As Iraq's provincial council elections draw close, the remaining days carry heightened political and security importance. Even in the absence of major disruptions and with the elections unfolding as scheduled, Iraq is poised for a transformative phase. Amidst the events unfolding in the Middle East and Iraq's internal dynamics, certain factors indicate that the upcoming year is likely to be filled with political tension. The disputes between the Coordination Framework and the Sadrist Movement, the tension between Islamic Resistance groups and the government, the repercussions of the Gaza war intertwined with international politics, alongside the complexities of the Kurdish and Sunni components, collectively pose potential catalysts for fresh challenges in Iraq.
Dynamics of intra-Shiite conflict
In the lead-up to the elections scheduled for December 18, two prevailing Shiite internal conflicts stand out as significant factors shaping the country's political trajectory and potential sources of future tensions in Iraq. One centers on the rivalry between the Coordination Framework groups and influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement, while the other stems from internal divisions within the so-called Islamic Resistance groups.
Sadr's call for an election boycott clashes with the Coordination Framework groups, which view the upcoming elections as a crucial opportunity for preparing for the next parliamentary elections in 2025. This extends beyond a mere political dispute, manifesting as factional clashes in certain areas. Tensions have flared in Basra, Maysan, and parts of Baghdad. Meanwhile, Najaf may be shielded from internal Shiite tensions due to Iraq’s highest Shiite authority Ayatollah Sistani's influence, analogous tensions could potentially arise in various other southern Iraq locations, including Dhi Qar.
The potential victory of former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki's list or the prospect of former Sadrists from Asaib Ahl al-Haq securing the governor's post may undermine Sadr's influence. Yet, in contrast to the notion that the election could definitively shape the balance of power in Shiite politics, the conflict is poised to transition into a new phase.
A group of young leaders, aged 46-53, including figures like Muqtada al-Sadr, Qais al-Khazali, Ammar al-Hakim, Ahmad al-Asadi, etc, coupled with the vulnerability of traditional figures within the Shiite community, is poised to endure for years. Consequently, sooner or later, Sadr is likely to take to the streets again if an agreement is not reached.
The name of "Iraqi Islamic Resistance" initially suggested unity among its constituent groups but it soon became evident that the behavior of those inside the government differed from that of others like Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba - armed groups outside the government. This does not appear to be merely a tactic to absolve the government from any actions they take against the United States.
Some leaders within these groups are likely drawn to the prospect of positioning themselves as the new leader of the Islamic resistance. This appeal is particularly evident now as key figures such as Qais al-Khazali or Hadi al-Amiri find themselves compelled to focus on protecting the government they have established. Furthermore, they are inclined to avoid leaving the arena of opposition to the US exclusively to Sadr.
Certainly, as attacks against the US persist, these groups are increasingly prone to conflict with the government led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani. Moreover, armed groups are likely to seek political achievements from their anti-American endeavors, further weakening the cabinet over time.
Another consideration involves voter turnout and the potential for protests. However, it is premature to determine whether participation in the southern provinces will be lower, given the distinct nature of these elections compared to those in 2021. There is competition at the local level in this election, which could be an incentive for people to participate with political, social, and tribal motives. Yet the voices of those who boycott are not weak. However, if, as many now say, the turnout is lower than before, then it is not unrealistic to expect another wave of protests in the coming years.
Legal and constitutional change
Following the Tishreen protests in 2019, the Iraqi parliament initiated a committee to amend the constitution. Though it did not yield success initially, it later became part of the Sudani's government's agenda, expected to present proposals by October of this year. However, October passed without the government delivering. The likely cause behind the delay is disagreements among parties regarding the approach to implement changes, a matter likely to surface more prominently in the coming year.
The Asaib Ahl al-Haq secretary had highlighted approximately 60 constitution articles requiring modification. Other Shiite leaders advocated for constitutional changes in light of post-election issues and the ongoing disputes between Baghdad and Erbil. Notably, Faiq Zedan, president of Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council, emerges as a key figure to monitor in understanding unfolding developments. Zedan, wielding significant powers in the judiciary, has evolved into a crucial player in Iraqi domestic politics, emphasizing the political need of constitutional amendments, and the primary justification stems from the recognition that political crises in the country can be triggered by constitutional restrictions. While there might not be significant opposition to modifying certain constitution articles in a general sense, there is apprehension about a potential gradual decentralization of power. As a result, concerns over reducing the powers of provincial councils, issues related to the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad, and the overall political system become critical. Without consensus on these matters, complications are likely to arise.
Regional politics and tension with the US
Another factor that adds complexity to the situation in Iraq is the ongoing war in Gaza and tension with the US over its support of Israel. So far, an escalation in clashes between the armed militia groups and the US has been controlled.
The persistent attacks by these groups could eventually lead to a US withdrawal from Iraq, potentially extending to Syria. Alternatively, it might escalate into a war between the United States and armed groups, necessitating the deployment of more troops, as currently has more than 10,000 along with contractors, in Syria and Iraq. In either scenario, the Iraqi government will be drawn into the conflict, inevitably complicating Iraq's domestic politics. Adding to the complexity, the ongoing conflict in Gaza has the potential to escalate tension in both Iraq and Syria.
Recent developments, including Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to the Gulf as well as China's Middle East policy, underscore the significance of energy security and the stability of Gulf countries for both Moscow and Beijing.
More than that, as China and Russia intensify their engagement in ensuring the security of Gulf countries this might potentially concentrate the tensions in Syria and Iraq. China, a major consumer of Gulf oil, deployed six warships to the Middle East shortly after the conflict in Gaza. A Kremlin spokesperson revealed that Putin and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman discussed the war and other sensitive regional issues. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi's visit to Moscow coincided with discussions on Sukhoi Su-35 aircraft, Russian helicopters, and Iranian ballistic missiles, marking a potential advancement in Russian-Iranian defense collaboration. Notably, the actions of Yemen’s Houthis and pro-Iranian groups in the region align with a broader strategy that cannot overlook the interests of China and Russia.
Kurds and Sunnis in the elections
The budgetary dispute between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad is no longer just about oil and financial matters. Even the prospect of resolving issues related to oil and finance, including the issuing of loans, has given rise to significant challenges. The government implements a debt policy to prevent significant harm to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) while actively playing a role in sustaining the ongoing demonstrations in the Kurdistan Region.
This matter may also have direct implications for the upcoming Kurdistan Region parliamentary elections which are scheduled for February 25. It appears that the primary strategy of certain political groups in Baghdad is to delay parliamentary elections and, if held, to undermine the current dominance of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the government. The potential failure to conduct elections in February next year will intensify concerns about the legitimacy of KRG institutions. Amplifying legitimacy concerns alongside reviving budgetary issues could open the door for heightened political and legal interventions in the Kurdistan Region. If tensions persist between the (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) PUK and KDP, it may foster a conducive environment for the success of this strategy. Beyond the dynamics in the Kurdistan Region, the future role of former parliament speaker Mohammed Halbousi, coupled with the competition between parties vying for control of Anbar province, stands out as a crucial potential source of tension with implications for both domestic and foreign policy.
Iraq is at a turning point in its domestic and foreign policy. The Shiite internal conflict is entering a new phase. Just as Kurdish-Sunni relations in Baghdad are moving towards a new era after more than two decades. However, the situation in the Middle East and the world is changing. These can provide a glimpse of the situation in Iraq next year. However, if unilateral domestic and foreign policies are avoided, the situation could take a different turn.
Ziryan Rojhelati is the director of Rudaw Research Center
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw
