Analysis
Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr gives a news conference in the central holy shrine city of Najaf, on November 18, 2021. Photo: Ali Najafi / AFP
The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced the final election results of Iraq’s October 10 election on November 30, with only five seats changed from the initial results announced on October 12.
In response, the leader of the Sadrist movement Muqtada al-Sadr welcomed the announcement through a tweet saying: "Thank you to the Election Commission." At the same time, the Coordination Framework rejected the amended results in a press statement saying, "We renew our firm position based on evidence and documents that there is a major tampering of the election results, which prompts us to reject the current results."
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Although there are apparent differences about the elections and their results, most political parties know that the election results stand, which necessitates them to sit at the dialogue table to form their political alliances and form the next government.
The announcement of the final results is the starting point for the expected political marathon. We will see intense movement and shuttle meetings among political parties and political leaders to crystallize ideas and bolster their power to form strong alliances and move to become the largest bloc.
Sadrists and the Framework: opposing stance
The leader of the Sadrist movement announced in a press conference held on November 18, 2021, that he wanted to form a majority government or "become opposition." He also addressed the political parties by saying, "Your loss cannot be a prelude to the ruin and end of the democratic process," calling on the leaders "to review themselves to restore the people's trust in them."
Al-Sadr's speech comes weeks after the political blocs gathered within the Coordination Framework escalating their opposition to the election results, led by the Al-Fatih Alliance, as well as the Forces of the National State. These blocs consider the elections to have been marred by fraud. They have repeatedly pushed home this message, and confirmed that they will be "continuing the lawsuit filed before the Federal Court to cancel the elections."
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The Sadrist movement leader also leads the political movement. The negotiating team was banned from holding political meetings or meeting with any political party, so the activity of the political commission was limited to some diplomatic meetings, waiting until the green light arrived.
While the meetings of the Coordination Framework continue periodically, stressing its rejection of the elections without making an actual movement or trying to make changes to the existing situation, the Coordination Framework is not a political entity. It does not seem that they are determined to turn it into a formal political alliance to attract other blocs. The political parties affiliated with the Framework do not agree on all matters related to the elections.
Federal Court and the Framework
A well-informed source confirmed that the Coordination Framework demanded the judiciary to issue a court injunction to stop all electoral processes, including the announcement of the final results until the case was submitted to the Federal Court regarding the unconstitutionality of the elections.
However, IHEC's announcement of the final results yesterday means that they failed in getting the court injunction. It is worth mentioning that several parties filed various lawsuits about the unconstitutionality of the republican decree to hold the elections, as well as the unconstitutionality of the decision to dissolve the Parliament, in addition to the claims that the election was marred with fraud.
It should be noted here that there is no time limit obligating the Federal Court to decide on these cases, and the court may delay issuing a ruling on them for several months.
Away from winning and losing, the parties opposing the election results may not gain much from the courts' movement. At the same time, observers see it as a temporary tactic, and one in vain, because canceling the elections will harm these parties more than others in the sense that canceling the elections means going towards the unknown.
An informed source revealed that some legal experts advised the Coordination Framework with a legal opinion that canceling the elections would mean the return of the former Parliament. However, this opinion lacks a legal and constitutional basis because the previous Parliament was dissolved. In addition, holding new elections with the same electoral system and the same IHEC will not change the reality of the elections.
There are no indications that Iraqi voters will go to the polls again so that the results will be rejected by the losing forces again. More importantly, the international community will not risk supporting the elections again and will not participate by sending international observers, especially as the international community labeled the current elections as fair.
Indeed, the international community warned Iraqis explicitly. In a briefing made by Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, the special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Security Council on November 23: "any unlawful attempts to prolong or discredit the electoral results process, or worse: to alter the electoral results through (for instance) intimidation and pressure, can only backfire. And I call on all stakeholders not to go down that path."
Political movement to break the deadlock
The Iraqi political scene is becoming more complicated amid the opposition parties' adherence to the elections' rejection of the results and the winning parties' insistence to complete the electoral process without a genuine dialogue to bridge the rift. A shift is required to open the dialogue between the different parties.
The pace of the political movement will intensify in the coming days after the Federal Court ratifies the final election results next week. Both sides will push to attract the small winning parties and, more significantly, the independents. At the same time, the independents will work to form medium-sized blocs to become a political force to be reckoned with, and some of the winning representatives may remain on the hill to monitor where the wind blows before deciding to enter this or that bloc.
The Sunni arena will also witness a remarkable movement towards attracting winners from small blocs and independents. The Taqadum Alliance needs to include more independents. At the same time, an Azm Alliance gathers opponents of Taqadum and works to sign up the largest number of seats to become a significant force that can represent the Sunnis. This race may mean the emergence of two Sunni blocs that claim to be representatives of Sunnis and are likely to be divided between the two main Shia blocs.
The two Kurdish blocs are likely to agree on going to Baghdad as a united bloc with specific demands. The two blocs know very well that their division in 2018 played a vital role in weakening Kurdish influence in Baghdad, and it is not reasonable to repeat it.
In terms of finding solutions, the three presidencies have worked on a political initiative to bring together the various parties to begin a dialogue between them to reach satisfactory solutions. Yet, the initiative of the presidencies was not officially launched and remained in the drawer.
Muqtada al-Sadr, for his part, in a surprising step, has invited the leaders of the Coordination Framework, without exempting anyone, to a meal in Najaf at the house of his father, Sayyid Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr.
This invitation has many critical symbolic properties, such as the decision to reach a solution being pure Iraqi will, and one taken by Iraqis. The agreement stems from Najaf, instead of regional or international capitals, and most importantly, al-Sadr wants to show that the house of Sadr is what unifies them. The Coordination Framework welcomed the initiative but has not agreed to it; instead, they requested al-Sadr to send representatives of al-Sadr to attend a meeting of the Framework.
A prominent politician said that he believes it would have been better for the Framework to accept the invitation and make Najaf a starting point for finding solutions. Since al-Sadr is in his father's house, he would be more flexible than anywhere else. It would have been possible to work with the principle of "Show an Arab respect and take his cloak."
Suppose the political forces accept the call to meet in Najaf. In that case, this will be the essential starting point towards a natural convergence of views and a political breakthrough that may lead to the selection of presidencies and the distribution of the cabinet. Still, if they fail to reach an agreement, the political blockage will continue. Months will go by wasted on useless arguments.
Time is of the essence. As we await dialogue, the country looks set to enter into 2022 without a budget, amid a new pandemic wave due to the new mutation, and a recent drop in oil prices in excess of 20%.
Farhad Alaaldin is the chairman of the Iraqi Advisory Council. He was the political adviser to former Iraqi President Fuad Masum, the former chief of staff to the KRG prime minister from 2009 to 2011, and former senior adviser to the KRG prime minister from 2011 to 2012.
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