Iran
Photo: Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri (centre) met with Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan (left) and Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen al-Marar (right) in Abu Dhabi on November 26, 2021. Photo: handout/UAE news agency (WAM)/AFP
The long-awaited resumption of the Vienna negotiations to revive the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) is taking place. In the spring of this year, success seemed a forgone conclusion. Yet now, even though the talks are resuming, many people are much less certain that things will go quickly and smoothly. The main, if not only, reason for this change is the new government in Iran, including Tehran’s point man for the talks.
Ali Bagheri Kani has replaced Abbas Araghchi as Iran’s deputy foreign minister and lead nuclear negotiator. He has been a major critic of the nuclear deal. Many observers in Iran note that he even refrains from mentioning the name "Barjam," the Persian equivalent for JCPOA, and insists on calling the talks “sanction removal.”
The 54-year-old Bagheri is as much an establishment insider as you can get. His alma mater, Imam Sadegh University, where he was also a professor, is known for producing conservative Islamic Republic officials. That reputation has grown under Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi's administration as he brings in a new generation of officials, mostly from that university.
Bagheri comes from a conservative family. He's the son of Mohammad Bagher Bagheri Kani, a member of the Assembly of Experts. His uncle, the late Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani, a former prime minister, was the president of Imam Sadegh University for decades and is credited with making the institution what it is today. His brother, Mesbaholhoda Bagheri Kani, is married to the Supreme Leader's daughter, Hoda Khamenei.
At the young age of 22, Bagheri was a foreign affairs deputy at Iran's Supreme National Security Council. He was one of many young officials who took various government and military positions after the Islamic Revolution. He spent some time as a political deputy at the state media outlet IRIB and then at 27 he joined the foreign ministry, where he became a right-hand man to Saeed Jalili, who he followed back to Supreme National Security Council when Jalili became head of that body. Before being named to his current post, Bagheri was foreign affairs deputy and human rights committee director in the judiciary where Raisi was the head. And now he has followed Raisi into the government, though his main ally is still considered to be Jalili.
The nuances of political stripe in Iran are often lost on the West, which paints officials in Tehran with the same brush, considering all of them, especially the conservatives, to be at the same high level of connection and loyalty with the power centers of the Islamic Republic and the same belief in the system. But in Bagheri’s case, the stereotype is not far from the truth, which is why his name has been mentioned as a possible foreign minister or deputy foreign minister for every possible conservative administration in every election.
Although this change of pace between former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's administration and Raisi's seems obvious to Iranian watchers, many in the West, especially the US, don't appear to grasp the significance. At the beginning of US President Joe Biden’s term, officials in his administration didn't buy that a change of government in Iran would have much effect at the negotiating table.
"Washington has long tended to see Iran’s political structure as a monolith and that the Supreme Leader is the decision-maker regardless of who is elected president," said Negar Mortazavi, an Iranian-American political reporter and analyst based in Washington D.C. When Biden assumed the presidency, many believed he should hurry to put the JCPOA issue to bed while time was still left in Rouhani's term, but the attitude Mortazavi described was a factor behind the proverbial dragging of feet.
"The Biden administration missed the window of opportunity during the first six months of his administration when Iranian moderates were in charge," she explained. "Now that hardliners consolidated power, the revival of the JCPOA or any nuclear deal with Tehran will be more complex and difficult for Biden."
And Bagheri is going to be the person with the JCPOA file, in charge of reviving something he has long criticized.
Bagheri isn’t used to being in the spotlight, but as former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and his team were signing the deal and then keeping it alive, he has popped up in media interviews, claiming that Iran lost much more than it gained in the JCPOA.
In May 2020, in an interview with IRIB, he claimed Iran never was under the threat of Chapter 7 of the UN Security Council Charter, which deals with acts of aggression, denying what was one of the main concerns for Iran in the lead up to negotiations. In July 2019, in the midst of the aftermath of the US leaving the deal, Bagheri told state-owned Ofogh TV that the JCPOA is like "a sick child" and, in criticism of the Rouhani administration's reaction to the US withdrawal, he made a revealing point: "This administration won't leave the deal."
In September 2018, in an interview with Didarnews, Bagheri said he didn't believe the deal was the decision of the Supreme Leader, casting shade on a key argument of proponents of the accord. "[The Supreme Leader said] there shouldn't be a single retreat on the rights of Iranians, especially the nuclear rights," he said, "yet a hundred of the rights of Iranians have been violated." He didn’t mean a hundred as a symbolic number: "24 have been violated indefinitely, eight for 15 to 20 years, and 20 for 10 years." In November of 2016, speaking at Khaje Nasir University in Qazvin, he criticized those who "insist negotiating with America is the solution to the country’s problems and are simple-mindedly optimistic of the negotiations bearing any results." After the deal was agreed in 2015 and when the results were discussed in the Majlis, Iran's parliament, he was one of the critics who attended to argue against the deal.
