Iran at the Center of Gulf Cooperation Council Divisions
WASHINGTON DC – Earlier this month Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced in a joint statement that they have withdrawn their ambassadors from Qatar. Initially, inexplicit reasons were given for such a bold move, which unusually exposed disputes inside the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Riyadh, Manama and Abu Dhabi allege that their “stability and security” were endangered as details began to surface by the Saudi- sponsored press about alleged hidden collusions by Qatar against its neighbors with the likes of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar denied the allegations, and expressed "regret and surprise."
The GCC, an alliance of monarchies set up in the 1980s to counter Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf, includes several of the world's biggest producers and exporters of oil and gas. The current tensions in the GCC are the unexpected ripples of the so-called “Arab Spring.”
Micheal Stephen, deputy director of RUSI Qatar, said in a recent article on the think tank’s website: “Ultimately, there are no good scenarios that emanate from the current crisis. Even if the UAE and Saudi get their way, relations with Qatar will be damaged for some time to come, and there is little benefit to be gained. (Iran’s Supreme Leader) Ayatollah Khamenei will surely be looking on in amusement.”
Alireza Nader, a senior international analyst and author of “Iran After the Bomb,” told Rudaw that, “There have been GCC divisions on Iran for some time.”
Some of them have to do with relations with Iran. Sultan Qaboos of Oman facilitated a dialogue and secret meetings between Iran and US, leading to serious ongoing negotiations in an attempt to solve Iran’s nuclear dispute. Qatar’s resistance to Saudi hegemony and perceived efforts to shape Arab public opinion through its influential Al Jazeera television channel, have also contributed to the strains.
Nader said Oman, Qatar and to some extent Kuwait have more cordial relations with Iran, while Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE are much more suspicious. Inside the UAE, Dubai is friendlier toward Iran than Abu Dhabi, Nader told Rudaw.
“At the end of the day, all GCC states are somewhat wary of Iran. Tehran may try to exploit these divisions and try to distance some of the smaller GCC states from Saudi Arabia. But the (Iranian President Hassan) Rouhani’s government wants better relations with Riyadh as well,” Nader said.
Dr. David Weinberg, a senior fellow working primarily on Saudi Arabia and Gulf affairs at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told Rudaw: “The current dispute between Qatar and its neighbors is an enormous setback to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s efforts at fostering Gulf unity.”
He said, not only have Qatar’s activities undermined the fiction that the Gulf states have a common viewpoint on foreign policy, but its neighbors are now citing these activities as a threat to their stability and security.
“The current controversy makes military cooperation among the GCC states much harder to sustain and develop -- as might Oman’s recent natural gas deals with Iran,” he said. “Therefore, this fight inside the GCC may decrease the ability of Iran’s neighbors to provide a cohesive military and diplomatic deterrent.”
Weinberg said Iran poses both direct and indirect threats to the countries of the Gulf. Directly, its military is often geared toward engaging in hostilities with the Gulf States, but the Gulf states are actually more worried about Iranian subversion activities throughout the region: in Syria, in Lebanon, in Iraq, in Yemen and in Saudi Arabia’s eastern province.
“The Gulf states are concerned both about Iran’s nuclear program and Iran’s subversion activities in the Gulf and Levant. Thus, the GCC see the Iran nuclear deal in Geneva with some concern, since it does not address Iran’s regional mischief-making activities. Some in the Gulf even see that deal as a blessing for Iran to continue these sorts of problematic actions,” Weinberg said.
The GCC not long ago agreed to form a joint military command, most obviously to confront the perceived threat from Iran. However, if the history of NATO is any guide, the Gulf command’s power will be limited. Furthermore, Qatar and Oman share natural gas fields with Iran, so they have strong, selfish incentives to keep such a command from ever being able to compel them to act in the event of a military conflagration with Iran.
Middle East expert Ali Mahboubi told the Fars News Agency that the Saudis are seemingly trying to scare off the young emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim, and letting him know that his policies must be aligned with those of Saudi Arabia.
“It’s likely that the Qataris will calm the waters down by following the policies of the GCC and maintain the relations with the Brotherhood under the table, but will not contribute much to the council as in the past,” he said.
Mahboubi predicted that the current crisis will not tear the GCC apart, nor will it lead Qatar to break away from the alliance. He said this was true, even though Riyadh is upset at Qatar for supporting Islamist groups it perceives as a threat to the monarchy, and Qatar’s support for Iran-West negotiations.