US ambassador hopes Turkey follows their approach in Iraq when dealing with PKK

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region — The US Ambassador to Iraq Matthew Tueller said Tuesday that he hopes Ankara would follow Washington’s approach in dealing with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) by letting Baghdad deal with the group.  

Tueller accompanied by the US Consul General Robert Palladino and the consulate team answered questions from four media outlets including Rudaw for almost an hour about the pressing issues in Iraq and the Kurdistan region.

He said the PKK is a “terrorist organization” and in bed with some non-state Shia militias and cooperating in some areas side by side. 

“So the PKK, we are deeply concerned when Turkey takes actions against the PKK in Iraq because in the long term what that does is, it further weakens the Iraqi forces and challenges the Iraqi state. I would hope that over time Turkey would take the same approach that we do, that our interests really lie in having the Iraqi state able to deal with those areas in which PKK operates and eliminate it as a threat,” the ambassador said.

Despite Baghdad’s concerns, Ankara has been targeting the PKK in the Kurdistan Region and Iraq’s northern cities like Shingal and Makhmour. 

Tueller also emphasized the importance of “political dialogue” in resolving the differences amongst the friends of United States, when he was asked about the recent development within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Sulaimania in a gathering with journalists at the US consulate in Erbil.

The ambassador’s ultimate message was a “strong” Iraqi state working with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that can assert its authority and stand up to some of its neighbors that in stead of helping Iraqi state, help elements that are weakening the state.  “Ultimately the antidote to just about every problem that you’re going to raise with me, I’m going to say is a strong, normal Iraqi state, a state that’s able to operate as a state, that’s able to exercise its sovereignty, that has a monopoly on the use of force and the possession of heavy weapons,” Tueller said.

When asked about the recent development in Sulaimani where the co-president of the main ruling party the PUK Lahur Talabani was removed from office by his cousin and the co-president Bafel Talabani, Tueller avoided specifics.

“Without addressing the specifics of what is happening in Sulaimani , I‘ll give you a general response , it has been the United States position and message  we convey consistently  to all our friends here whether Kurds or Arabs, Sunni or Shia is that their interest and Iraq’s interests are always going to be served as they work trying to find common ground and unify their position,” Tueller told the reporters. “ our message is as a friend of Iraq to tell all our friends that please find ways to resolve these differences through political dialogue through talking with each and certainly any attempts to try to resort to violence would exacerbate the lack of trust..."

The US ambassador said that while President Joe Biden has taken “proportionate” actions against the militias, Washington is careful not to take actions against these militias in a manner that “undermines ultimately what is our interests, which is an Iraqi government that’s able to take on its role.”

Read the full interview transcribed below:

So, we have today the US ambassador to Iraq, ambassador Matt H. Tueller, who has been the ambassador since 2019 here in Iraq, as you all I'm sure know. He is a three time ambassador in Kuwait and to Yemen, so it's amazing to have him here. We also have the new Consul General to Erbil, Robert Palladino and obviously we're here to do an on the record, round table.
 
Tueller: I always look forward to coming up to Erbil and of course particularly engaging with the Media here. It's vibrant and of course you all face challenges, but of course we really admire the manner in which here in this region at least there is some commitment and some ability to grant greater leeway for the media to perform its job. You know how much we respect what the press does, which is why we take time to sit down and talk with you. I want to just make kind of a brief, sort of within - like open up the floor for your questions, of course come recently from what we term the last of our strategic dialogue sessions after having since early 2020, the inner process that was on our part and I think a shared objective of the Iraqi government to reset the foundation of our bilateral relationship which had endured its real challenges in late 2019 and early 2020. 

This most recent session in Washington, I think was successful from our perspective. Prime Minister Khadimi came along with his team which included not only the foreign minister who led the bilateral plenary session along with our secretary of state, but the day before, the Pentagon of the deputy commander of the Joint Operation Center and the national security adviser, including with a participation of senior Peshmerga officers, met with US military counterparts to really sort of discuss what is the nature of the threat? What are the needs? What are the capabilities that the US through its leadership at the International Coalition is able to bring to Iraq. And the clear threats that continue to face the Iraqi security forces. That really provided the underpinning for then the Communique which followed after the meeting in the White House between President Biden and Prime Minister Khadimi that indicated that the United States is now going to, after the 31st of December this year, will no longer have any forces here with a combat role. That obviously doesn't mean that all the US forces are leaving, but it does mean that those who remain will have a mission of providing the enabling support to the Iraqi forces, whether it's the Peshmerga, the Iraqi security forces or the counter terrorism forces to continue to pursue their missions. And to a large extent that's already a transition that has been underway for some time, but we're now committed to having that transition completed by the end of this year. And you will see in the coming months as that there is new leadership of our Combined Joint Task Force, you will see some of the elements such as just in the last few days there has been an announcement about what we have as sort of a Quickly Reaction Forces, part of the coalition forces will be able to provide, And of the other elements that we will be leaving.

