Middle East Peace and Security Forum: A conversation with Prime Minister Masrour Barzani

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - The Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region spoke at length to Guardian journalist Martin Chulov at the Middle East Peace and Security (MEPS) Forum at the American University of Kurdistan (AUK) in Duhok, on Tuesday, November 16, 2021. Among a variety of pressing issues, Masrour Barzani shared his opinion on topics including the migrant crisis and relations with Baghdad, as well as Syria, Iran and the United States, and the impact of climate change on the Region.

The transcription of the full conversation is below. Rudaw's recording of the event is available to watch here.

Martin Chulov: Good afternoon everybody. It’s my very great pleasure to welcome you all to this session of the Middle East Peace and Security forum at the American University of Kurdistan. It’s my pleasure this afternoon to welcome his excellency, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani to the stage. 

Thank you prime minister, and it’s a pleasure to have you here and to spend this hour with you. I’m very much looking forward to turning this into a robust conversation about your time as leader, your time as chancellor of the Security Council in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and also to speak more broadly, beyond the very real, very significant issues which you are stewarding here in the Kurdish Region. Also, a chance to have a look beyond the borders of the KRG and Iraq, and into the region itself. 

Now, you’ve been prime minister for two and a half years now, since July 2019. For seven years, roughly, and prior to that chancellor of the security council, where you spear-headed the global fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) terrorist group and, I think it’s important to acknowledge upfront, the efforts that you, the Kurdish people, and the Iraqi people made to fight ISIS did the world a great service, and the world owes a debt to the KRG and to Iraq for helping to get rid of the scourge of ISIS. Thank you for that. 

Let me take the start of this conversation further afield, to the forests of Belarus and Poland where thousands of young Kurds are freezing in a forest in a far-away land. How did that come to happen, and what is being done to get them back?

Masrour Barzani: Thank you Martin for this opportunity. We are talking about an issue that is very important. We are all very concerned, and personally I’m very concerned about the health and well-being of these people who are stranded on the border between Belarus and Poland. Apparently, there are many people from different countries, including from the Kurdistan Region.

Unfortunately, it looks like that these people have been exploited by a number of people, let’s say “travel agents”, human traffickers, some political merchants, if I may say that, and of course some people from within Belarus as well. These people did not leave this area under any sort of pressure, and they were not legally pursued, or imposed with any restrictions on their travel, so most of these people travelled freely on their own will through airlines and official channels. After they went to Belarus, spending some time in hotels, they were directed to the border to cross into the European Union (EU). Unfortunately, the situation with the cold weather and, from what we’ve seen from TV and video footage, it’s very concerning because some of them have children, and these children are innocent people who are unfortunately paying the price for what looks like to be a political game.

We are reaching out to all of our friends abroad, and also here we are dealing with Baghdad to find a way for all of those who are willing to come back, so that they can return. And until then, we are asking our partners in Europe to allow the Red Cross to provide immediate aid to these people who are in much need. Now, whether these people can go into the EU or not, that’s something that obviously we will know as we follow the events there, but what’s important for us to say is that, unfortunately, there’s been a lot of misinformation about why they’re there, and why they went to that area.

Like I said, most of them went out of their own free will and, if you look at Kurdistan, relatively speaking to the rest of the region, it is a very secure place. We are hosting almost 1 million IDPs [internally displaced persons] who are fleeing different parts of Iraq and neighbouring countries and coming to Kurdistan because they feel safe and secure here. It doesn’t make any sense to say that they are leaving here because of the security situation.

What I will say, is that they are leaving in search of opportunities that aren’t being provided.

Let me get back to that point. Some may say, “okay well, it’s because of the economic situation”. That may be true, but the bad economy is not the fault of the KRG. As you know, over the years we have had our own issues with the federal government. Since 2020 and 2021, twelve months of the KRG’s budget was not paid by the Iraqi government. Covid hit us very hard at the very beginning of this cabinet, and of course the oil prices dropped. No budget, no trade, bad economy, but we still managed to survive by the reforms that we started in the KRG.

Yes, we couldn't pay full salaries every month but we did pay salaries every month. And job opportunities, in fact, since the beginning of this cabinet until now, we have created about 112,000 jobs by reactivating some of the projects, some by the private sector, some by public partnership, and some sponsored by the government itself. There are opportunities for other people for work, if you look. People have come all the way from Asia, from Bangladesh, from the Philippines; people have come from Lebanon, from Africa. They are coming here to work from Turkey, from Iran, from other parts of Iraq, so why can they find jobs here, but some other people cannot find jobs? It depends on the nature of the jobs people are willing to have. 

