Marginalizing Iraq's IDPs will lead to radicalization, yet more violence: USIP director

Islamic State (ISIS) seized huge swathes of the north and west of Iraq in 2014, exacting untold violence on its population and an exodus of residents to camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) across the country until the group's territorial defeat in Iraq in 2017. 

ISIS now operates in sleeper cells concentrated in the Anbar, Nineveh and Saladin provinces to the north and west of Iraq, resorting to insurgency tactics including sporadic car bombings, agricultural arson, and the kidnapping and killing of local officials and civilians.

In total, 5.8 million people are believed to have been displaced, with 1.7 million yet to return to their homes, due to security fears, a lack of basic services, or the presence of explosive devices left behind when ISIS were defeated.

Federal government has been accused of preventing the families of those who had allegedly joined ISIS from returning home from IDP camps, which Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in June was “to collectively punish families.” 

HRW also published a report at the beginning of July detailing the ‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’ pretrial detention conditions in which thousands, including women and children, have been held on terrorism charges.

Dr. Elie Abouaoun is the director of Middle East and North Africa Programs for United States Institute for Peace, a U.S. Congress-founded, non-partisan institute “providing expertise, training, analysis, and support to build a more peaceful, inclusive world.” He has worked from their Regional Hub in Tunis, Tunisia since 2013.

Prior to his role at USIP, he held the position of executive director at the Arab Human Rights Fund. He was also the acting country director and program manager of the Danish Refugee Council in Iraq. 

Harsh detention conditions for the families of those held on charges of terrorism amount to collective punishment that will ensure future radicalization and yet another wave of violence, says Abouaoun, as does a lack of educational and employment opportunities for the internally displaced – especially in a country where 58.7% of the population are under 25. 

The rehabilitation of Iraqi society post-ISIS can only be performed by focusing on “repairing the damage to the social fabric of the country” left in the militants’ wake, says Abouaoun, not just through material repairs on buildings, roads and other infrastructure but though social cohesion and the restoration of trust between neighbors and communities.

Iraq’s rampant public and private sector corruption has done more to fuel pro-ISIS sentiments than sectarian or religious incitement; tackling it would alleviate radicalization, according to Abouaoun. Iraq is ranked 168 of 175 countries in the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index, averaging a ranking of 162 since the 2003 US invasion.

This interview was conducted via email on May 6th.

Robert Edwards, Rudaw: Iraq’s Parliamentary Speaker Halbousi recently warned that Iraqi IDPs are vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by Daesh [arabic acronym for ISIS] and its offshoots. Former Prime Minister Allawi even called them a ‘time-bomb’. Do you concur? Why is this demographic vulnerable?

Dr. Elie Abouaoun: While statements like these are indeed alarming, it is important to keep in mind at the same time that IDPs are among a population that has suffered immensely under ISIS.  For this reason, and according to a recent IRI and other credible surveys, the message of ISIS simply does not resonate anymore for many within the IDP population.

However, there is a long-term danger at play when it comes to a certain percentage of IDPs and the potential for radicalization. What this means in practice is that ISIS or similar groups may be able to recruit a small number of jihadists, but these will not enjoy a wide support from the broader Sunni constituency which will limit their operational capacity. 

Among the IDPs, there is a sub-group known as the “ISIS family members”; who are basically IDPs accused of having ties to ISIS members. These individuals (mostly women and children) are being detained in camps without access to basic services, or legal documentation and are being subjected to violence, often rape and even human trafficking. Added to the caseload of Stateless children who were either born under ISIS or those who lost their official documents while fleeing ISIS and thus deprived of basic services too, the situation for this group will only get worse over time, if no solution is found quickly. 

By marginalizing and excluding large segments of IDPs, many of whom are children, the Iraqis are laying the groundwork for a larger and different form of radicalization amongst this population in the not-so-distant future.

What causes radicalization among this demographic? Is it simply socio-economic or are there ideological or ethno-cultural causes? Sectarianism? Sense of injustice? Islamist sympathies?

While radicalization is a highly individualized process that combines a myriad of internal and external social, economic and ideological factors for each person, in general, a few trends have emerged:

First comes the perception of insecurity. The presence, influence, abuses and often impunity of some Iranian-backed military units (Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF) have actually evoked sympathy and nostalgia for Sunni militant groups in areas where these PMF units  are stationed . In these areas, people actually deem the PMF tactics as intrusive, reckless and threatening to their own safety. Many of them consider that the only way of countering this presence is to support Sunni militants.