But these - and many other - criticisms aren't the only reason Iran's commentators consider Bagheri an opponent of the JCPOA. For many, his main political alliance was enough of a clue. He's a close ally of Saeed Jalili, the man who was in charge of the negotiations before the Rouhani administration. Bagheri was a member of Jalili's negotiating team. Jalili has been an ardent critic of the deal his successors reached. In the run-up to the 2021 presidential election, when most conservatives including Raisi himself, looking forward to taking charge, toned down their criticism of JCPOA and were talking about following up on it in case of a win, Jalili was the sole voice still keeping up the criticisms.
Ahmad Dastmalchian is a former Iranian ambassador to Lebanon and Jordan who has known Bagheri as a close friend for years. He said Bagheri was very important to Jalili’s team, calling him “Jalili's mind outside of his own” during negotiations. "He had a very active and effective and determining role in those negotiations. Most of the ideas of that team came from him,” he said.
What sort of effect can Bagheri's new position as Iran’s point man in the revival talks have on the negotiations? Ghasem Moheb Ali, former director for the Middle East and North Africa in the foreign ministry during the reformist administration of Mohammad Khatami, is a proponent of the 2015 deal. He said the JCPOA is a matter of national interest and it's the agenda that directs decisions, not personal preferences. Yet "the lack of motivation [on Bagheri's part] might affect things," he said. "This lack of motivation might cause a delay in getting results."
Dastmalchian is more optimistic: "Naturally national interests are a higher priority" than people and their positions, he said, adding even though Bagheri may have valid criticism of the deal, reviving it is the now the official policy. The parliament, government, Supreme Leader, and experts were all involved with the initial process of ratifying the deal. "The criticisms are in the content and details of the deal," he added, "but the fact that [Bagheri] has his criticisms doesn't mean he won't go ahead and act in the new situation."
But, Dastmalchian, warned, the “JCPOA isn't a constant principle” of Iranian policy and Tehran could let it go. “If the West comes to the table with logical positions, the negotiations will lead to a result. If they don't, it'll go nowhere and it's going to be on them,” he said.
One tactic Bagheri could take is to buy for time. “This is another concern - that the goal of their approach isn't to revive JCPOA but to buy time to move other things forward,” said Moheb Ali.
Washington’s envoy to the talks, Robert Malley, has said that if Tehran’s goal is to stall talks while it steps up its nuclear advances, then the US will not “sit idly by.”
Dastmalchian dismissed this concern. "We don't need time for anything. If we wanted to do something, we would just say we would do it,” noting that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has declared nuclear weapons “haram,” religiously forbidden. “If it wasn't haram, if we didn't have a religious problem with it ourselves, we wouldn't be afraid of anyone, we wouldn't need to hide or buy time for anything,” he said.
Proponents of the deal believe Tehran should be motivated to strike an accord in order to get sanctions lifted. Iran is suffering under brutal US economic sanctions, while it deals with several other crises including environmental issues like water shortages and the COVID-19 pandemic. Dealing with most of Iran’s problems requires some form of engagement and cooperation with neighboring countries and the world at large. That has been made very difficult if not almost impossible due to the sanctions.
Another idea making the rounds in Iran is that Bagheri may try a different route, effectively scrapping the JCPOA and negotiating something new. Dastmalchian points to a repeated line by the current administration officials: "The issue at hand is the JCPOA and not anything else. Neither can there be a new thing created nor is it in the agenda."
But some, including Moheb Ali, still have their concerns. "If there is going to be a new negotiation with a new framework, the other side will bring up other issues as well. It wouldn't be limited to the nuclear issue." Western nations have a list of issues: “Missiles, regional activity, terrorism, human rights issues, it will all be on the table. It will be complicated," he said.
If Tehran takes this route, "we should say goodbye to JCPOA,” he added, but warned going down that road could be a disaster. "There's no alternative for JCPOA. If Iran doesn't implement JCPOA, all those [sanctions and resolutions] will come back and maybe even more severe.”
Have the changes in Tehran led to any change in the US administration’s approach? "I don't think the change of administration will have any impact on Biden administration's broader strategy," said Mortazavi. "But I think there is an understanding within this administration that the hardliners are a little bit different than the moderates. There's still more emphasis on the Supreme Leader and the fact that he is the ultimate decision-maker."
She believes Tehran’s negotiating team will arrive in Vienna with a different approach to its predecessor and, sooner or later, Washington will understand the new reality. "If not now, after the first round I think the Biden administration will realize that this team is different from the previous one, I think both in terms of competence and ideology as far as negotiations, the language of talks and also their positions coming into the room."
