Might US-Turkish relations become like Israeli-Turkish ones?

Addressing senior Justice and Development Party (AKP) officials in Ankara on Saturday, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated “Whoever is on the side of Israel, let everyone know that we are against them.” The United States most definitely appears to be on the side of Israel, so does this mean that Turkey stands against America?

To many American observers, this has been the case since not long after Erdogan’s party came to power in 2002. The anti-American rhetoric in Erdogan’s government reached surprising levels a long time ago, culminating in accusations that the American ambassador was somehow involved in the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. From threatening the Americans with an “Ottoman slap” to claiming the US is an “uncivilized” country after it issued arrest warrants for his bodyguards (after they savagely attacked peaceful protesters in Washington), it seems Erdogan and his government thrive on anti-Americanism.

The government’s anti-Americanism reflects public opinion in Turkey, which was not very favorable to the U.S. even before the AKP came to power. Turkish nationalist opposition parties, including the new IYI (Good) Party, appear no different on this matter. Turkish leftist parties likewise have no love for America or Israel.

Even in the 1990s, when this columnist lived in Ankara, most Turks seemed to believe the US and European Union were supporting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This view only briefly changed after the Americans captured PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in Africa and handed him over to the Turks. At least now, with Western military support for the PKK-linked Kurdish parties in Syria, that accusation has a bit more substance.

Since the AKP’s ascension and the 2003 Iraq war, unfavorable views towards America have grown exponentially. Today, some 81.9 percent of Turks view America as a threat, and according to a 2015 Marshall Fund survey, 71 percent of Turks have an unfavorable view of America. Some 88 percent view Israel unfavorably (although only 63.3 percent view it as a threat), which is even worse than the 83 percent who don’t like Armenia.

Some might be tempted to think that with a change in leadership, American-Turkish relations (as well as Turkish-Israeli relations) could get back on track. This seems unlikely. Erdogan and his AKP party did not create anti-Americanism in Turkey – they simply stoked it to their electoral advantage.  Although Kemal Ataturk, modern Turkey’s founder, did an admirable job reducing and containing anti-Western sentiment in Turkey, the roots of such feelings on both sides run several centuries deep. 

The Sevres Syndrome, a belief that foreign powers seek to partition Turkey that refers to the Treaty of Sevres that ended World War I, also remained alive and well in Turkey during all this time.  Just as Western powers plotted to divide up the foundering Ottoman Empire’s territory during the war, most people in Turkey seem to suspect that this is still the case.  Large numbers believe that Kurdish unrest in particular is a result of Western machinations rather than political mistakes and misdeeds at home.

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkish and American interests have also begun to diverge.  As the Western bogeyman shifted from communists to radical Islamists, Turkey’s identity as a Muslim state began to cause problems.  Turkey could have remained in the Western camp by retaining Ataturk’s strict secularism, but that policy was never popular outside elite circles in Istanbul, Ankara and Turkey’s Aegean coast.  The old Turkey’s avoidance of Islam and pro-Western stance also limited the country’s appeal in the rest of the Middle East, hamstringing Turkish foreign policy in the region.

With the AKP’s adoption of Muslim identity politics, the previously sidelined majority of Turks in the heartland stepped forward. Even with a change in leadership, they will not soon slip back into obscurity. Their Muslim identity politics in turn seem to thrive too well on antagonism towards the United States, Israel and much of Europe.  We can therefore expect even more antagonism in the Turkish-American relationship, especially as Washington increasingly allies with secular Kurdish groups fighting Islamists, secular dictators in places such as Egypt, and an Israeli government that has lurched considerably to the right.

Even as Turkish-Israeli relations seem to have completely collapsed, however, the two continue to do increasing amounts of business together.  Israel remains one of Turkey’s ten most important export markets even today.  Columnist Cengiz Candar summed up the relationship in a May 2018 column entitled “Turkey and Israel: Barking, biting, but still doing business.”

And so it may go with Turkey and America.  While Ankara’s recent purchase of Russian S-400 missile defense systems is forcing the US to remove Turkey from the F-35 stealth fighter program, the White House seems to have little appetite for the additional economic sanctions many in the US are calling for.  Political and military relationships are one thing, and business is another.  If Israel and Turkey keep doing business despite all the rhetoric, it hardly seems likely that the US and Turkey will stop doing business together anytime soon.