 
On another hand, the nation-wide metastatic corruption of both public and private sectors has done more to fuel pro-ISIS sentiments than other religious or ideological factors. According to resent research, the ability for ISIS to thrive in Iraq for so long was rooted less in the historic sectarian divisions and more so, simply, in poor governance. Wherever the government is perceived as not inclusive, unjust and corrupt, support for the group is higher among marginalized communities who have long felt neglected by their leaders. There is no doubt that ISIS’s strength is capitalizing on local grievances against the state. Now, the government’s handling of the aftermath of ISIS will indeed dictate the magnitude of the next wave of radicalization. 

Another trend is that IDPs are often returning back to their homes and their communities only to undergo a second wave of displacement. Upon returning to their homes they find no opportunities for employment. Without any viable foreseeable options for the future, finding membership in (and, ending up on the payroll of) an extremist group may remain attractive to some. Given that 20% of Iraq’s population is displaced, and that 58.71% of the population is under 25, employment and education, or lack thereof, are two huge factors.


Are you aware of reports of Daesh/extremist sleeper cells inside IDP camps who may have arrived from Mosul or Makhmour? How do such groups operate in a camp setting?

USIP is not operating in camps thus cannot provide an expert opinion on their internal workings, but it is known that there is a thorough screening process before someone enters a camp. 

Claims of the presence of ISIS in IDP camps are especially challenging to corroborate because of the haphazard and arbitrary nature by which the government accuses and convicts individuals, who are often actually victims of ISIS’s brutality rather than perpetrators of it, of terrorist activity. The government has yet to publish one coherent and complete set of criteria by which someone can be deemed a “terrorist” and tried as such, and thus thousands of innocent people are being jailed, confessing to crimes only under torture, and sentenced to death.


What problems does this create for the humanitarian aid sector? Could aid money/resources end up funding insurgency?

There is no question that blurring the lines between humanitarian aid and support to political or militant groups is always problematic. That this is happening in some cases in Iraq is no secret. However, it is important – and fair - to remain focused on the specific cases of abuse (of the humanitarian aid) rather than casting a doubt on all the humanitarian actors working in Iraq. 


A whole generation has grown up in Iraq knowing only violence, displacement, ineffective government, joblessness, et cetera. What specifically can be done for children and young people to prevent their radicalization?

Children and youth in Iraq are extremely vulnerable to perpetuating the cycles of violence that have ravaged the country for decades if patterns of vilification, marginalization and displacement continue. In order to turn the tides on these patterns, the government must create viable pathways for children – including those born under ISIS rule or to ISIS families and all those who lost their legal documents in the conflict, to access the state amenities. In other words, finding a solution that takes into account the religious, social and cultural realities of Iraq should not prohibit this significant population from enrolling in school, receiving medical care access employment, and enjoying other basic rights... 

If the government keeps this population on the margins of society, in an approach that rings as collective punishment, the future will surely see another wave of violence. The best option is to objectively identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice and in parallel reintegrate the innocent back into society and present youth with attractive alternatives to extremism. 

Nearly 3.5 million school-aged children are not being educated due to the conflict, and this will have huge negative implications for the future if the government does not take measures to make up for the lost time. 

Last but not least, the government must also enhance inclusive and participatory political processes to better represent the needs and interests of such a diverse population and to counter the ISIS narrative that peaceful coexistence is not possible. 


What can the Iraqi and Kurdistan Region governments and the international community do to prevent radicalization of IDPs? Reconstruction? Returns? Good Governance? Focus on cross-sectarian coexistence? Removal of Shiite militias from Sunni areas?

To prevent the radicalization of IDPs, the international community can support government officials in a comprehensive and multilayered process aimed at repairing the damage to the social fabric of the country ISIS left behind. This must be done in synchronicity with the tangible reconstruction work happening on the ground. As much as buildings, roads and other infrastructure are necessary to rebuild Iraqi society, so too is social cohesion and the restoration of trust between neighbors and communities in order to fully create a habitable environment again. This must be done at the local level and it is important that communities themselves take ownership over solutions to the local conflicts they face.

The perception of safety remains one of the biggest barriers to IDP returns. Until IDPs are convinced that their communities are safe for themselves and their families, Iraq will remain destabilized by displacement and those displaced will remain susceptible to radical ideology absent other mainstream pathways. 

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