Many want to go to Europe in search of a different opportunity; it’s not the flee of desperation. They’re going there [to seek different opportunities] and I hope that the truth is told and the world knows that these people went there like every other immigrant wants to travel and go in search of different opportunities in different parts of the world, but if they want to return, they can always return here.

In fact, many of the people who have gone, have spent thousands of dollars to travel agents and some individuals. So, if they could come up with thousands of dollars to pay for their trip, I’m sure if they wanted to work together, they could have created their own jobs here. As we’ve seen in many parts of Kurdistan, I’ve seen entrepreneurs in Sulaimani, in Duhok, in Erbil, that have started their own small jobs and the government has also been supportive of them to do that. 

Will you help those who want to get back, in terms of repatriation flights, organising logistics?

We are working with the federal government, and there have been efforts to return those who want to come back. 

Now, you spoke about the lack of jobs available at the moment, potentially for some people who are looking for jobs in their domain. We’re sitting in a learning institution now, which is obviously very special to you, and is an institution in the KRG which is looking to create highly skilled graduates who fit in and add value to the Kurdish workforce. As part of that, the reform programme that you have pioneered in your time as prime minister has been comprehensive; we’re talking diversification, the empowerment of institutions, efficiency drives, even, I hear, privatisation of some aspects of state infrastructure, such as the distribution sector of the electricity industry, for example.

Also, you push very hard against corruption, which has remained a potent menace, not just here, but in other parts of Iraq and around the Middle East. All of these things that you’ve done, how have they started to cut through, in your mind, to people who are saying to me and to others that they’re fleeing because there’s nothing for them here? Can you convince them that within a generation, or even less than that, that this will be a land of opportunity and that the world’s best-practiced reforms and initiatives that you’re putting in place will cut through?

Well, let me just clarify something. I’m not just saying that here the situation and conditions are perfect. We still have problems, we still have economic problems, we still have security issues and the challenges that we face collectively in this region do not exclude us, so we are part of the overall region that are facing all these challenges altogether. But what we have done in the KRG in terms of reform has helped us to survive in these very tough times. I explained at the beginning how difficult the economic situation for Kurdistan was, and if it were not for the reforms, probably, we would have collapsed. But that doesn’t mean that we are where we want to be. We have just made sure that we put everything back on the right track, and we are looking forward to having a better economy with the creation of new jobs, with the creation of new opportunities, solving some of the outstanding issues with Baghdad which we hope we can achieve.

We hope that there will be new opportunities for everybody here to work. I believe that Kurdistan has significant potential to be a much better place, a much safer place. In terms of economic prosperity, in terms of security, and in terms of political stability. For that, we need to work much closer together. In fact, many of the things that are mentioned about the economy or about security may not be the problem per say, but the major problem we are facing is political, and both the economy and security are used as tools to increase political pressure on the KRG, internally and externally.

In order to overcome these problems, we have to find a way to bring about better political stability to the region. That will, in turn, help improve the economic conditions for these people. There are opportunities, and people have been very successful here. The government is doing everything in its capacity to work towards a better life and living conditions for its citizens and population, but let’s also not forget that we are hosting about one million IDPs and the cost of that is on the shoulders of the KRG, without any support from the federal government.

The federal government, in fact, has the sovereign expenditures, some of which should be spent on these camps and refugees and IDPs that are in Kurdistan, but that’s not the case, so except from some NGOs, most of the responsibility for taking care of these IDPs and refugees rests with the KRG. In order to help them return, the living conditions and security of these people in their homes must improve so that [along] with their return, a huge burden will be lifted from the shoulders of the KRG.

You speak about political impediments to get you out of what you aptly described as the perfect storm of conditions which have brought the Kurdish economy to its knees over the last eighteen months in particular, but central to the difficulties here are the ongoing issues you have with Baghdad, the budget allocation which should be coming your way according to an understanding, which was struck by Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister many years ago - 17 years ago now.

At the time, that was 17.5% of the Iraqi budget, it never really got there, but was in certain months and certain years within range. Where are we now with the budget allocation, given that earlier this year, you put out a statement praising Mustafa al-Kadhimi for a deal which had been struck to get that back in motion?

