Iraqi defense ministry unwilling to cooperate against ISIS: senior Peshmerga official

A senior Peshmerga official has blamed continued Islamic State (ISIS) activities in areas disputed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi government on Baghdad’s unwillingness to work in coordination with Kurdish forces. 

Speaking from Sulaimani with Rudaw's Sangar Abdulrahman and Hevidar Zana on Thursday, KRG Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs chief of staff Jabar Yawar said his forces are capable of filling the security voids in the disputed territories themselves - but the Iraqi government does not allow them to do so. 

ISIS swept through parts of Iraq and neighboring Syria in the summer of 2014. The extremist militant group, otherwise known by their Arabic acronym Daesh, were declared territorially defeated in Iraq in December 2017, but continue to conduct deadly attacks on security forces and civilians. According to Yawar, Peshmerga ministry data shows that ISIS attacks have not only failed to subside since last year, but have actually increased – putting the number of terrorist incidences on par with levels recorded in 2014, when the group were at their peak.

This interview has been edited for brevity and clarity.

Rudaw: What is the current capacity and manpower of Islamic State (ISIS) following the attack they most recently launched on Peshmerga forces in Kolajo?

Jabar Yawar:
First, I would like to extend my condolences to the families of the two brave martyrs who two days ago sacrificed their lives to protect the land of the Kurdistan Region... As we have said before, the group has not stopped their movements and activities since they were declared defeated at the end of 2017.

Daesh has ended only as a caliphate - they still operate as a terrorist group, not just in Iraqi government-controlled areas or disputed areas, or parts of Syria.

According to our data, the group increased its activities in 2018 and 2019, especially in Kurdistani areas outside of the Kurdistan Region administration including Diyala, Hamrin, Kirkuk, Tuz Khurmatu and Qarachogh. In Qarachogh, they even established bases. As you know, an American soldier died and American and French soldiers were wounded in a Coalition operation in these areas. 

Do you have any data on how many attacks have so far been staged by ISIS in 2020?

According to past data, Daesh launched 456 terrorist attacks in 2014. In 2019, they launched nearly 300 attacks. Only four months into 2020, they have so far launched 100 attacks.
    
Where are they most active?

In Qarachogh, where they have bases and shelters in the nearby mountains…The reason why Kolajo has seen so many acts of terrorism is its geography and topography. The area is full of ponds and dense trees, making it very difficult for our forces to protect it and making it easy for the Daesh militants to hide. 

They operate most in Diyala because most of the security voids are in that province. In some parts there is 60-kilometer long security void, in others it is 40 kilometers. Such large swathes of territory have become a safe haven for the terrorists. To make money, they have undertaken kidnappings, making up to $100,000 or $200,000 in ransoms. Sometimes, they extort so-called taxes from farmers and shepherds in areas within their reach.

Do you have any information on the Islamic State's current finances and manpower in Iraq and Syria?

The numbers vary…when they operated under the Caliphate they controlled large swathes of ground and had a massive number of force members, so you knew how many of them they were.

Now that the caliphate is defeated, we hear different figures. Sometimes their numbers are put at 20,000, other times at 12,000, or 5,000. There is no stable figure. The problem now is that they have regrouped to operate in small-scale cells.

Has Daesh capitalized on coronavirus containment measures taken by the governments to re-organize themselves?


No, coronavirus has nothing to do with Daesh’s growing terrorist activities. We have repeatedly warned that the Iraqi government - especially the defense ministry - has not come forward to establish coordination between the Peshmerga and Iraqi Army in these [disputed] areas.

The existence of a huge military void between us and the Iraqi army across the length of 1000 kilometers from Khanaqin all the way up to Rabia area [on Syrian border] is another problem as there is no armed force to control this large swathe of territory. The Daesh group has seized this opportunity to establish their bases there and move freely.

The Iraqi armed forces are being negligent. They cannot sufficiently protect areas they are in control of. The majority of attacks staged against the Peshmerga bases and observation posts do not originate from Kurdistan Region land, but from areas on the side of the Iraqi army. 

With the Kolajo attack [on April 7], the militants fired bullets and mortars from the side of the Iraqi army-controlled region. They also used snipers and long-range weapons.

We have not withdrawn Peshmerga troops from their bases due to the coronavirus. Our forces are still stationed across the defense line we protect from Khanaqin to Rabia, to protect the Kurdistan Region from any threats posed by the Daesh terrorists.

In the past, there were joint Iraqi Ministry of Defense and [KRG] Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs committees, working to establish joint Iraqi Army and Peshmerga forces to the disputed areas and fill the security voids.

Why did the committees stop working?

When [now caretaker PM] Adil Abdul-Mahdi was prime minister at the end of 2018, he decreed the formation of a high-level defense ministry committee to engage in talks with the Kurdistan Region for coordination centers to be established in Diyala, Saladin, Kirkuk, Erbil and Mosul. He also decided that joint forces would be set up to start joint operations and protect areas where Daesh is active.

We at the Peshmerga ministry immediately responded to the call and formed a committee. We even initiated talks between the two sides - we held a meeting in Erbil, agreeing on a good set of mechanisms to resume joint work with. We then visited Baghdad to follow up on the talks we held. But unfortunately, throughout 2019, they were only ready to talk with us twice. At both meetings, we made clear we were ready for cooperation. 

As Peshmerga, we can single-handedly fill the security gap and never let Daesh get near us. But the Iraqi government is neither serious about coordination, nor have they allowed us to fill the security void.

Is now not the right time to reach out to the Iraqi government once more to resume talks on filling the security void?


We visited Baghdad before the coronavirus crisis emerged. A meeting was held between the Peshmerga and Iraqi defense ministries... We agreed on and signed two main points. First, activate joint work and mechanisms on how to cooperate in these regions, deploy  joint forces, and establish joint bases to start operations against Daesh remnants. Second, we agreed on a mechanism for the Peshmerga budget.
 
The agreement we signed was officially submitted to the Iraqi Council of Ministers. Unfortunately, the response we received was very negative – it said that the Council of Ministers was not aware of the meeting held between the Peshmerga and Iraqi defense ministries. This is the problem. The Iraqi state institutions do not coordinate with each other.

Amid these issues, what is the stance and role of coalition partners about Peshmerga-Iraqi Army relations?

The coalition is encouraging the KRG and Iraqi government to engage in serious dialogue to protect areas where ISIS has increased their activities. However, it cannot pressure the Iraqi government, only advise them.

Translation by Zhelwan Z. Wali