Putin's men in the Turkish army

By Timur Akhmetov

Despite its complicated relations with Turkey, Russia through its diplomacy demonstrates willingness to put bilateral ties on a non-conflictious basis. Russian decision-makers, it seems, can genuinely comprehend and acknowledge Turkish legitimate concerns over its national security issues and political developments in neighbouring Syria and Iraq. Russian approach in dealing with Turkey is focused on cooperation rather than competition. This may have far reaching consequences for Turkish politics: Russian diplomatic efforts to incorporate Turkish ambitions and anxieties in its broader policies in the Middle East may create a positive image of Russia within the Turkish army and in turn have a serious impact on the strategic decision-making process in Turkey.

The past 5 years witnessed tectonic shifts in relations between the Turkish army and political government. On the one hand, the military is undergoing an identity crisis unleashed after the July 2016 coup attempt. Since the end of the Second World War a lack of coherence of worldviews within its ranks has long been a major issue for the Turkish army. Unity was attained through harsh treatment of middle-rank and junior officers and rigid control over military education by western-oriented military leadership. Nevertheless, the problem never was settled for good.

Right after the coup, the Turkish government was determined to uproot anti-democratic elements within the army. Putschist-affiliated officers and sympathizers within the military that has long been associated with the Western strategic interests lost their dominance in the decision-making process. These developments created a perfect opportunity for other groups with radically different worldviews to gain weight and therefore to promote an idea that Turkey may look for alternative strategic partners, be they in Eurasia or in the Muslim world.

On the other hand, ever rising unpredictability of events in the Middle East has contributed to domestic instability in Turkey, which has still been struggling to overcome political volatility and to eliminate terrorist threats within its borders. The situation in Syria and Iraq makes Turkish political authorities genuinely concerned over national security and its capacity to produce effective policies to respond to existing challenges. Under such circumstances the Turkish army is inevitably being placed within the center of strategic decision-making process due to its unique expertise and knowledge in related fields.

Meanwhile, Russia is building its relations with Turkey in times when the latter feels abandoned by its traditional Western security partners. Western capitals have not only estranged Turkish authorities by their ambiguous reaction to the July coup attempt and demonstrative rejection of cooperation offers in post-coup investigation efforts, they also infuriated Ankara by openly cooperating and providing a safe-haven to activists and sympathizers of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), classified as a terrorist organization by NATO, EU, USA, and Turkey. To make things even more complicated, there is unrelenting criticism coming from the West over Turkish authorities' efforts to curb terrorist threats in the country. The criticism is accompanied by lecturing on democratic practices and at times outright Turkey bashing.

This creates a climate of distrust between Turkey and the West and eventually forces Turkey to seek support elsewhere. The Muslim world, however abstract this idea may be, could represent for Turkey a viable alternative to the West. There are, however, serious strategic limitations in the Turkish strategic cooperation with Muslim countries: sectarian strife between leading Muslim powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, complicates any cooperation-building efforts. Moreover, Ankara is perfectly aware that with lack of unity among themselves, Sunni Muslim powers can't be trusted with their own national security.

This leaves Russia as being the only strategic alternative. Russian diplomats seem to understand this by carefully designing their relations with Turkish decision-makers, including the Turkish military. The most striking example of this understanding was the Russian decision not to escalate the situation during the jet crisis in 2015. Instead, efforts to channel the crisis into more predictability were made, primarily through soft measures like sanctions.

The Russian approach to nurture its own positive image among strategic decision-makers was further seen in Moscow's dealings with Syrian Kurds. Russia used the US support for the PYD in Syria to its advantage by insisting that it will never use the Kurds against legitimate Turkish interests in Syria. By doing this, Russia signaled that it genuinely understands Turkish anxieties and concerns over its national security.

This logic partly explains why Russia was eager to invite Turkey into the Astana negotiation process and make it its main guarantor. By giving Ankara a tool to influence developments on the ground in Syria, especially during the Euphrates Shield operation, tacitly approved by Russia, Moscow may try to influence changes within the Turkish army and, more importantly, to promote positions of officers that see in Russia a favorable strategic partner.

It is important to scrutinize Russian diplomacy vis-à-vis Turkey through strategic and political dimensions. Russian authorities are ready to work with Turkey, without asserting its values and views on democracy. Russian decision-makers are perfectly aware of Turkish anxieties about its national security and political stability and they act accordingly by demonstrating a well-meaning disposition in regards to relevant issues, be it Syria, Kurds, or the political situation in Turkey. Groups within the Turkish army, a main addressee of Russian efforts, are to be persuaded that Moscow can be trusted. This, in turn, may have further implications for the Turkish political decision-making process in the long run.