Yes, well, we have been talking about this many times, and I have personally talked about this on many occasions. [The] KRG never received 17% of the Iraq budget. Even at the time where it was said that [the] KRG received 17%, it was never the case. Then, if you look at the sequence of events, that 17%, based on a personal decision of a prime minister, was reduced to 13.6%. And even that was never the case, so [the] KRG never received 13% of the Iraqi budget.

The reason for that, first of all, is that most of Iraq’s revenue is from oil. Almost 1 million barrels of oil are used for local consumption and don't add up to the overall Iraqi budget, and that’s about roughly 22% of the Iraqi budget. So forget that. The rest that has been exported and turned into revenue, about 48% of that was allocated for sovereign expenditures, and that’s supposed to come, for instance, to Peshmergas that are supposed to be a part of the overall Iraqi security apparatus, to pensions, and there are many areas that the KRG is eligible to receive the sovereign expenditures for but none of the sovereign expenditures actually ended up in Kurdistan. So we are talking about 52% of the 80% of the Iraqi overall budget, and [the] KRG received 13% of that.

If you calculate that, it will really be somewhere around less than 5%. So [the] KRG has really been receiving about less than 5% of the Iraqi budget. And then, of course, there is the question of the 2021 budget. There is a law that a certain amount is put aside to be paid to the KRG. We had a deal with the federal government. They calculated all the revenues of the KRG, including oil and the internal revenues. Adding that up, you come up with a number. And then, there is the Kurdish share of the Iraqi budget. There is a difference, and that difference needs to be paid by the federal government to the KRG. 

So when some accuse the KRG and say that the KRG is not actually fulfilling its obligations, that is not true. We have already agreed to subtract whatever revenues we’re collecting from the overall budget, and the remaining part is paid to the KRG, and even that was not paid. They came up with just a number, 200 billion dinars, which is equivalent to 137 million dollars, that was supposed to be paid to the KRG. That’s in 2021, but in 2020, this wasn't the case because, back then, they were paying 320 million dollars to the KRG. Six months of 2020 were never paid to the KRG, and even according to the Iraqi budget of 2021, six months have not been paid, so a total of 12 months of this budget was never paid to the KRG. If you add up all of the numbers, that’s about 3.1 billion dollars. So, with that, we are still facing some economic issues and some economic problems.

Part of the solution is doing the best that you can to put the KRG on a sovereign economic footing and therefore the efficiency drives and reforms are central to that. In order for that to happen, building a strong viable private sector is obviously essential, but the private sector requires risk, and one of the things we’ve heard quite consistently in this conference over the last couple of days by several speakers is that, perhaps, the culture in the KRG is not entirely prepared for risk. How do you build a new constituency that will inevitably ask for a much stronger say in how things are run?

Well first of all, individuals have responsibilities as much as the government does. It’s a shared responsibility to run the government. The government is there to serve people, and people are there to play their part. In terms of the reforms that we have made, and the jobs that we have created, and everything that we have talked about, I don’t want to repeat myself, [but this has] helped to improve the conditions and actually help us survive until this moment.

One of the factors you mentioned that was helpful is the private sector. When we were in desperate need of doing some projects so the economy could get going, I invited all of the private sector businessmen to come and we sat together. I told them, I expected them to play their part and do their projects. That helped to run the economy at a very critical time. So it really brought many people back to jobs, if you will. Now, in terms of people having a say, of course people are the ultimate decision-makers in any country. They either decide on who to become the government in elections and they can basically influence the decisions of policy-makers. They have a responsibility, and the biggest responsibility for them is to love their country, to protect their country, and to work to improve their country. The government alone cannot do that.

I can give you an example, that about 85% of this government’s budget is going towards the salaries of people on the government payroll. These are about 1.2 million people. But the population of Kurdistan is more than 6 million, so we still have roughly about 5 million people who are not on any payroll. What does that mean? Is the government responsible for the lives and living conditions of only those who are taking salaries? That’s a very important question to ask. The government is responsible for providing for the health system, education, basic services, electricity, water, and you name it, for all of its citizens, whether it’s a government employee, or on a government payroll or not, and when I say that we have 1.2 million people who take salaries, they’re not all employees, that includes pensions.

In Baghdad, they have made a separation. Only those that are directly working for the government are considered to be employees, but the other ones are taking their pension and salaries from the sovereign expenditures. That never came to Kurdistan. So, the number we are giving is the collective of everybody that is actually paid by the government. So in that case, we must feel responsible for how we can improve the overall economic conditions of Kurdistan. We cannot do that with very little percentage left for the services to all, so Kurdistan cannot continue or expect to improve if it only pays whatever revenues it has to the salaries. That’s one problem that we face, the other problem is the collective debts that accumulated over the years on the KRG for a number of reasons.