But the bottom line is because the request of the Iraqi government is been absolutely clear that they want to maintain and continuing strategic relationship with the US, including in security cooperation and that the Iraqi military forces across the board all said we need these particular areas of support to enable us and those as mentioned in the Communique, include some advisory roles that the Coalition components will undertake, some very specialized training and then also continuing to provide some of the very, very important intelligence that through our capabilities we're able to provide under all those networks of Daesh operating and how they operate. And then just finally, of course what I hope will be signaled in these series of strategic dialogues, and that is we complete that phase and now return to the regular bilateral engagement that will take place under the strategic framework which was signed between our two countries in 2008. That we will now began to really together focus on building out the relationship in the areas of economic cooperation, providing more opportunities for investment of US companies in Iraq, to help Iraq achieve greater energy independence, to foster more culture and education exchanges and to have a relationship that really has a strong foundation because both countries want to see a relationship that's going to endure for decades into the future.
 
You talked about some commitments from the KRG about press freedom. What is the latest in terms of you talking to the Kurdish officials and Kurdish government in terms of press freedom because there have been some pressing issues here in relation to the detention of some journalists, activists?
 
Well, I can say that there isn't a meeting that I have with any senior government or party official here, and I think Robert will say the same, we always reaffirm the US strong commitment to freedom of press. We make the point of course that there has long been a distinctive atmosphere here in the Kurdish Region that has allowed for greater freedom of press compared to neighboring countries. We've expressed concerns that we see some indications that there is some backsliding from that and that’s very dangerous. We think that that is something the Kurdish people themselves, I feel are concerned about. And generally, the responses we get indicate that there is a commitment here on the part of government officials to maintain the freedom of the press. We have differences in some of the details in some of the discussions. But I think on the basic principle, we are aligned. It's now really a question of making sure that in practice that the Kurdish Region continues to foster an atmosphere that we think is part of what has enabled us to have such a special relationship.
 
Are you positive that they're going to foster that atmosphere?

I think there is a commitment to the principle. I think in actual practice what we hope to see is when it gets down to the details how in fact. I hope you and other journalists have seen, you have an open door when it comes to going into senior officials of the KRG that they have tried to reach out and that's something they promised us they will continue to do. Because the dialogue needs to be taking place not between us, as a foreign government and the KRG, but between the KRG and representatives of the fourth estate.
 
We've seen over the past six months trials of at least 17 journalists and activists, some of them have been held in secret, some without proper observation, people have raised concerns about judicial independence, about due process. Have those been raised as well and have you seen any improvements since February when these trials began?
 
Well, I think you've seen that publicly we have consulate here and the state department in Washington has made statements about the first case that was going through. So, both publicly and privately, we have raised this issue. And as I said, we will continue to do so.
 
You talked about the statute agreement between Iraq and the US, the thing that's still not clear is the future role of the US. Will it be like the 2011 withdrawal? Or are there any dangers or threats that Iraq will go back to the after 2011, when US withdrawal the situation gotten worse or is there any threats that the Afghanistan scenario we have been, after US withdrawal in Afghanistan the situation getting worse and the Taliban is getting stronger and taking control of most of the important provinces in Afghanistan. What do you think in the future?
 
