be ousted from their territorial base in Mosul, Iraq’s armed forces are unlikely to be capable as to prevent such threats in the future.”
The new Iraqi army—created after the old army was disbanded in 2003—has often been criticized for lack of motivation and organization despite their US-supplied advanced weaponry.
“Iraq’s security institutions are weak and lack cohesion,” Mardini argued. “Problems with effective policing and counterterrorism, along with intelligence, communications and logistics will remain for the foreseeable future.”
The army and Iraqi government suffered a great humiliation in the summer of 2014 when a group of ISIS militants overran the city of Mosul and seized the arsenal of two army divisions in less than 24 hours.
This lack of faith in the army was even a reason for the rise of Shiite militia groups such the Hashd al-Shaabi, thinks Shakhawan Abdullah, head of Iraq’s parliamentary defense and security committee.
“In the past we have seen the experience and capacity of the Iraqi army, despite all the support they had they could not protect the country,” Abdullah told Rudaw. “If they could do so, the Shiite militia Hashd Al-Shaabi would not have emerged.”
Mardini believes that the Iraqi army is a victim of ‘toxic’ politics and the fact that militia and tribal groups are playing the role of an army.
“The main challenge is Iraq’s toxic politics,” he says. “Iraq’s security sector needs to undergo large-scale integration. Its forces, including irregular militias, are many and lack direct lines of command within the state’s security infrastructure. If the political situation enters an era of intra-Shiite power struggle, fragmentation among these armed forces will continue and undermine efforts at rebuilding state institutions.”
The question of state-control and loyalty is another issue, he explained.
“A cohesive military that is loyal to the state and expresses a national Iraqi identity is the goal,” he said. “Unfortunately, this will be very difficult to achieve, even more so now than in 2003.”
Ehsan Qaisun, an Iraqi military analyst argues that it is not easy to give the army a clear identity until perhaps after the war.
“The Iraqi army is at the stage of reconstructing itself, after the war on ISIS the identity of the Iraqi army will be unveiled,” Qaisun said. “Now the army is at war and it is hard to tell its identity, but after ISIS it will be clear whether it’s a national or sectarian army.”
Shawqi believes likewise that militia groups have almost got as much military power as the army, if not more.
“There are Shiite militias that have got light and heavy weapons,” he said. “These weapons should be taken from them and only Iraqi government departments such as defense and interior ministries should have access to these weapons, otherwise if the weapons stay in their hands this may lead to internal war and disaster.”
The Sunni and Shiite forces and political leadership would be able to contribute to building a strong professional army, which might not be possible any time soon due to deep sectarian tensions and mistrust, says Col. Peter Mansoor General Raymond E. Mason, Jr. Chair of Military History at the Ohio University and a CNN military analyst.
“The key to any effective military force is good leadership, morale, discipline, and esprit-de-corps,” Col. Mansoor told Rudaw English. “These elements are severely hindered in a force fractured by ethnic and sectarian divisions. To succeed in the long run the Iraqi Army needs both Shi'a and Sunni members to work together, and that is very difficult to achieve in the current political environment in Iraq.”
During their presence in Iraq and after their withdrawal at the end of 2011, the US army continued to train and equip their Iraqi counterparts to the cost of $25 billion, which Col. Mansoor who served in Iraq as executive officer for General David Petraues during the 2007-08 surge believes would give the Iraqi army great advantage over their ISIS enemies.
“Without a doubt, support from the United States will be crucial to sustaining the Iraqi Army's ability to fight,” he said. “Many of the weapons employed by the Iraqi Army are made in the United States and require a long-term effort to keep them functioning properly. U.S. trainers are important aspects of sustaining the Iraqi Army's fighting abilities. Of course, U.S. airpower has also been a key factor in giving the Iraqi Army a decided advantage over its foes from the Islamic State.”
Mardini agrees that the US support may boost the morale of Iraqi forces, but only temporarily, and that it may lead to long-term dependency as they currently show in their heavy reliance on coalition air strikes to make any progress against ISIS.
“The U.S. military’s support is crucial for morale, but it also can lead to miscalculation and over-confidence and therefore lead to poor decisions by political leaders,” he said.