[In the] four years of fighting against ISIS from 2014 until 2017, not a single dollar was paid to the KRG from Baghdad. So [the] KRG had to borrow money from the oil traders to be able to run its affairs. Those are now debts that we inherited, [and] we need to pay them back. So, when you look at the overall revenues, these revenues are not enough to pay the debts, to pay the salaries, and yet to also improve the economy of this region. For that reason, we started the reform to cut the expenditures of the government, and to collect the revenues so we can put it to better use to build an infrastructure that could help Kurdistan become economically sufficient. We are diversifying the economy to look at other sources of revenues. We are looking at improving agriculture, and building industries, and looking at tourism to be additional revenue avenues for the KRG.

I want to zoom out a little now and move on to the broader neighbourhood. Let’s start with Syria, the disintegration of which, over the last ten years, you’ve had a front row seat to quite a unique vantage point. We’re at a point in the Syrian civil war where we can almost call it the post-war period. What now for Syria? It may well be the definition of pyrrhic victory, but is it time to acknowledge that Bashar al-Assad has won and to move on?

Well, he survived. I don’t know if it’d be the right terminology to use, to call him a loser or winner, but he survived. He survived against all the odds and this is a new reality in Syria. Now the question is, what should the future of Syria be? Of course, as neighbours of Syria, we want to have peace, and we want to have stability, because one way or another it’s going to affect the situation in Iraq as well.

We are concerned about the Kurdish population in northern Syria, and we are trying everything we possibly can to reduce tensions and to make sure that there will be a comprehensive solution for all of Syria, not just that part, but as you know, there are many actors and players. It’s not just the Syrians, but there are regional powers, foreign powers, there are many, including the United States, Russia, Turkey, Iran - all of them are in Syria. To have a sustainable solution in Syria, these countries should also come to some sort of agreement. What we wish, is that it will not be at the expense of the rights of any community in Syria. We want to see peace restored in Syria, and the stability back for the region. 

The two hundred thousand or so Syrian Kurds who came to the KRG during the last Turkish incursion to the northeast in October 2019, have they mostly stayed or have they returned?

They are mostly here. They haven’t returned. Very few of them have returned, but the reason they are not returning is not because of ISIS. They may have fled because of ISIS, but the reason they are not returning is because of the current system in place that are affiliated with the PKK, and because of the oppressive policies of the system in place, and because of the uncertainty of the future of this country.

A lot of these people are very skeptical about what could happen next. They don’t know if the United States is going to stay there or not. They don’t know if this part of Syria is going to be sandwiched between the pressure from the south and the pressure from the north, so they just don’t know what they should go back to, and that’s one of the main reasons why they are not returning until now. 

If the opportunity presented itself, would you join the rapprochement with Damascus and travel to see Bashar al-Assad, or invite him to Erbil?

Well, we always prefer peaceful dialogue with all of the regional powers and countries. We’ve never had any personal problem with any of the leaders in the region, so if given the opportunity to promote peace and stability, we would always endorse those opportunities.

Turning to the east now, to Iran. Later this month, we have a crucial round of talks on the JCPOA. It’s clear in recent weeks that the American rhetoric is starting to become a little unsettled, they’re not sure if this deal is going to materialise. What are the stakes here? What happens if this deal falls over? What are the stakes for the region and beyond?

Well that’s an important question, because the JCPOA is between Iran, Europe and the United States; mainly the Western powers versus Iran, but when it comes to the regional countries, the situation goes beyond JCPOA. We are talking about the stability of the region that does not only focus on a nuclear deal with Iran. Iran is an important player in the region, and of course having any sort of peaceful solution that would promote peace and the rules of engagement limited to non-interference in the neighboring countries, of course that would be the ideal solution for the region.

This region is not suffering from any nuclear proliferation or, let’s say, competition. In fact, it’s suffering from the interferences, the competition on the ground in each other’s affairs. So in my view, in order for the region to feel safer, and from the talks that we’ve had with many of the regional leaders, we need to have a better system and better relations on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference.

What happens if this deal falls over? Where do we go from there?

Well, I don’t want to make any comments based on assumptions. Let’s hope that they will not fall apart, and hope that there will be some sort of understanding that will help the region and the stability of the area. 