The strategic framework agreement that I mentioned which we signed in 2008 and which is ratified by the Iraqi counsel of representatives, was a document that laid out all the areas in which both sides were committing to foster cooperation. There is a very, very brief section of that strategic framework agreement that dealt with security but only in very general terms. And saying that based on mutual agreement, the two countries would engage in security cooperation. We did not sign at that time, what we would call a defense cooperation agreement which would've included a status of forces. And by 2011 because we had not been able to reach an agreement on the Iraqi government establishing a legal basis for any remaining US forces, at that time PM Maliki decided to have the US forces withdraw. Although, in practice they remained in a capacity for a certain amount of time continuing to act as training and enabling forces, although no longer as a combat force. I think as we have engaged in this discussion most recently, everybody had in mind that in fact part of the vacuum that was left with the departure of the US forces and some of the decisions made by the then Iraqi government hollowed out the capabilities of their own forces contributed in a large measure to the collapse of the Iraqi army, the rapid speed with which ISIS was able to siege such vast amounts of Iraq that nobody wanted to see that scenario repeat. And so, I think that what we consistently heard from all the Iraqi security forces and others from the Iraqi army ,the CTS the Peshmerga is that notwithstanding a political decision that have been made by a vote in parliament in January 5th to call the government to have all foreign forces withdraw that the military assessment was that that needed to be done in a way that would not leave a vacuum that could be exploited. And particularly since the role of the coalition, our mandate is to fight ISIS that that did not allow an opportunity for ISIS to resurge. We are aware that there are other threats within Iraq other than ISIS. Here you deal with PKK which often is clashing with Peshmerga or engage in activities that are creating instability, causing villages and others to have to vacate and also is invited in military presence of Turkey without the concurrence of the Iraqi government. And of course that throughout Iraq there are armed militias that are not under the authority and command of the state. So there are a variety of security threats that the Iraqi security forces face. But as a coalition, our mission, our legal mandate is confined to dealing with the threat of ISIS since we believe that there is still a residual capacity of ISIS and although they've been territorially defeated, there are areas within Iraq and in northeast Syria that are still able to operate in remote geographic areas or in areas where mountainous difficult terrain gives them capability to operate. And even now, I think almost on a daily basis one or two areas where they're able to .. hit and run attacks against electricity infrastructure, set up moving roadblocks where they assassinate or kill or extort local population. There is still very much an ISIS mission here. Obviously, if our mission here continues to give the strength and morale capacity of Iraqi security forces, we believe that also ultimately it will enable those forces to take on any other security threat. Ultimately, what we hope, both through the role that the US led coalition will play but also as we really indicate that the US is here for the long haul.

The question on the intention of is the US about to withdraw, I think clearly that is not on the mind of President Biden. He understands the importance of Iraq, the importance of the US to Iraq, the importance of Iraq in the region. And that the security of the middle east is the security of Iraq. And we need to be involved here so that the strong Iraqi state can emerge to deal with a number of threats that Iraqis face and prevent Iraq to become an area where threats emanate and spread out to the region. Whether extremists ideologies, armed non-state actors or the very pernicious influence of corruption, of sectarianism, of tribalism, of all of these influences that serve to weaken states in the region. 

Which regional country is going to benefit from American withdrawal, your troops will stay here and not leave Iraq but they work under another name or another task?

There would be another task, that is what we are signaling, that in fact the Iraqi security forces  are now able to shoulder the responsibility for conducting the operations against ISIS. That the role of the US led coalition will now move or continue what is already being an ongoing transition to the final phase of the campaign plan which is a lot more about normalization and that has more to do with combat role which still is necessary and conducted by Iraqis but that the role of coalition and what the US is able to bring and I don’t think what we are doing is a mistake , I think it actually is what serves ultimately to strengthen the Iraqi state is that we will help to bring about the conditions that will prevent the atmosphere from which Isis was able to rise that our presence here will mean that there will be a stronger state, a stronger Iraqi security force, that in those liberated areas that populations will be able to return from areas from which they were displaced and the government will be present providing security , providing electricity , services , health, housing , jobs and as that happens that means that there will be no prospect for Isis or any other similar groups to exploit the absence of the state in order to arise. So that is the phase we are going into and I think that is capabilities that the US brings because of the skills we have  also because the US is able to marshal international support in the way no other country can. And I talk about the coalition, there are actually 92 countries and international organisations that are part of the coalition that the US has been able to mobilize and about 12 of those countries actually have forces that are on the ground. And those forces likewise will be in an enabling role to assist the Iraqi forces.

The US presence strengthens the Iraqi state. But that’s not what some parts of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which are ultimately a legitimate force here, that’s not what they’re saying. A few days ago, our reporter in Baghdad spoke to the spokesperson of the Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada and they said we don’t accept change of clothes for the American and for the coalition troops. So many people may agree with you, that your presence here strengthens the Iraqi state. But there is a disruptive force that doesn’t accept that. And it seems they’re continuing to push that. Just last month we had drones flying over Erbil, attacking different locations. How do you resolve that contradiction within the Iraqi state?
 