"The Biden administration will also realize that they missed a golden window of opportunity when the moderates were in charge but it's too late now. I'm not sure how much a return to any deal is possible at this point with a hardline team," she added.
Bagheri’s many critics are worried, but have stopped short of calling it game over for the moment.
"At this point," Mortazavi said, "I'm cautiously pessimistic.”
Ali Bagheri Kani has replaced Abbas Araghchi as Iran’s deputy foreign minister and lead nuclear negotiator. He has been a major critic of the nuclear deal. Many observers in Iran note that he even refrains from mentioning the name "Barjam," the Persian equivalent for JCPOA, and insists on calling the talks “sanction removal.”
The 54-year-old Bagheri is as much an establishment insider as you can get. His alma mater, Imam Sadegh University, where he was also a professor, is known for producing conservative Islamic Republic officials. That reputation has grown under Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi's administration as he brings in a new generation of officials, mostly from that university.
Bagheri comes from a conservative family. He's the son of Mohammad Bagher Bagheri Kani, a member of the Assembly of Experts. His uncle, the late Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani, a former prime minister, was the president of Imam Sadegh University for decades and is credited with making the institution what it is today. His brother, Mesbaholhoda Bagheri Kani, is married to the Supreme Leader's daughter, Hoda Khamenei.
At the young age of 22, Bagheri was a foreign affairs deputy at Iran's Supreme National Security Council. He was one of many young officials who took various government and military positions after the Islamic Revolution. He spent some time as a political deputy at the state media outlet IRIB and then at 27 he joined the foreign ministry, where he became a right-hand man to Saeed Jalili, who he followed back to Supreme National Security Council when Jalili became head of that body. Before being named to his current post, Bagheri was foreign affairs deputy and human rights committee director in the judiciary where Raisi was the head. And now he has followed Raisi into the government, though his main ally is still considered to be Jalili.
The nuances of political stripe in Iran are often lost on the West, which paints officials in Tehran with the same brush, considering all of them, especially the conservatives, to be at the same high level of connection and loyalty with the power centers of the Islamic Republic and the same belief in the system. But in Bagheri’s case, the stereotype is not far from the truth, which is why his name has been mentioned as a possible foreign minister or deputy foreign minister for every possible conservative administration in every election.
Although this change of pace between former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's administration and Raisi's seems obvious to Iranian watchers, many in the West, especially the US, don't appear to grasp the significance. At the beginning of US President Joe Biden’s term, officials in his administration didn't buy that a change of government in Iran would have much effect at the negotiating table.
"Washington has long tended to see Iran’s political structure as a monolith and that the Supreme Leader is the decision-maker regardless of who is elected president," said Negar Mortazavi, an Iranian-American political reporter and analyst based in Washington D.C. When Biden assumed the presidency, many believed he should hurry to put the JCPOA issue to bed while time was still left in Rouhani's term, but the attitude Mortazavi described was a factor behind the proverbial dragging of feet.
"The Biden administration missed the window of opportunity during the first six months of his administration when Iranian moderates were in charge," she explained. "Now that hardliners consolidated power, the revival of the JCPOA or any nuclear deal with Tehran will be more complex and difficult for Biden."
And Bagheri is going to be the person with the JCPOA file, in charge of reviving something he has long criticized.
Bagheri isn’t used to being in the spotlight, but as former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and his team were signing the deal and then keeping it alive, he has popped up in media interviews, claiming that Iran lost much more than it gained in the JCPOA.
In May 2020, in an interview with IRIB, he claimed Iran never was under the threat of Chapter 7 of the UN Security Council Charter, which deals with acts of aggression, denying what was one of the main concerns for Iran in the lead up to negotiations. In July 2019, in the midst of the aftermath of the US leaving the deal, Bagheri told state-owned Ofogh TV that the JCPOA is like "a sick child" and, in criticism of the Rouhani administration's reaction to the US withdrawal, he made a revealing point: "This administration won't leave the deal."
In September 2018, in an interview with Didarnews, Bagheri said he didn't believe the deal was the decision of the Supreme Leader, casting shade on a key argument of proponents of the accord. "[The Supreme Leader said] there shouldn't be a single retreat on the rights of Iranians, especially the nuclear rights," he said, "yet a hundred of the rights of Iranians have been violated." He didn’t mean a hundred as a symbolic number: "24 have been violated indefinitely, eight for 15 to 20 years, and 20 for 10 years." In November of 2016, speaking at Khaje Nasir University in Qazvin, he criticized those who "insist negotiating with America is the solution to the country’s problems and are simple-mindedly optimistic of the negotiations bearing any results." After the deal was agreed in 2015 and when the results were discussed in the Majlis, Iran's parliament, he was one of the critics who attended to argue against the deal.