Looking elsewhere in the Middle East, you’re committed to outreach to Arab states, to the Gulf monarchies and beyond. You’re obviously starting from a handicap in that you are dealt with as a sub-national actor, not as a sovereign state at this point, but have you had any success in recent times in looking for trade routes, looking for investment, looking for political connections outside of Iraq?

Yes, definitely. I mean, of course we are interested in improving our situation in every aspect. We have reached out to neighbouring countries, we have reached out to the Gulf states, the Arab countries, we have reached out to Europe, to the US, even to Asia. One way of doing that is by increasing our economic relations and trade between the two sides. But trade, in our view, is not going to help us very much if it’s just one way, importing from other countries. What I am interested in, in this cabinet, is to increase the production of Kurdistan, so that we could in fact have a balanced trade between Kurdistan and outside.

One of my major tasks in my visits abroad is to find a market for the local products, [and] for that we have to increase the opportunities and increase the local production in Kurdistan so that when we have more than we can consume, we can export it outside. Of course, the best and the most ideal way would be to send most of these products to other parts of Iraq, and for that we’ve had numerous talks with relevant ministries to strengthen that bond between Kurdistan and the rest of federal Iraq. But if we, let’s say have even more, then obviously we have been looking at other markets, and in fact there has been some success in exporting some of the products outside as pilot projects, and we hope by increasing our products we will in fact help that sector as well, and we can generate more revenues for this country. 

A viable export market requires buyers, it requires trade routes, and it requires connectivity as well. Have you had any success in establishing more flight routes in and out of Erbil, or with the immediate neighbourhood in working towards any bilateral trade agreements outside of Baghdad? Trade requires connectivity to start with. Let’s start with flight routes, and also any agreements in the offing in the Gulf or elsewhere.

We have. We have succeeded in securing some agreements with some countries, to increase trade between the two sides. On the other hand, as a supporting factor for that, we have encouraged many of these countries to come and invest in Kurdistan, so that, with their investments, we could have joint benefits, and with increasing more production here, with either joint ventures, with direct investments, so that we can increase these productions so that, again, we can export it to other countries. We have a very attractive investment law that we have amended some of those laws to make them more attractive, and we are working on that sector. We are trying to do our best to increase and to bring more foreign investments into Kurdistan.

Speaking of the region, during the last Baghdad government, there was a serious attempt to reintegrate Iraq with the Arab world, in the post-ISIS era, the post-Saddam era, the post-civil war. How important was that? And also, concurrently, there was an attempt in the last seven to eight months to turn Iraq into a broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia in fixing what many would say is an ancient schism, and others would say is a more politically driven schism of modern history. Iraq hosted a series of talks between both rivals, and how important is that?

The short answer is, it’s important, and we are supportive. We do believe that Iraq needs to get back to its original place of being an active player in the region and in the world, so having more engagement with the different countries in the region or beyond is going to help Iraq. We, in the Kurdistan Region, are a part of this collective security and stability, so the more Iraq moves towards security and stability, we also benefit from it. So we do support that and think that it’s important.

In Baghdad, things are rarely stable politically, but last week we saw a real political assassination attempt at Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi. What did that represent and who is behind that?

I think we have to wait for the final results to be officially announced who is behind it, but it was a cowardly act. We condemned it at the very beginning. We expressed our support to the prime minister to promote democracy and promote stability, so whoever did that, did not think of any sort of, let’s say solution for the country. That was an act of creating more chaos, more problems, and I don’t think that anybody who is a friend of Iraq or cares for Iraq would be involved in such acts. 

Moving now to another neighbour, Turkey. A powerful friend to have, and a difficult friend to have at times. I want to focus on the northeast of Syria, there’s been some belligerent rhetoric out of Ankara in recent weeks, suggesting that another incursion may be planned. What would be the impact if that was to happen and beyond that, is the peace process with the Kurds flatlining?

Well, we are talking about Syria and Turkey now. We don’t support any sort of military buildup or any sort of additional incursion or invasions in any part of this region. But there has to be ways to engage and reach a peaceful solution between all the actors and all this tension that exists, not only between Syria and Turkey but also in the region as a whole. 

We do support very concrete and constructive dialogues between all sides, ignoring problems will never bring peace and solutions. Problems have to be addressed and accepted as problems, then there would be opportunities for solutions and ways to get out of them, but ignoring problems will continue to be problematic. 