Of course we understand that the institution of the Popular Mobilization Forces is not a monolithic force, that it contains many elements, that there were many young Iraqis who responded to the call to defend their country from ISIS and the Popular Mobilization Force was a way to mobilize that and allow them to play a role. Unfortunately, it also provided an umbrella under which certain non-state actors with their own agenda, in many cases a sectarian agenda, or an agenda that was really enacting a vision of Iraq that’s at odds with what the Iraqi state itself sees. And that is ultimately a job now for the Iraqi government to reconcile the fact that they have these elements within Iraq that, when they attacked us as the US, whether it’s an embassy or our forces, their real objective is attacking the Iraqi state. Our presence here has given them the pretext to conduct activities where they want to continue to weaken the Iraqi state, to show that they have a legitimacy, a force, a presence that is greater than, more important, should be listened to more than the Iraqi state.
 
We believe absolutely that our interests as a country lie in a strong Iraqi state. And we believe that most Iraqis want to see a strong Iraqi state because what they want to see is a government that’s able to provide security, it’s able to provide jobs. And those elements that are weakening the state are actually working against Iraqi national interests.
 
So then who actually speaks for the Iraqi state? Is it the prime minister and the minister of defence and the joint operations commander? Or is it the self-appointed head of a shadowy group that gives themselves a very sexy sounding name, but in fact who do they really speak for, who do they represent? We think that if the Iraqi state is not able to assert its authority, then most Iraqis will feel that they don’t have a government that’s doing its job and that the government needs to be able to ultimately bring under control these non-state actors. I don’t think Iraqis want to see a militia state. I don’t think they want to see a state where there’s groups that operate outside the reach of law and command and control of the military. But that’s a job for Iraqis, that’s not necessarily a job for us.

Thinking forward from that, there’s the election coming up. Should the government of Iraq change its opinion, despite the military arguments about the need for US and coalition presence to do training, intelligence and all the things that we talked about, should the government change its policy on that and ask the coalition to leave, will the coalition do that?

Absolutely, there’s no question about that. Our presence is here, the only legal reason, the only basis on which the United States can have a force here, and not only the United States, but all of the other coalition partners, is because we are here at the request and invitation of the Iraqi government.
 
Does that include the Kurdistan Region? Because there’s a lot of concern up here that should that happen this area would be vulnerable to the other kinds of threats that we also discussed.
 
Well as you all know, when that vote was taken in the parliament on January 5th of 2020, it deviated, although it was a vote that there was a quorum and there was a majority of votes, it deviated from the spirit of Iraq in terms of all components acting on consensus. As you know, the Kurdish and Sunni representatives were not present and they have always questioned whether it’s in Iraqi’s interest to call for the withdrawal of those forces. So that’s where we’ve been really for the last year and a half, plus. I think that through the manner in which Prime Minister Kadhimi has managed the issues, and what you saw after the communiqué is it was really welcomed by the main political parties, particularly the main Shia political parties. No question there were voices, you know, from some of these elements that style themselves as the resistance that were questioning that, doing that. But I saw important statements from Fatah party leaders, from Sairoon party leaders, from Nasr and others that all said what the prime minister’s done and achieved we welcome because this is in fact consistent with Iraqi interests. And we have no problem with any Iraqi prime minister or political leader who says this is what we want based on Iraqi interests. What we have a problem with is when there are voices that call for things that we think are actually calling on behalf of frankly an Iranian agenda or Iranian interests or any other outside party, rather than an Iraqi interest.
 
Just to drill down on that. Should there be a demand for withdrawal that would cover all of Iraq including the Kurdistan Region?
 
Yeah, we would have to. The legal basis for our presence here goes back to 2014 when the Iraqi government asked us directly. We asked them then to make that request through the United Nations, which they did. We had an exchange of notes between our embassy and the foreign ministry. The basis for our presence here rests entirely on the invitation of the Iraqi government. I know where you’re heading on that. We deal with the Iraqi government. If there were, obviously between Baghdad and Erbil there still an evolving relationship that ebbs and flows, it would be challenging. But up till now, I don’t think that that’s an issue that divides Baghdad and Erbil.
 
