The Kurdish Muscle in Post-Election Iraq

Initial results of the Iraqi parliamentary polls show that no party, list or alliance is likely to win enough votes to dictate how the next government should be formed. This means the country’s Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds will have to brace themselves for long negotiations, political squabble and backroom deals.

In light of this reality, Kurdish leaders and their parliamentarians who are to head to Baghdad soon, should make the Kurdistan Region’s right to produce, export and sell oil the main precondition in any future political deal or alliance.

First though, Kurdish groups, with help from Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani, whose Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) appears the strongest on the local and national level, have to form a united front at home and in Baghdad in order to have a say in the Iraqi capital.

Early results show that the Kurds may win 58 seats in the Iraqi parliament, around the same number of seats (57) they won four years ago.

In their own territory the Kurds have shown some serious signs of division in the past few months. Despite six months of talks since the September 21 regional parliamentary elections, Erbil still doesn’t have a government.

Unless the five major Kurdish parties gather under one umbrella and form a strong bloc, they will easily fall victim to Nuri Maliki or any new prime minister who will happily exploit a Kurdish division.

Within the Kurdistan Region, each of the PUK, the KDP, the Change Movement (Gorran), Islamic Union (Yekgirtu) and the Islamic League (Komal) has their strength and weaknesses. But if they unite against Baghdad, they are a force to be reckoned with.

Iraq’s presidency which has been held by the Kurds for ten years must not be a major point in future negotiations. For the Kurds, that post seems to have run its course, especially since Jalal Talabani, the PUK leader who often acted as a pacifying figure, is no longer there to play that role.

The post can be exchanged for something more important to the Kurds, the Defense or Finance Ministry, for instance.

The Kurds will also be wise to retain the Foreign Ministry that has been held by Hoshyar Zebari for a number of years. In the past two years alone more than 20 foreign countries have opened consulates in Erbil, which would have been impossible in Iraq’s intricate bureaucracy if not for the foreign ministry’s quick green lights.

Baghdad isn’t in an enviable position right now. Corruption is rife, people grieve over lack of services, and most importantly Sunni insurgents are back full force. Under Maliki, Iraq has lost control of many towns and cities, especially in Anbar.

The residents of Anbar, Mosul and Salahaddin are angry with Maliki and possibly with any future Shiite government. This would only offer the Kurds another ally in Baghdad. With the security situation worsening in the center and west of the country, Baghdad couldn’t afford to antagonize the Kurds, unless it wants to push them towards independence.

The Iraqi prime minister has already spoken of forming a majority government ‘for a better performance’, something he can do in coalition with, for example, the Arabia bloc of Salih Mutlaq who has enjoyed good relations with Maliki. But in practice, cutting off the Kurds would give credence to their idea of independence as there won't be any point in Kurdish MPs going to Baghdad.