So, as the Kurdish talks with Turkey, we’ve had a number of discussions with the Turkish officials, they’ve always told us that they don’t have problems with the Kurds, they have problems with the PKK. They simply make a distinction between [the] PKK and the Kurds. They’re saying they’re willing to address the Kurdish issues and solve many of the outstanding issues but they are not willing to do that with [the] PKK. To get back to Syria, I think one way to help the situation would be to break away from [the] PKK. The administration in northern Syria, in Rojava, in the Kurdistan of Syria, must break away from PKK to lessen the sensitivities that the Turks have towards PKK. In fact, that is also going to help the other Kurds, because as you know, not everybody in Syria is affiliated with the PKK. 

Not all of the Kurds, in fact, a minority of them are affiliated with them, but the majority are not, including the 200,000 refugees that are now in Kurdistan. They’re not going back because they don’t accept this sort of ideology. The best way for them would be to start a Kurdish-Kurdish dialogue, to reach an agreement and break away from PKK, and that would definitely, I believe, reduce the sensitivities and the tensions with the Turks as well.

You think it’s viable in Rojava for the administration itself to break away from the PKK which has played such a significant role, not just during the fight against ISIS but beyond that in building capacity in the northeast?

Why is it not?

Some may argue, and many do, that that’s a distinction without a difference to say that the administration itself is separate from the PKK. 

So here’s the irony, if they don’t want to break away from the PKK or believe there is no way to do that, then of course they will be facing the consequences that unfortunately not many can help. But if they want help, then they must accept to break away from [the] PKK and start a better future.

Just getting back to local now. The reforms that you’ve put in place, is it fair to say that you’re almost staking your legacy on those reforms taking root? If we are at such a critical juncture in the modern history of the KRG, that these simply have to work, what happens if they don’t?

Well, we don’t have the option. It must work, and it will work. 

Why are you so confident?

I’m confident because I believe in the abilities of our people, I believe in what we have done, and we have the vision, we have the people, we have the resources, so failure is not an option.

Do you believe you have the buy-in from the society?

Can you elaborate on that?

Do you believe society is invested in what you are trying to achieve?

We compliment each other, so I’m not saying, you know, what we do and what they do. We collectively have to do it together, and I do believe that we need, of course, to increase communication with each other, we need to build trust more between the government and the people, and once we reach that point I think success is inevitable.

Just getting back to the relationship with Baghdad, which remains fraught and is likely to remain fraught for many of the issues we’ve discussed. What sort of model, ideally, would you have for governance in the KRG? I’ve heard you talk in the past about confederation, is that something you would still endorse? And, if so, could you explain what exactly that model would represent?

Let me give you a broader explanation of this. If you look at the history of Iraq, and we heard some people speak about this this morning in two panels, talking about the history of Iraq. Iraq was never at peace, ultimate peace. Either it was at war with some people, or with its neighbours. That was the reason that a country like Iraq, so rich in resources - natural resources - so rich in humans, why Iraq is where it is today. There is only one answer to that because the systems in Iraq were not supportive of all the opportunities that exist in Iraq. Bad systems, bad governance, bad administrations, bad management, and continuously that’s been the case in Iraq.

There are reasons why, because there are some deep-rooted problems in Iraq that politicians often try to ignore. Everybody wants to have a good speech, everybody wants to look good, but to look good means you have to ignore the real problems, because once you touch the real problems, you can be accused of being a separatist, or of being anti-system. That is the main problem in this country, in my view. There are serious issues, but there are solutions.

Like I said, just a little while ago, the first step to solving problems is admitting to the problem, admitting that there are serious problems. If you look at the differences of communities, look at the national identity in Iraq, how many are Iraqis before they are something else? There are Shiite Iraqis, there are Sunni Iraqis, there are Kurdish Iraqis, but are there Iraqis that are not Shias, not Sunnis or not Kurds?

I’m glad you raised national identity, because Sayyid Ammar al-Hakim spoke persuasively about this this morning, talking about the need for a cohesive national identity. Let me ask you, as the prime minister of the KRG, are you a Kurd first or an Iraqi first?

I am a Kurd.

When we are talking about systems, it doesn’t mean we cannot live together, of course I’m a Kurd. Iraq is an identity, is borders on a map, and that’s supposed to be a country, and it’s a fabricated state, whether we like it or not. It was drawn to be a country, it was not based on the differences of nationalism or geography. It was a fabricated state that was built almost a hundred years ago. 