On that point about your presence here, when you talk to people, people are concerned about the US presence. In August 2014 when Erbil was threatened, it was the United States that came to the rescue. So people rely and trust in the United States. But now, given all the problems that exist in Baghdad and what Win just discussed, they’re concerned about your presence here. There are concerns whether they can rely on the US given what’s going on around them, given the hardliners coming to power in Iran, given the way they go on about their business, attacking coalition forces, even allegedly carrying out assassinations here. What do you have to say to the Kurdish people here who see the United States as an ally?
 
Well, again just as in the communiqué the Iraqi government reaffirmed that it has the desire to have the US-led coalition present here, we reaffirmed on our side that we’re committed to a long-lasting strategic relationship. That means that our involvement, our interests in Iraq are enduring. This, however, will ultimately be about a lot more than the presence of US forces and their role and doing that, although if you look around the world, it’s very, very normal that with our important partnerships everywhere around the world there’s a security aspect to the relationship. That doesn’t mean that that is… it doesn’t dominate that and it certainly doesn’t mean that because we have troops in Japan, or Germany, or the UK, or Korea, or the 80 plus countries around the world where we have forces, that is not in any way something that undermines the sovereignty of that country. In fact in most cases those countries regard it as a way that in fact boosts their security, that sends a signal that they have partners that are going to be able to deter against any potential threat, that brings their own forces, and through organizations that we are part of, security organizations like NATO and other, that we work together with military partners so that we don’t have to face a threat we can deter. That’s what we hope ultimately we reach a state with Iraq.
 
For the moment of course Iraq actually has active, ongoing threats and that means that there has to be a particular focus on exactly what is the role of those forces that Iraq asked to come in. But I think that we’ve hit on a sweet spot and that’s something that serves the interests of both countries.

You talked about the attacks and the threats of the Iranian backed militia groups against the US bases or US embassy and coalition forces bases. The response has been different from the Trump administration and Biden administration. The attacks still continue but the response from the US government, the Trump administration and Biden administration, has been very, very different. If those attacks continue, what will the US position or reaction be?
 
I think twice President Biden has actually authorized a kinetic response, a military response to attacks that have taken place against our facilities, including as you know that attack on the airport here in Erbil where a US contractor was killed. President Biden is determined however to make sure that our responses are proportionate, are measured and are taken in a way that serves as a signal of our intent to act in self-defense and to preserve our right to do that, without doing it in a way that undermines ultimately what is our interests, which is an Iraqi government that’s able to take on its role. And if you look in the communiqué language, the Iraqi government affirmed and we acknowledged that it is the role of the Iraqi government to provide for the security of those guests and forces that are here in Iraq.
 
That said, we’ve made very clear that if the Iraqi government is unable to do that, we reserve the right to act in self-defence if we’re attacked.
 
As you know, the United States is going to build one of the biggest consulates here in Erbil.
 
Yes.
 
But after the attacks on spaces in Erbil and other areas, how will the United States confront those paramilitary groups that are responsible for this? Of, if I speak clearly, is there any possibility to confront Iran on Iraqi soil?
 
I certainly hope not. And I think our intention, of course we do not want to see our tensions with Iran play out in Iraq, because again, as a country, our interest is in seeing Iraq as a stable country where all those forces that are serving right now to weaken the Iraqi state are mitigated. We think there are others in the region that in fact would like to see a weak Iraqi state, that it gives them opportunities to pursue separate agendas. So we have a different vision of Iraq and its potential, we think, than some of its neighbours.
 
The real question of course is whether the very troubled US-Iranian relationship. President Biden has made very clear that we want to resolve our differences with Iran through diplomatic means, and we’re going to pursue diplomatic means. We hope that Iran will reciprocate, that they will use diplomatic means, whether it’s through the talks in Vienna on the JCPOA or through other avenues to reduce the tensions about the other areas of Iranian behavior that are troubling. The problem that we see is Iran, and of course this is an ongoing manner in which they conduct themselves in this region, is they use armed proxies or other groups that actually conduct attacks and put pressure on behalf of Iran, allowing Iran to maintain some level of deniability about their involvement. Yet they’re able to conduct attacks against facilities in Saudi Arabia, against tankers or ships in the Gulf, all while claiming well this was not Iran. In this most recent incident involving the attack on the Mercer Street, the vessel, the United States, our G7 partners and others have all been very clear: we know who was responsible for this attack, there’s no question about that. And we’ve all indicated that there will be a response. Iran cannot believe that it can continue to conduct diplomacy on one level while on the other hand, under the table, continuing to pursue its objectives through illegitimate means.
 
