Since 2002 when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Recep Tayyip Erdogan entered Turkey’s elections race, it has won nine elections, ranging from parliamentary, municipal and presidential polls to a referendum on the constitution.
But the AKP is facing a different election this June, seen as the most decisive polls in Turkey’s history. That is because, after more than a decade of political activity, Turkey’s Kurds are looking to join the race as a political party, if they succeed in passing a 10 percent threshold required for political representation in parliament.
If they pull that off, they will sit in parliament for the first time as a political party. If that happens, the AKP will lose a serious number of seats. That will mean they will no longer be able to easily achieve their goals of amending the constitution and changing Turkey’s parliamentary political system to a presidential one, or a mixed parliamentary-presidential system.
Turkey’s political fate appears to be tied to the June elections, about which several scenarios are being currently speculated. The first is that the Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) would cross the 10 percent threshold and double its 29 seats in the 550-place parliament to nearly 60. If AKP’s other rivals also win more seats, that will mean that the AKP will not only be unable to amend the constitution, it will even need allies to form a government.
The second scenario, in AKP eyes, is that the HDP will not only fail to enter parliament, it will even lose the current number of seats. That would allow AKP to have nearly 400 seats all to itself. At the very least, the AKP believes it can win more than 300 seats, thus commanding a majority. If that happens, and if the AKP cannot amend the constitution, it can at least resort to a referendum, as in 2010.
The main goal of the HDP -- a cross-country party devoid of all nationalist mottos -- is to curtail the AKP’s influence and its power to change the constitution or ruling system. Therefore, the HDP aims to inflict on the AKP what the ultra-nationalist Turkish parties were unable to do over the past 13 years.
The strongest message of a HDP victory could be that it is able to wrestle the AKP to the ground. Otherwise, AKP’s other rivals (nationalist Turkish parties) don’t really have anything to offer to solve the Kurdish question.
If the HDP does not succeed, then it will have to withdraw back into its shell and in revenge declare a local democratic autonomy. It will simply have no place in Ankara’s politics. But the question is: when that day comes, will those same groups that are patting the HDP on the back today maintain the attitude they have now?
Instead of counting on the Kemalist and ultra-nationalist vote for victory, the HDP should have offered an agenda and project to those Kurds who are outside the party, a kind of nationalist and patriotic project that would attract all Kurds. Had the HDP done something like this, it would easily pass the 10 percent threshold and leave no room for speculation by others.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