Now we live in Iraq. Yes, I am officially an Iraqi, but of course I am a Kurd that was forced to live in Iraq. But what does that mean? That means that we can still live together. We can use the examples of the European Union. The Europeans have fought for hundreds of years to create their own states, and then they realized that they can create a European Union, lift borders, and live together. If there was an engineer in Germany, an engineer in France could have more in common [with them] than a physician and an engineer in the same country. 

That mentality must also be accepted in the Middle East, especially in the areas that the Kurds live. Now we have a country, we have land, we have a territory that’s called Kurdistan and it’s divided - in history at least twice. But how can we live together with the rest of the Arabs and Turks and Persians? We are living in this region. Nobody is going anywhere, so what would be a system that we can be helpful to each other, compliment each other, rather than seeing each other as threats? That, once again, brings me back to what I said. It’s the system. 

The system has to be changed so that we could all feel comfortable and all of our needs can be accommodated. We don’t have to follow the steps of Europeans to go into war, to create borders, and then to lift borders. We can just jump into the final step and lift borders and all live together, but that mentality cannot be enforced if only Kurds feel that way. The Arabs have to feel that way, Turks have to feel that way, Iranians have to feel that way. But if they insist that it’s my right to have my own identity, to have my own territories, my own independence, and then deny you the same right that they take for granted for themselves, of course, that’s not fair, it’s not just, and it will not bring sustainable solutions and peace to the region. 

These are some of the issues that we have to address and be brave enough to address it. Many people try to avoid these questions because it’s not politically correct, but that is the problem. We don’t have to be politically correct, we have to be correct. We have to do things right, and that is to look at the system that is acceptable. 

Let’s say if you’re talking about Iraq, it has to be acceptable by the Shia communities, it has to be acceptable by the Sunnis, it has to be acceptable by the Kurds. Do we have anything in common? Absolutely, there is a lot that we have in common. So let’s look, instead of looking at the differences, let’s look at the commonalities that we all share, and let’s build on that and give each other guarantees that the atrocities of the past will never be repeated. 

We are victims of our past, and everybody is afraid of what could happen in the future if there are no guarantees that one community, or one society, one group, one regime cannot abuse the power that they possess against the other. That can only be done by a system, not just by ink on paper. We have had the constitution, the constitution could not prevent the abuse of power by a prime minister to use force against Kurdistan. Who held the prime minister accountable? No one, because the mechanism couldn’t stop that. We need a mechanism that can stop that. So, we started, we tried monarchy, we tried, or lived through dictatorship, we lived through autonomy, we lived through federalism. If none of that worked, why can’t we try something else? We definitely can try something else, and that something else can be unique to Iraq. It doesn’t have to be a system that we can duplicate from somewhere else. It can be something unique to us.

Confederation?

It could be a confederation. We could talk to each other, we could accept, but that has to be on the basis of understanding and accepting each other.

Throughout the fight against the ISIS terror group, the US remained a bedrock ally, but over the last year or perhaps a bit longer, I’ve sensed in some of our conversations but also some of your public statements that your satisfaction with Washington has started to dip. Do you see Washington under this administration as a bedrock ally and are you looking elsewhere for countries to strategically partner with? I’m talking here not just about the neighbourhood but what say you to the rise of China and it’s interest in the KRG?

Well I can’t speak on behalf of the United States. I mean, they are very smart people and they can decide what’s best for their country, but as allies, as friends, we've been through so much. We appreciate the support that they’ve given to us since toppling Saddam’s regime and then helping us during the war against ISIS, so we appreciate the support that both the US and the Coalition, and all of our friends have given to us.

Leaving that aside, in terms of US policy in the region, of course we have our own way of analysing things. I must say, the situation in Iraq is not the creation of the Iraqis themselves, and it’s not the Iraqis themselves who created the situation. There were a lot of external influences that shaped the events and today’s Iraq. So today, to say, “we take our hands off and leave it to you,” after what? Iraq still needs help, and that help must come from Iraq’s friends. Those friends can be anyone, but we do believe America is a friend.

This engagement of the United States in this region can change the balance. We think America needs to still stay engaged until Iraqis are strong enough to make up their own minds and make their own decisions. Any gap left by the Americans will be filled by non-Iraqis; it’s not going to be filled by Iraqis.

Does the United States remain a friend you can depend on?