There’s some rumours about Bashur base, the one near Harir, that there is an evacuation plan, or something like that. Is there any truth to that?
 
There’s no plans at the moment, and again when I talked about sort of the overall presence here, our presence again has some very, very specific tasks that are being undertaken in order to enable the Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga. We will adjust the presence of where we are in Bashur, is a very, very small element that has a role, again its focused purely on dealing with exploiting some of the ISIS prisoners and seizure material from ISIS. But I can’t say for certain at this point where we might choose to move some of the troops around. CENTCOM is looking at that at the moment.
 
Another security threat that you mentioned earlier, with regard to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, is the ongoing conflict between the PKK and Turkey here. As a NATO ally of Turkey, which is in many ways violating the sovereignty of Iraq, another partner Iraq is having its sovereignty violated. How is the US balancing those interests, along with its other interests in the broader region?
 
We have long designated PKK as a terrorist organization. It has a long history of attacks against civilians, attacks against interests in Turkey. Now as it has found ways to operate within Iraq, partly because they can in some cases operate in remote areas that are difficult to access, but also they’re capable to take advantage of the weakness of the Iraqi state and the inability of the elements of the Iraqi state to project its influence and presence in all areas of the country. So the PKK, in some sense, has become an ally with, and we see an intertwining of the PKK with some of the armed, non-state Shia militias. In some cases they now cooperate side by side. We see the presence of PKK and elements of Shia militias in Sinjar, for example, challenging the authority of the state and the intent on the part of the state, whether between Erbil and Baghdad, to implement an agreement that we think actually would certainly help to reduce the tensions, but it’s these non-state actors.
 
So the PKK, we are deeply concerned when Turkey takes actions against the PKK in Iraq because in the long term what that does is it further weakens the Iraqi forces and challenges the Iraqi state. I would hope that over time Turkey would take the same approach that we do, that our interests really lie in having the Iraqi state able to deal with those areas in which PKK operates and eliminate it as a threat.
 
So what is the solution? Iraqi sovereignty is being violated by Turkey. Iraqi citizens of Kurdish origins are being killed by bombs dropped from F16s and drones. PKK is abusing its power here. It’s on Iraqi territory, it’s again violating the Iraqi state, it weakens the Iraqi state. So what is the solution for this conflict between Turkey and the PKK, which has been ongoing for the last four decades?
 
Well again, I come back, I keep repeating. Ultimately the antidote to just about every problem that you’re going to raise with me, I’m going to say is a strong, normal Iraqi state, a state that’s able to operate as a state, that’s able to exercise its sovereignty, that has a monopoly on the use of force and the possession of heavy weapons. If you were to ask me about corruption, how do we deal with the issue of corruption that’s endemic. I would say that we need to have an Iraqi state that’s able to confront corrupt actors and hold them to account under rule of law. And if you ask me what do you do about the problem that you have neighbouring states that meddle and interfere in Iraqi politics, I’d say the answer to that again is to help the Iraqi state to stand up, to be strong, to assert its authority.
 
Then the answer, why isn’t there a state already that is able to do that. And of course there’s a long history of Iraq being in a post-conflict situation. This is a country that has endured now decades of dictatorship, of civil war, of armed actors and terrorism. And then of course, most recently, a third of its territory that was overrun by one of the most extreme, virulent ideologies that we’ve seen arise under this region. Then, in addition to that, you have Iraq’s neighbours that, rather than helping Iraqi to stand up and become a strong state, often actually act to support some of those elements that are weakening the Iraqi state. The US interest is in helping Iraqis to have the country that helps Iraq to achieve its potential and that’s what our presence here we think contributes to and what we hope.
 
