ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - The opening of the expanded US Consulate in Erbil underscores Washington's intention to maintain a strong, long-term presence in the Kurdistan Region, former US ambassador Douglas Silliman said on Wednesday.
In an interview with Rudaw’s Nwenar Fatih, Silliman noted that “the large size of the new consulate and the fact that there is housing for staff inside shows that the United States has planned for a strong and long-term presence in Kurdistan,” describing it as “a concrete sign of permanent staffing of American diplomats and other representatives on commerce and military cooperation in Erbil.”
The United States officially opened its new consulate compound in Erbil on Wednesday, describing it as the largest American consulate in the world. A senior US official said the facility is a “testament” to Washington’s commitment to a long-term partnership with the Kurdistan Region.
“We have significant opportunities in the coming period to demonstrate the return on America’s investment in this new consulate by delivering tangible outcomes that make America safer, stronger, and more prosperous through a partnership that delivers value for our America First agenda. The building we inaugurate today is a testament to our commitment and is a physical symbol of America’s long-term partnership with Iraq and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region,” said Michael Rigas, US Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources, during the opening ceremony.
Silliman emphasized that Washington’s broader priorities in Iraq include stability, economic development, and safeguarding the country’s independence from external, particularly Iranian influence.
“I think President Trump’s priorities for Iraq are to ensure that Iraq maintains its independence, especially from Iran and Iranian influence; that Iraq has the ability to engage with American companies and investors so Iraqis can benefit from the economic activity that a strong relationship with the United States can deliver,” Silliman said.
During the interview, Silliman also discussed key issues shaping Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, including the US assessment of the recent attack on the Khor Mor gas field in Sulaimani province, the Kurdistan Region’s need for enhanced anti-drone capabilities, Washington’s view on Iraq’s next prime minister, and delays in forming a new government in Erbil.
The following is the full transcript of the interview with Douglas Silliman, former US Ambassador to Iraq:
Rudaw: Mr. Silliman, you are very welcome. Thank you for joining us. The indication given today by the US Deputy Secretary of State is that the attack on the Khor Mor gas field was carried out by Iran-backed militias in Iraq. Iraq hasn't stated this yet, but this is the first point of view of its kind from the US, implying that the US possesses intelligence confirming that militias close to Iran conducted this attack.
Douglas Silliman: Well, thank you very much for having me back on Rudaw. I'm very pleased to be here speaking to our Kurdish audience. For the attack on Khor Mor, particularly since it was conducted using drones, there is... there are remnants of the weapons that are left over. And I'm certain that the counter-terrorism group, other Kurdistan authorities, and American authorities can identify the origin of the weapons and the group that perpetrated the attack. So I think that there will be continuing conversations between Washington and the government in Baghdad to bring to justice and bring criminal charges against those responsible. The attack on Khor Mor caused great damage. It caused the disruption of electricity for large parts of Kurdistan for several days, and it is really unacceptable activity for groups which are theoretically under the leadership of the Iraqi government and the Prime Minister. It is clear that they are operating independently of the Iraqi government, and that is a problem I know that the United States and the Kurdistan government have discussed many, many times, as well as the United States and the government in Baghdad.
Today, the Deputy Secretary of State also touched upon this, calling on Iraqi and Kurdish partners to weaken and dismantle the militias supported by Iran. How should this message be interpreted for Iraq in general? How should Iraqis understand this message?
I think Iraqis can understand this message as being a clear desire of the United States to put pressure on particularly the government in Baghdad and the political parties who participated in the recent parliamentary elections. It is important that these Fasa'il [armed factions] not participate in senior positions in the upcoming Iraqi government. And the United States has strongly opposed the Hashd al-Shaabi law, which would further entrench some of these Fasa'il with government funding without the guarantee that they will follow the orders of the government. So I think there are clear messages from Washington to Baghdad to make sure that the Fasa'il do not have influential positions in the new government. The same also goes for the Kurdistan government. The Kurdistan government and Kurdish political parties could also use their seats in the Iraqi parliament and their influence on the process to further this idea: that all of the armed forces of Iraq—and particularly the Fasa'il that have attacked Iraqi targets—need to come under the control of the Prime Minister and must be held to account by the courts for the crimes they have committed in the past.
Mr. Silliman, I will return to the topic of the government, but let’s discuss today’s event: the opening of a consulate of this magnitude in Erbil. It is the largest, or one of the largest, US consulates in the world. Does its size simply mean the US has a large building and compound? Or, considering the massive expenditure—just under a billion dollars—that the US has invested in building this consulate here, what does it signify for the relationship and friendship between the Kurdistan Region and the United States?
I think that the opening of the new American Consulate in Erbil is the most concrete example of the strong partnership between the United States and Iraqi Kurdistan. It is clear that the United States wants to continue its strong and long-term relationship with Kurdistan through this building. And I must say that I'm actually very excited that the building has been opened, because I had the great honor, seven years ago, with then-Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani to do the groundbreaking for this new building. We knew at the time it was an important symbol of American relations with Kurdistan, and now that it has been finished [and] realized, I believe it will do a lot of things to strengthen the ties between Washington and Erbil.
What political signal does its size and magnitude send regarding the relationship between the US and Erbil?
The fact that this... yes... the large size of the new Consulate and the fact that there is housing for staff inside shows that the United States has planned for a strong and long-term presence in Kurdistan. And I think that those in the audience who know of the neighborhood in Ankawa, where the Consulate has been located for the past more than 15 years, can see the progress in this new building. It will be easier for Iraqis to access the American Consulate, for Kurds to access the American Consulate, and it is, again, a concrete sign for a permanent staffing of American diplomats and other representatives on commerce and on military cooperation to be present in Erbil. I am very excited about this and the prospects for improving and strengthening US relations with the Kurdistan Region.
Mr. Silliman, Iraq is in the process of forming a government. I want to know, realistically—you mentioned that the US does not want militias to have a strong position within the government. However, the Shia factions, specifically the Coordination Framework, are deliberating on who to make Prime Minister. The current Prime Minister, Sudani, wants a second term; Maliki has nominated himself, and there are others. Let me start with Sudani: does he have a chance? It seems he has made efforts; yesterday Donald Trump told Rudaw in a meeting... that Sudani even wrote him a letter supporting him for the Nobel Prize. How does the US view Sudani? As a friend? Do you think they would support him becoming Prime Minister for a second term?
I think the real answer to the question is that the United States is going to let the Iraqi electoral and government formation process progress forward. The United States would be happy to have any Iraqi politician as Prime Minister who is willing to cooperate with Washington and willing to try to find ways for American businesses to work in Iraq or invest in Iraq, for American educational institutions to host Iraqis in the United States. If there is a Prime Minister who has an attitude toward the United States that is positive, I think Washington will accept whoever is chosen. That said, they would also be quite happy to see Prime Minister Sudani with a second term, but it is not going to do... I don't think that Washington will play a big role in trying to get the Prime Minister a second term. They want somebody who has been focused on providing services to Iraqis, someone who is willing to work with the American private sector and with the United States on security issues. Prime Minister Sudani has largely done that, but I think there are also other Iraqi politicians elected to the parliament who would be good choices as well. So I think Washington will not be determinative. The Kurdistan region and the votes of the KDP and the PUK and their influence in the process will probably have more ability to decide who the next Prime Minister will be going forward.
But do you agree that the US opinion regarding the person who becomes Prime Minister is very important, and that it won't happen without the US's approval?
The US has had an interesting way of dealing with government formations since 2005, where we have not really interfered to choose a preferred candidate, but have tried to make sure that a candidate who is willing to work with the United States is chosen as Prime Minister. I think that is the strategy that this Trump administration continues to follow. The President's envoy Mark Savaya has spoken to a number of people in Iraq, including Prime Minister Sudani, and I think he has conveyed that message: It is important that the Fasa'il, the political factions that do not want to work with the United States, be pushed to the side in the government formation and not be represented in the highest office of Prime Minister. We would like to see someone who is willing to work with the United States, with American companies, and American investors for the betterment of all of Iraq.
Maliki has expressed his desire and officially nominated himself, and there are official statements regarding this. How do you think the US views Maliki, considering it has experience with him from his two previous terms?
I honestly cannot speak specifically about the Trump administration. Prime Minister Maliki has already been Prime Minister twice, and I think it's probably time for the Iraqi political system to move on to a new, younger generation of politicians. I'm not speaking for the Trump administration, however.
Mr. Silliman, at least among the Iraqi politicians I have spoken with, one point remains unclear to them: the US strategy and policy toward Iraq in the Trump era—specifically, a second Trump term. But now there is a special envoy, Mark Savaya, coming to Iraq, who has announced that he met with Trump and that Trump gave him instructions and orders regarding Iraq. How do you interpret Trump's policy toward Iraq? What are Trump's priorities in Iraq?
I think President Trump's priorities for Iraq are to make sure that Iraq maintains its independence, particularly from Iran and Iranian influence; that Iraq has the ability to deal with American companies and American investors so that Iraqis can benefit from the economic activity that a good relationship with the United States can move forward. And frankly, there was a lot more that the United States can do with Iraq in terms of agriculture development, water scarcity, dealing with climate change, educational programs—the "360-degree relationship" that former Ambassador Romanowski talked about while she was there in Baghdad. I think that President Trump wants to build a strong relationship with Iraq for the benefit of both Americans and Iraqis, and he is concerned with the degree of potential Iranian influence in the new government. I'm guessing that is most of the content of the message.
Beyond the economy and increased American investment in Iraq, do you think the US has any other priorities for the country? For example, freedom of expression, women's rights, and democratic values? Because, in reality, after 2003, regarding the democratization of Iraq, I remember George Bush said in his speech, 'We have spread the seeds of democracy.' Are these things still important to the US administration, or is it solely about economic interests?