Why don’t you ask them? I hope so, and I can say one thing. I can say that we are the friends that all of our friends can depend on and can count on us, so I hope that that could be true with them as well. But definitely, we consider Americans to be our friends.

Now you mentioned something that I’d like to elaborate on. You mentioned China and other powers, and I heard the panelist earlier talking about the American shift of focus and competing with China at maybe a different level. Of course, that’s an American decision. They know what their priorities are. What would be the best for the United States, that’s their decision. But, some of the decisions they make can, unfortunately, affect us because, like I said, they have been actors, so any disengagement has to be gradual and has to guarantee some sort of stability behind before they disengage. That’s important.

It is not my job to tell the Americans what to do, but there are some facts. If America disengages and wants to focus on just competing with China on technology, but disengaging from the region, what does that mean? That region can become an area of manoeuvre for America’s competitors. So, the question is, is that what the Americans want? If that’s what their policy is, then I have nothing to say. But if they still want to be influential, they cannot just take their hands off from some places and focus on some other area, thinking that will bring them more success. So I do believe that there are parallel policies that need to be followed. We think that, as friends, all of our friends can stay with us, but the rules of engagement can change. Those rules can be the rules of support, can be the rules of construction, providing economic aid, consulting, training, and also help in terms of capacity building. There could be many many different ways of helping Iraq. 

We spoke earlier about what I would characterize as existential political issues vis a vie your accommodations, or lack thereof with Baghdad and perhaps a lack of buy-in to the system which is essential to holding this country together, but I wanted to talk about other existential issues, and they are natural issues. 

Climate change, we’ve just seen the end of a summit in which small states and large states were supposed to combine and share interests and work towards climate goals. I think the outcomes there were equivocal, but in your neighbourhood, you’re dealing with significant desertification as President Barham Salih said this morning and also water scarcity, which we’re coming off the worst drought in a hundred years,  at least in Syria and I imagine the situation is similar here. 

What can you possibly do to secure essential water supplies, especially given that two of your rivers, or one of them I should say, runs through Turkey and Syria itself? 

There are things that we can do, and there are things that only God can do. We cannot make rain fall on us if God doesn’t want it. That’s different, but with the scarcity of water and with droughts and, you know, no… dry seasons like we’ve had last year and this year. This is going to pose significant environmental challenges to Iraq and the region as a whole. And this climate change is global, it’s not just in Iraq, it’s global. So we all are collectively facing this, and I think if I could just make a general remark. If we don’t respect the earth, if we don't respect the environment, the environment and earth are going to retaliate against us. So we need to be respectful of the environment we live in.

Now to get back to some more specific questions you mentioned. Of course, because of understanding the danger of water supplies and issues, unfortunately, there are international laws that deal with this, but if we look at the sources of water that come into Iraq, there are two major rivers that enter Iraq from Turkey. One directly, which is the Tigris, and then the other one which is the Euphrates that comes through Syria and then enters Iraq. Any sort of blockage of this water or flow of this water is going to negatively affect the situation in Iraq. And I think again this is a collective responsibility.

Nobody should think that if I secure my situation, and in this case it’s food security, then I don’t care what happens to my neighbour because that neighbour can pose different threats to the security of the country of the source. There would be more migrations, there could be more, you know, bad economy. It could lead and give birth to more extremism and terrorism. So we are in this together. We can’t just think about our own security as an isolated entity, we have to look at collective security in the region. And this is important. 

Now the waters, for instance, that feed both lakes of Dukan and Darbandikhan have been diverted. But if these lakes dry out, if the economic situation in this region falls apart, then what happens? These people have to… it’s human nature, they look for ways to survive, and those ways could not necessarily be helpful to the neighbouring countries. The best way to help Iraq, the best way to help these people would be to help improve the living conditions in this country so that we can basically be of better use. 

Now, what we have done in this cabinet we anticipated this problem. We’ve decided to build 23 dams. Some of them are small, some medium, and some of them are relatively large in size. The small and medium-size ones are under construction, and for the larger ones, we need funds. So one way to deal with these water issues is to help us finance these dams that can actually help survive and save people here. It’s not just in Kurdistan but it’s in the rest of the country. 

We think that by holding water reservoirs and holding water and creating these dams, it can not only help people survive but it could also contribute to climate change, to agriculture, it can help industry, it can help tourism, so in many ways it can be beneficial, and this is our policy and I hope that the beginning we may need some hands of support but at the end, I’m sure this will pay off, and not only for us but for everybody that engages with us. 

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