You mentioned of course that we’ve got this presence here in Erbil. It is, that consulate building, and indicator that we intend to be here for the long term, that we believe that there’s an investment in this Kurdish region that can be transformational for Iraq and for the region, that the vision that the Kurds have of being part of an autonomous region within a strong Iraqi state is going to serve the best interest of the Kurdish people. But it depends on having that successful Iraqi state. What happens to the Kurdish region if the Iraqi state starts to disintegrate? We think that also our friends here in the Kurdish region have the same interest in seeing a successful government, a successful state, a political formula in Baghdad that doesn’t elect into parliament parties that are fronts for armed militia groups, that are trying to enact a vision for Iraq that is not an Iraqi vision, but in fact an Iranian, sectarian revolutionary ideology that does not mesh well with Iraqi culture and certainly not with Iraqi interests.
 
So it’s a tough problem. I’m hopeful that this upcoming election will deliver a result that will change somewhat the formula that emerged in 2018, which in some respects was a product of how poor the turnout was and how much these parties affiliated with militias were able to suppress the vote and then get a presence. And what can you expect of how strong a government’s going to be if its political base within a parliament rests in part on parties that have militias that challenge the authority of the state?

Just on the PKK issue. It’s been nearly a year since the Sinjar agreement between Baghdad and Erbil and supported by the US and all of the international communities. The agreement calls out all the militia groups, including PKK and Shia militias to get out of Sinjar so the Yazidis can go back to their homes and provide security by the Iraqi forces. But nothing has happened. What will the US position be if the PKK or those groups don’t leave and Iraqi government, as you said, is too weak to act to force those groups to get out of Sinjar and those areas? What will the US position be if those tensions or problems continue in Sinjar?
 
We think the Sinjar agreement was a good agreement. It’s the basic model that we think will help ultimately to resolve the issues in Sinjar. I know that there are many people who were disappointed in how little has been done on that. I would not say that nothing’s been done, but I’m certainly disappointed that on some of the key issues, particularly on security and local administration, we still have a long way to go. There has been some progress in the hiring of locals for that security force. Part of that was impeded by the absence of a budget, which prevented the Ministry of the Interior on some of that hiring. I think that we just need to continue to work, to push that. But as you said, there are elements that are determined not to adhere to the instructions of the state. There are elements of the Hashd that do not want to withdraw from the area and have disregarded the orders of the commander-in-chief to do so. The PKK, which is present there, has not really withdrawn either. Maybe they’ve gone to the outskirts of the city, but they still maintain their presence there.
 
Ultimately I hope to see that simultaneously, both on the security front as we stand up that local security force, have patriotic, nationalist Iraqi forces from the army that are able to go in and ensure the withdrawal of those elements that now are contributing to the insecurity, and then the appointment of a mayor and local administration in consultation with local residents that is seen by local residents as not a puppet of or a proxy for any political interest or party, that then we can start to see some progress. As you know, the US government has invested an awful lot of our development and stabilization resources in areas like Sinjar to try to ensure that residents can have hopes that as they return there’s housing, there’s water, there’s schools, there’s hospitals. But they’re not going to return if there isn’t security and if they don’t feel that there’s a local administration. So we’ve got some ways to go on that.
 
There is a fear among Kurds of being abandoned by the United States, as we see it before, in Syria, for example. Some accused the Trump cabinet and some others normalize it and say there’s friends or foes in politics. My question is what is the upcoming United States strategy for the Kurds in this year?
 
Well, as I said, we recognize that Iraq has a very, very distinct and remarkable character. That is a reason why the Iraqis chose a constitution that provided for an autonomous Kurdish region. And that largely, while that formula has had some rough spots, that ultimately I think both those in Baghdad and those in Erbil agree that this is really the way to continue forward. So we support that and it’s why we will invest very strongly in our presence here because we think ultimately having that strong, stable autonomous Kurdish region within a strong, stable Iraqi federal state, is what could be transformational for this region.
 
I think Iraqis have a huge interest themselves in seeing a government emerge that is consistent with the vision of the Iraqi constitution, which says that no matter what your ethnicity, no matter what your sect, no matter your background, you’re an Iraqi citizen and the law applies equally to all and the protections of the government apply equally to all. Has the Iraqi government achieved that vision yet? No. But I think that’s the vision that we want to see implemented. If that happens, we think that that action begins to signal to this whole region that in fact it’s ridiculous to say that democracy somehow can’t work in the Middle East, that people in the Middle East aren’t ready for, don’t understand what it is to have responsibility for their own lives, their own decisions about their future. We think that Iraq has the potential to demonstrate to everybody that that’s not true. In fact in Iraq, whether you’re Arab or Kurd or Turkmen or Yazidi, Shia, Sunni, that if your identity is ‘I am part of an Iraqi state and I have an identity whatever my own particular background is, but it’s within an Iraqi state.’ Is this going to happen in the next two years? No. But could it happen over the coming generation? Absolutely. And it should happen. Because what if it doesn’t happen? What if Iraq continues on this trajectory of being a state where Iraqis feel somehow that because of my ethnicity or my religion I’m a second class citizen in my own state? They will not then be invested in trying to ensure the prosperity and stability of Iraq’s state. And ultimately I think that will put Iraq at great risk, becoming an era of instability and problems that will be exported throughout the region.
 