I think that the thing that is most important to the United States is stability and prosperity in Iraq. Iraq... Iraqi stability, Iraqi prosperity is crucial to the entire region. And a wealthier Iraqi population, a wealthier Kurdistan population, a system in which the Fasa'il do not attack Iraqi or foreign targets from Iraqi soil, and a system within which commerce can flow freely across Iraq and into Iraq will create stability. That is really the goal of the Trump administration policy. They see ties between Baghdad and Tehran that are too close, that could be supportive of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards or the Quds Force, can create instability. And I think the real thing that President Trump would like to see in Iraq is stability, prosperity, and a truly independent Iraqi Republic.
On the topic of militias in Iraq; Mr. Silliman, Sudani was unable to fully control them. As you said, they operate independently outside the government, and in some areas, they hold significant power; the government cannot even confront them. The last election also showed that they command a large number of votes. To what extent is this a source of concern for Iraq and the US?
It does concern the United States because, first of all, armed factions that are not within the control of the government, but still receive funding from the government, are inherently destabilizing. And it is important for not just the Prime Minister, but all of the political parties and political factions in Iraq who oppose such independent, uncoordinated military action by the Fasa'il, work together to prevent them from getting a strong place in government. I think that is the main concern of the Trump administration. If the Fasa'il believe that they can attack Khor Mor field, they believe that they can also attack other targets inside Iraq or outside Iraq that suits their agenda. They are, at the moment, in my own opinion and in the opinion of the Trump administration, the most destabilizing activists... actors in Iraq. And I think that the government, but also all the political parties who do not want to see these Fasa'il having such a powerful position, need to cooperate.
The Kurdistan Region needs US assistance in this regard, especially in countering drones. A large number of the drones directed at the Kurdistan Region in the past few years, Mr. Silliman, by those factions, were launched under the pretext that the Kurdistan Region is a friend of the US and hosts US interests. However, so far, the US has not provided anti-drone technology and certain other systems to the Kurdistan Region. After the Khor Mor attack, the Kurdistan Region has once again requested that the US must assist and provide anti-drone and defense systems. At what stage do you think the US will do this for the Kurdistan Region? Because they haven't done it yet, and why aren't they doing it?
First of all, the current level of technology and development of anti-drone systems are not as good as the United States or anyone would like to see. So they are not 100% effective. So, anti-drone technology and anti-drone weapons are not a magic wand to prevent this kind of attack from happening in the future. The reality is also that the United States, as it discusses possible security cooperation with the Kurdistan region, must also discuss that cooperation with Baghdad. And it is important that Kurdistan leaders make sure that Prime Minister Sudani and the next government will approve American assistance to the Kurdistan Region—and frankly probably American assistance to the Iraqi military—for counter-drone technology if that is in fact what both the Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi government want.
Regarding the internal situation in the Kurdistan Region: it has been over a year since the election was held, but the government has not yet been formed, and the parliament is essentially inactive—it doesn't meet. Today, Mr. Rigas mentioned that they want a strong Kurdistan Region. A strong Kurdistan Region requires strong and active institutions. How concerning is it that the government hasn't been formed in the Kurdistan Region more than a year after the election, and the parliament isn't convening?
Unfortunately, this is not the first time that this has happened in Kurdistan. When I was Ambassador, I think I traveled to Erbil and Sulaimani 20, 30, 40 times over the point to try to convince both the KDP and the PUK to resolve the relatively few differences that divide them. I think it is very important, particularly as Baghdad and the parliament seek to form a new government, that there is a... if not a united position from Iraqi Kurds, that there is cooperation and a functioning government in Erbil to provide services to the Kurdish population. So I would encourage, as I did when I was the Ambassador, to both the KDP and the PUK to find compromise solutions, to make deals so that they can work together to strengthen Kurdistan and make the lives of Kurds living in the north of Iraq better. And that also puts them in a stronger position in dealing with Baghdad in government formation and after the new government is formed.
My last question, Mr. Silliman: What was the most prominent challenge you faced during your tenure as the US Ambassador to Iraq—something that was consistently a challenge for you?
To be honest, and unfortunately, the biggest challenge I faced was actually Daesh [ISIS]. I was there during the assault on the city of Mosul, on Tal Afar, and a number of major battles that eventually pushed Daesh back into Syria. So much of the focus that I had at that point was really trying to work with the Peshmerga, with the Counter-Terrorism Service, and with the Iraqi army to make sure that Daesh was pushed out of the country and could leave Iraqis free to continue their lives. And thank God, we were successful in that effort through great efforts on behalf of the Peshmerga, the Counter-Terrorism Service, and the Iraqi army, as well as the international coalition that provided a lot of support. And I am sorry that that was a major focus of my tenure, but I am very happy that it was, in fact, a successful battle against Daesh.
