The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s seizure of Mosul was a stark reminder of Iraq’s fragility. As further chaos looms ahead for both Syria and Iraq, Turkey seems to be banking on the alliance it has forged with the Kurdistan Regional Government, not just to feed its energy-hungry economy but also to create a Kurdish buffer zone against a growing ISIS threat.
The policies of Turkey, Syria and Iraq since the start of the Syrian uprising have mainly been driven by concerns about Syria’s Kurdish problem. After Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ceded control of strategic border areas to the Democratic Union Party (PYD) — a Kurdish group with links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — in retaliation for Turkey’s support for the Syrian opposition, the PYD became Ankara’s number one threat.
To counter this threat, Turkey cultivated closer ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. Turkey’s assumption was that Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani, with his leverage over Syrian Kurds, could push the Kurdish National Council — the umbrella organization composed of Syrian Kurdish parties created under Barzani’s sponsorship — to marginalize the PYD within the Syrian opposition. Turkey also supported jihadi groups in Syria to keep the PYD in check.
ISIS’s takeover of Mosul and large swathes of territory in Iraq, however, presents Turkey with a bigger threat than the PYD. To address the ISIS challenge, Turkey needs to work with the United States against ISIS and other radical organizations in the Syrian opposition; to engage the PYD; to empower the KRG; and to pursue its peace process with the PKK.
Turkey already seems more willing to work with the United States to marginalize Al-Qaeda-linked organizations. After resisting calls to blacklist Jabhat al-Nusra and arguing that the western decision to do so only increased the group’s appeal, Turkey finally designated the group as a terrorist organization on June 3. The decision removed a major irritant in Turkey-US relations. Turkey has also reportedly agreed to take part in a US-led program to train vetted rebels in Qatar to marginalize jihadis in the Syrian opposition.
The PYD has proven to be one of the most effective forces fighting ISIS. There are signs of a thaw in Ankara’s relations with the PYD, but Turkey’s approach to the group needs further revision. So far, Turkey has allowed limited aid through its border to PYD-controlled parts of Syria, and secret talks between the PYD and Turkish intelligence are reportedly underway.
The challenges ISIS poses to the unity of Iraq and to Turkey’s security have further highlighted the importance of a strong KRG in Turkey’s regional strategy. To the surprise of many, a spokesman for Turkey’s ruling party recently announced that the Kurds in Iraq have the right to self-determination.
Turkey still officially supports a unified Iraq, but it has been empowering the KRG for some time by signing energy deals without Baghdad’s approval as well as engaging Barzani diplomatically and politically in an effort to resolve its Kurdish issue and address the PYD challenge in Syria.
Behind Turkey’s engagement policy lies an understanding that the KRG can serve Turkey’s interests in an increasingly chaotic region and a hostile Iraq ruled by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki — if the KRG becomes economically dependent on Turkey. A KRG alliance is even more vital to Turkey in the face of ISIS advances in Iraq, given that a strong KRG can serve as a credible partner both against Maliki and ISIS.
A recent development highlights Turkey’s KRG strategy. Barzani’s Peshmerga took control of oil-rich Kirkuk earlier this month after the Iraqi Army abandoned the city. Despite years of Turkish objection to KRG control of Kirkuk, Turkey now seems reconciled to the fact that the city will be under Kurdish control for the foreseeable future, and Turkey might even import Kirkuk’s oil from the KRG. The KRG’s Minister of Natural Resources, Ashti Hawrami, announced on June 17 that a link was completed between Kirkuk’s oil fields and the KRG’s recently built pipeline to Turkey.
Turkey’s energy deals with the KRG have strengthened the economic foundations for a potential independent Kurdish state, and the KRG’s capture of Kirkuk will further boost the KRG’s economy.
Collaboration between a strong KRG and the PYD along Turkey’s southern border could create a zone of stability between Turkey and the troubled parts of Iraq and Syria. But this cooperation is contingent on Turkey’s peace process with the PKK.
One of the sources of friction in the PKK/PYD-Barzani relationship has been the latter’s close ties with Turkey. If Turkey takes steps to address the Kurds’ demands in Turkey, the PKK’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, might continue playing a constructive role in mending fences between the PYD, Barzani and Ankara.
The challenge posed by ISIS appears to be reshuffling the strategic cards in Turkey’s neighborhood once again, forcing Turkey to recalibrate its Kurdish strategy.
Gonul Tol is Executive Director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute.