Today, Fuad Hussein went to Tehran. He seemed to have a message, an invitation to the Iranians to talk to the Saudis, I think in Iraq. What is the US position on that, in Iraq playing a greater role?
 
My understanding, actually what he was doing was delivering an invitation that the Prime Minister Kadhimi has extended to a number of heads of state, regional countries to come to Baghdad for a conference really about supporting Iraqi sovereignty, committing from all Iraq’s neighbours that they’re going to in fact not take actions that undermine the Iraqi government and Iraqi state. I hope he’s successful in this. I think it’s very difficult. I know that the invitations have been extended by the foreign minister in Ankara, in Riyadh, and then today he’s gone to Tehran. I think that the foreign ministry in Baghdad has announced that this conference is to take place on the 28th of this month. I know that French President Macron intends to participate, as a representative of sort of the international community and our collective desire to indicate our support for the Iraqi government and Iraqi state. It remains to be seen, I think, whether this will produce anything other than maybe some window dressing. I would love to see, actually, the endeavor succeed, but I’ll wait and see what happens.
 
If there is something on the sidelines between the Saudis and Iran with the help of the Iraqs…
 
There had earlier been some, the Iraqi government was able to enable, I think that’s largely been diverted to other channels and I’m not aware at this time that there’s any ongoing Saudi-Iranian talks in Iraq.
 
On the elections, there’s a lot of talks that the election won’t happen or will be postponed for three or six months as well. And given one of the powerful Shia movements, Sadr movements, withdrew, boycotting the elections and some other parties as well, boycotting the elections. What’s your view? Will the election happen or…? Given the situation as well, there’s a lot of tensions, security problems?
 
Well the government of Prime Minister Kadhimi came in with a program that included calling for early elections and I know that he feels very strongly that he has an obligation to respond to that demand from the Iraqi people, that actually led to the resignation of the prior government under the demonstrations in late 2019. And so I know that he personally feels a very, very strong commitment and would have liked, I know, and originally intended to call the elections for June, but when confronted with the reality of what the election commission and others told him about the task before, had set the date in October.
 
I believe most of the political parties have committed and support holding the election on the date in October. I certainly hope it happens. In Iraq anything’s possible, but I think there seems to be a lot of momentum towards holding the election.
 
Then the question is will the election be conducted in a manner that restores the trust of the Iraqi people in the electoral process. In 2018, part of the reason these more extreme parties were able to make gains in the election is because the turnout was so low, in fact in part because they worked so hard to suppress the turnout. And they ultimately were able to use that voter suppression and other illegitimate means to advance their own representation.
 
The Iraqi government earlier this year approached us and other members of the Security Council to ask for the Security Council to expand the mandate to UNAMI to give UNAMI a role in doing more than just technical assistance to the election, but to actually play a role in monitoring the process and in a sense validating the process. Likewise the EU has been approached and has agreed to send a monitoring mission. We hope that with this international presence monitoring the election, along with other measures that the government should take will signal to the Iraqi people that you can go out and vote and you can be safe in voting, your vote will count, it won’t be fraudulently taken away from you. And if the Iraqi people demonstrate in the turnout in this election that they still have faith in the democratic process, we think that that actually can begin a process and maybe Iraq will enter a new phase of electoral results that will put in place politicians who interests lie in making alliances across ethnic and sectarian grounds so that governments will be formed that won’t be saying ‘this is a Shia government, this is an Arab government.’ But it will be a government that will be an Iraqi government, that every component will have a stake in the success of that government because there will be, as often is the case in parliamentary systems where you have to form coalitions, that those coalitions come together in order to work on a larger cause with everybody sort of having their own interests represented within that cause.