Turkey’s Parliament last week authorized Turkey's military to make incursions into Syria and Iraq and allow foreign troops to operate out of Turkish bases. In Washington, the parliamentary vote has led to optimism that weeks of intense pressure on the Turkish government has paid off and the reluctant ally is finally fully onboard in the fight against the Islamic State (IS.) The United States, however, might soon find out that Turkey is not quite there yet. The wording of the resolution suggests there will be no change in Turkey’s Syria policy. Defeating Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s regime and keeping groups that are aligned with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in check remain Ankara’s priorities. Addressing the IS threat seems to have taken a back seat to fighting the regime and PKK-affiliated groups. The resolution states, “The risks and threats to Turkey's national security along our southern land borders have increased substantially as a result of the developments over the last few months. In the northern region of Iraq, armed PKK terror units are still present.” It continues, “The destruction caused by the Syrian regime’s attacks with heavy weaponry, including ballistic missiles, are becoming more serious. The Syrian regime’s aggressive policies that target our country continue. The regime’s killing of more than 200,000 people with conventional weaponry also reveals the threat level it poses to our country.” The resolution is also unlikely to prompt any immediate military action against IS. Rather, Turkey is likely to pressure Washington to secure a US-backed no-fly zone in return for its full military cooperation. Ankara believes this could address both challenges. Turkey has long argued that the Assad regime and IS have forged a tactical alliance. When regime forces bomb opposition held territories, Ankara claims, the Free Syrian Army withdraws to areas where they can be protected against the air bombardment. IS forces are growing stronger by capturing Free Syrian Army territories. Ankara is promoting the no-fly zone in Syria as a way to stop the Syrian regime’s aerial bombardment against moderate opposition forces and strengthen their hand in the fight against Assad. A no-fly zone could also address Ankara’s other big concern: the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Syria. Turkey has become increasingly unnerved by the emergence of another autonomous Kurdish entity on its border. The PKK’s improving international standing due to its fight against IS has become Turkey’s latest headache. Since the capture of Mosul by IS, the PKK has been playing a crucial role in the fight. PKK militants have come to the aid of Peshmerga fighters in the war against IS to halt the jihadi group’s advance into the autonomous region of northern Iraq. The People’s Protection Unit (YPG,) a PKK ally, was the main force battling IS and helped thousands of Yezidis escape as IS attacked, winning the YPG favor in western capitals. Alarmed by the PKK’s new positive image, Turkey wants to establish a no-fly zone in Syria that could smother the self-declared autonomous Kurdish region by establishing a Turkish military presence there. But Turkey’s Syria strategy is likely to create more complications for Ankara. The Turkish government’s relations with its own Kurds have already been strained due to lack of progress on the Kurdish peace process. Adding to the tension is what many Kurds see as Turkey’s unwillingness to stop IS attacks against Kurds in Kobane for fear of empowering Kurdish militants in both Turkey and Syria. Intensified shelling in Kobane has angered Kurds on the Turkish side of the border, who have blamed the Turkish government for allowing IS to fester and not doing enough to stop IS killings in the northern Syrian town, contributing to the growing discord between Kurds and the government. Last week, Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK’s imprisoned leader, warned that if IS carried out a “massacre” in Kobane, the peace process with the PKK could end. Thus Turkey is in a tough spot and has to pick its opponent: PKK or IS. * Gonul Tol is Executive Director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute.
