Strained bilateral relations between the US and Turkey have not been resolved by Wednesday’s deal to create a join ‘safe zone’ in northern Syria, Tahiroglu told Rudaw’s Roj Eli Zalla on this week’s edition of The Washington Perspective.
Instead, the vagueness of the deal illustrates just how incompatible US and Turkish interests are in northern Syria, she added.
The following is an abridged version of Tahiroglu’s interview.
Will the safe zone be another Afrin?
The difference will be that in here, in northeast Syria, Americans will be involved and I don’t believe that they would allow for any of these proxies to partake in any kind of safe zone 
I think the idea of the safe zone or peace corridor in the rest of northeast Syria is going to be a little bit different. Because in Afrin, Turkey effectively had a green light from all sides to do whatever military operation it wanted to do, and the idea for Turkey was to completely remove the YPG and the Kurdish leadership there. So it is much more of an occupation zone and it was much more of a serious military operation.
The motivation is always going to be there and Turkey’s main motivation in all of these cases, because it’s a political situation for Turkey, is to make sure that YPG, anybody affiliated with YPG, or even sympathizing with the YPG must be removed, so that means when Turkey is looking to clear any zone from anywhere in Syria, that will involve I think targeting a lot of people who are largely bystanders in this whole picture, and that is what we are talking about with the human rights abuses.
That said, much of the human rights abuses that Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have been showing us that happened in Afrin seem to have been perpetrated by the proxy groups that Turkey has been using in that operation and also with the Euphrates Shield operation in that zone.
The difference will be that in here, in northeast Syria, Americans will be involved and I don’t believe that they would allow for any of these proxies to partake in any kind of safe zone, securitizing mission in here, because the idea is the security of the zone would be conducted by the United States and Turkey jointly and potentially with an outside partner.
But either way I don’t think the Americans will allow the same sort of looting that happened in Afrin by the proxies that Turkey was using at the time who are very Islamist and jihadist sympathizing, if not jihadist elements themselves.
Is the US-Turkey ‘safe zone’ deal significant?
Ultimately there is a reality that everybody needs to face, which is that America’s goals in Syria are incompatible with Turkey’s goals Now there are lots of problems with that because none of the issues that have been plaguing the relationship have gone away, even including with regards to northern Syria. The two statements coming out of the two sides about this agreement are incredibly vague and open to interpretation. The major issue, such as how deep is this safe zone going to be, how long is it going to be, who is actually going to be manning it and securing it, none of these have been addressed.
Ultimately there is a reality that everybody needs to face, which is that America’s goals in Syria are incompatible with Turkey’s goals. So the idea that they can agree to something like a safe zone is a rather easy statement they can make and it’s very encouraging but it’s not going to solve any of the problems because at the end of the day what the two sides want to accomplish are not only incompatible, they are contradictory.
What does it mean for US-Turkey relations?
Given the anti-Americanism that has been emanating from Turkey over the last few years, especially in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in Turkey in 2016, it is a big question mark as to whether Turkey even wants to be a part of NATO. When we look at the picture with all of this, then the safe zone is actually a way for Turkey to cooperate with the United States and show its American counterparts that there is still room for cooperation between the two sides and help alleviate some of the other problems that are bringing down the relationship.
Part of the most recent disagreements between the two sides has to do with this purchase of the S-400 system. This is a really big move Turkey made by choosing to acquire this system, because Russia is one of the top adversaries of the United States. It’s also one of the top advisories of the transatlantic alliance, of NATO.
And the idea that Turkey made this purchase has first of all threatened the F-35 – America’s next generation fighter plane – so now Turkey is effectively removed from the F-35 program, and Turkey has actually participated in this program, it has a major role in the cooproduction and the refueling of the jets, so the idea that Turkey was removed from it is already a major consequence for this action.
But in the big picture of things, it is also communicated to the United States that Turkey is potentially not a willing member of NATO and not a full participant of the NATO alliance. Given the anti-Americanism that has been emanating from Turkey over the last few years, especially in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in Turkey in 2016, it is a big question mark as to whether Turkey even wants to be a part of NATO. The Americans, especially in Congress, are questioning the value of Turkey as a strategic partner for the United States.
One of the more practical implications of the S-400 deal is of course also triggering sanctions by the United States under the CAATSA legislation – the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
What Erdogan wants to show his domestic audience is that he can strong arm the United States into giving in to Turkish demands So we do know that the two issues are very much intertwined … and Turkey’s recent purchase of the S-400 is very much part of that debate.
One thing that this shows us is that Trump sees holding back on the CAATSA sanctions as the concession he’s giving Erdogan in exchange for Turkish restraint when it comes to Syria.
Erdogan is definitely looking at his own cards and seeing himself as the winner in this game because he is getting everything, almost everything he wants.
What Erdogan wants to show his domestic audience is that he can strong arm the United States into giving in to Turkish demands, and having joint patrols in a 10 to 15 km zone in northern Syria is something Erdogan can easily sell his own electorate as a political win, not only as a win in itself in terms of what he wants to accomplish in Syria but also as a win against the United States, and that is definitely a big selling point politically in Turkey right now.
This might turn out to be like the Manbij discussions and we may not actually see any safe zone being created over the next few months. This might be from the United States point of view a stalling tactic to get Erdogan to hold off on any kind of military threats or operation in Syria unilaterally and to continue the dialogue between the two sides without taking any concrete steps.
