The optimism surrounding the early days of the Arab uprisings has given way to skepticism about the region’s future. Calls for democracy and freedom have turned into a bitter sectarian conflict that will haunt future generations in the Middle East. There are very few winners in this gloomy picture, but the Kurds could prove the exception if they overcome internal divisions.
The Arab uprisings have provided an historical opportunity for the Kurds of Turkey, Syria and Iraq. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) has become an important political and military force in Syria while the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has boosted its economic and diplomatic power by striking energy deals with Turkey and advancing into oil-rich Kirkuk.
In Turkey, the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party consolidated its power by winning local elections in the Kurdish region and launched an initiative to appeal to non-Kurdish segments of the country. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has become a legitimate counterpart to the Turkish government. Turkey’s policies played a key role in this process.
In retaliation to Turkey’s support for the Syrian opposition, Assad gave Syria’s Kurds a free hand in the north of the country, leading to de facto Kurdish autonomy on Turkey’s border with Syria. As the conflict dragged on, the PYD further consolidated its power among Syria’s Kurdish community.
In 2012, Turkey opened the door to the Kurds in an effort to address the challenges posed by the new developments unfolding on its southern border. In addition to initiating talks with the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, cultivating closer ties with the KRG through energy deals and political engagements have been key components of this strategy and further empowered the Kurds of Iraq.
The growing ISIS threat — for which Turkey is partly responsible — could be an opportunity for the Kurds of Syria and Iraq to set aside their differences and establish a united front. An alliance would not only counter Al-Qaeda linked groups but also the central government in Baghdad and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.
After ISIS seized large swathes of territory in Iraq, the KRG took control of Kirkuk and pledged to remain in the oil-rich city, which many Kurds consider an integral part of Kurdistan.
Kurds in Turkey have also been emboldened by developments in the region. Many believe the Kurdish political movement is on the verge of an historical breakthrough and refuse to settle for less than they have demanded all along: some form of decentralization that will allow them more say in governing their own affairs and an inclusive constitution that addresses Kurdish demands.
The common denominator among Kurds in Syria, Iraq and Turkey is their quest for self-determination. Although Kurds in Iraq are by far more advanced in this process.
their aspirations in Syria and even in Turkey — if in a somewhat more distant future – are moving in the same direction.
The next step is the dream of Kurdish independence and unity in the framework of a greater Kurdistan. Kurds who are more realistic should be the first to recognize that a greater Kurdistan is a distant mirage, but time and momentum is certainly on the Kurdish side.
For this dream to become a reality, however, Kurds will have to overcome two major hurdles.
The first and most important has often plagued past attempts at unity: internal divisions. Kurds have long struggled with conflicts that external actors exploited. Ottomans and Persians excelled in the divide-and-rule policies that kept Kurds under control.
The second major hurdle for Kurds in their path to independence and unity will be to co-opt the most powerful actor with the highest stake in all things Kurdish: Turkey.
Half of the region’s 30 million Kurds reside in Turkey. Turkey also has the most powerful army and is the strongest nation-state, which has traditionally seen the Kurds as a mortal enemy. This is why the current peace process with the PKK and the potential emergence of a Kurdish federation in Turkey is a truly historical opportunity for Kurds, not only in Turkey but also in Iraq and Syria.
The fact that Turkey did not react negatively to the Kurdish advance in Kirkuk is telling. It points to Ankara’s acceptance of a greater Kurdistan in Iraq as long as this entity is under Turkey’s economic orbit.
Perhaps for the first time in their history, the ball is fully in the Kurdish court. If they play their hand wisely — by staying united and being both strategic and patient — an independent Kurdistan, under Turkey’s wing, may no longer be a distant dream.
Gonul Tol is Executive Director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute.