But these - and many other - criticisms aren't the only reason Iran's commentators consider Bagheri an opponent of the JCPOA. For many, his main political alliance was enough of a clue. He's a close ally of Saeed Jalili, the man who was in charge of the negotiations before the Rouhani administration. Bagheri was a member of Jalili's negotiating team. Jalili has been an ardent critic of the deal his successors reached. In the run-up to the 2021 presidential election, when most conservatives including Raisi himself, looking forward to taking charge, toned down their criticism of JCPOA and were talking about following up on it in case of a win, Jalili was the sole voice still keeping up the criticisms.
Ahmad Dastmalchian is a former Iranian ambassador to Lebanon and Jordan who has known Bagheri as a close friend for years. He said Bagheri was very important to Jalili’s team, calling him “Jalili's mind outside of his own” during negotiations. "He had a very active and effective and determining role in those negotiations. Most of the ideas of that team came from him,” he said.
What sort of effect can Bagheri's new position as Iran’s point man in the revival talks have on the negotiations? Ghasem Moheb Ali, former director for the Middle East and North Africa in the foreign ministry during the reformist administration of Mohammad Khatami, is a proponent of the 2015 deal. He said the JCPOA is a matter of national interest and it's the agenda that directs decisions, not personal preferences. Yet "the lack of motivation [on Bagheri's part] might affect things," he said. "This lack of motivation might cause a delay in getting results."
Dastmalchian is more optimistic: "Naturally national interests are a higher priority" than people and their positions, he said, adding even though Bagheri may have valid criticism of the deal, reviving it is the now the official policy. The parliament, government, Supreme Leader, and experts were all involved with the initial process of ratifying the deal. "The criticisms are in the content and details of the deal," he added, "but the fact that [Bagheri] has his criticisms doesn't mean he won't go ahead and act in the new situation."
But, Dastmalchian, warned, the “JCPOA isn't a constant principle” of Iranian policy and Tehran could let it go. “If the West comes to the table with logical positions, the negotiations will lead to a result. If they don't, it'll go nowhere and it's going to be on them,” he said.
One tactic Bagheri could take is to buy for time. “This is another concern - that the goal of their approach isn't to revive JCPOA but to buy time to move other things forward,” said Moheb Ali.
Washington’s envoy to the talks, Robert Malley, has said that if Tehran’s goal is to stall talks while it steps up its nuclear advances, then the US will not “sit idly by.”
Dastmalchian dismissed this concern. "We don't need time for anything. If we wanted to do something, we would just say we would do it,” noting that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has declared nuclear weapons “haram,” religiously forbidden. “If it wasn't haram, if we didn't have a religious problem with it ourselves, we wouldn't be afraid of anyone, we wouldn't need to hide or buy time for anything,” he said.
Proponents of the deal believe Tehran should be motivated to strike an accord in order to get sanctions lifted. Iran is suffering under brutal US economic sanctions, while it deals with several other crises including environmental issues like water shortages and the COVID-19 pandemic. Dealing with most of Iran’s problems requires some form of engagement and cooperation with neighboring countries and the world at large. That has been made very difficult if not almost impossible due to the sanctions.
Another idea making the rounds in Iran is that Bagheri may try a different route, effectively scrapping the JCPOA and negotiating something new. Dastmalchian points to a repeated line by the current administration officials: "The issue at hand is the JCPOA and not anything else. Neither can there be a new thing created nor is it in the agenda."
But some, including Moheb Ali, still have their concerns. "If there is going to be a new negotiation with a new framework, the other side will bring up other issues as well. It wouldn't be limited to the nuclear issue." Western nations have a list of issues: “Missiles, regional activity, terrorism, human rights issues, it will all be on the table. It will be complicated," he said.
If Tehran takes this route, "we should say goodbye to JCPOA,” he added, but warned going down that road could be a disaster. "There's no alternative for JCPOA. If Iran doesn't implement JCPOA, all those [sanctions and resolutions] will come back and maybe even more severe.”
Have the changes in Tehran led to any change in the US administration’s approach? "I don't think the change of administration will have any impact on Biden administration's broader strategy," said Mortazavi. "But I think there is an understanding within this administration that the hardliners are a little bit different than the moderates. There's still more emphasis on the Supreme Leader and the fact that he is the ultimate decision-maker."
She believes Tehran’s negotiating team will arrive in Vienna with a different approach to its predecessor and, sooner or later, Washington will understand the new reality. "If not now, after the first round I think the Biden administration will realize that this team is different from the previous one, I think both in terms of competence and ideology as far as negotiations, the language of talks and also their positions coming into the room."
"The Biden administration will also realize that they missed a golden window of opportunity when the moderates were in charge but it's too late now. I'm not sure how much a return to any deal is possible at this point with a hardline team," she added.
Bagheri’s many critics are worried, but have stopped short of calling it game over for the moment.
"At this point," Mortazavi said, "I'm cautiously pessimistic.”
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