Iraq: No parliamentary elections until spring 2022?

A series of marathon meetings between the three presidencies, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), and the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Iraq and the political parties, led to instructing the IHEC to postpone the elections, and they obliged. The Council of Ministers approved the decision.  As a result, the political parties breathed a sigh of relief and can now rearrange their cards in preparation for the elections, early or not.

The postponement reasons given were that the IHEC wasn't technically capable of carrying out the elections in June. But the truth is entirely different. The political parties have not started preparing for the elections. They haven't worked for nearly six months to remove the obstacles for holding one, including solving the dilemma of the Federal Court, setting a date for the dissolution of Parliament under the constitution, as well as the problem of international supervision and providing the necessary financial and administrative capabilities to IHEC. 

The pressure of holding elections

The main reasons for calling an early election were the October protests and the call by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to hold early elections, after losing faith in the political class altogether. He declared early on that any new government replacing Adil Abdul Mahdi's resigned government is just a caretaker. 

"The next parliament and the government emanating from it will play the required role in carrying out the necessary reforms to get rid of the consequences of corruption, quotas, and the absence of social justice in the previous period," he said. 

The October protests have shaken the political system to its core and forced the government's resignation, and the adoption a new election law based on the first past the post system, which may exclude many traditional leaders and entities that have dominated the political scene.

However, the political parties were able to penetrate the ranks of the demonstrators. They descended on their tents in the demonstration-squares. The newly-formed government was formed by those closely associated with the demonstrators. As a result, the glow of the protests diminished, the fire of the revolution subsided.  The political parties got a second chance to recover and return to their usual procrastination and delaying tactics, in the same way, they have been successful in the past decade at evading the Sistani’s instructions for reform. This time will not go differently.

Seriousness to hold elections

Some believe that postponing the elections until next October is, to some extent, justified to help IHEC to improve its technical and logistical capabilities to better perform its duties.  However, some observers believe that the parties are not truly serious about holding early elections for several reasons, which follow:

First: Solving the dilemma of the Federal Court

The Federal Court's dilemma began when it ruled on May 21, 2019, that "Article 3 of the Federal Supreme Court Law is unconstitutional," thus cancelling the right to nominate members of the Federal Court by the Supreme Judicial Council. This has killed the only legal root to appoint new members to the Federal Court in case of death or retirement of a judge. Since then, two judges have left the country’s top court, and it has lost its quorum. 

The political parties have tried to pass a new law for the federal court since 2005. However, they failed to do so because this legislation requires the vote of two-thirds of  parliament, which is difficult to achieve due to the continuing political disputes and sectarian differences over the law. Some have sought to amend Article Three of the current law. Still, this endeavor has not succeeded yet. The parties seeking this amendment want the Court’s current Chief Justice to remain in his position for at least two years, while other political parties oppose this project, halting this adjustment.

The President of the Supreme Judicial Council in a speech on Iraqi Judicial Day on January 24 called on parliament to "legislate laws about the judiciary according to an institutional vision far from personalizing texts." This statement is evidence that the Judicial Council believes that the political parties are trying to use the judiciary for self and political interests, and not motivated by the building of institutions, such as the Federal Court as stipulated in the constitution. 

As long as the Federal Court's issue remains unsolved, the indication would be that  political parties have no desire to hold an election, with the body legally needed to any approve election results. 

Second: The dissolving of parliament

An early election will automatically trigger rticle 64, which comes in two parts, and both parts are subject to opposing interpretations.

Part one of the article gives parliament the right for a majority of its members to vote to dissolve itself, if a request is submitted by one-third of its members. However, another mechanism described in the clause stipulates that the Prime Minister can submit a request to the President who must agree. The only condition being in such a request is that the Prime Minister cannot be questioned in parliament. 

Part Two of the article states: "Upon the dissolution of the Council of Representatives, the President of the Republic shall call for general elections in the country within a period not to exceed sixty days from the date of its dissolution." Some think the sixty days is the allowed period for holding the election. In contrast, others believe the sixty days is the period for the President must set the date within, and election day can be set whenever he thinks is viable to hold the election. 

In the absence of a Federal Court, there is no way to determine who is right and who is not in the interpretation of article 64, and until then, the Parliament cannot dissolve itself.

Third: the fear of new players

The political parties fear the arrival of newcomers on the scene. It is expected that the elections will bring about those who represent the October demonstrations or the newly set up parties that are supported by the prime minister or some influential political figures. 

Some of the old parties believe they will not collect sufficient votes due to the new election system.  Regional popularity will be the most critical factor in any candidate's success, unlike the previous elections where they heavily relied on the votes carried by the leaders and the list itself.

The newly formed parties, led by many activists and demonstrators, have a qualitative and influential presence in areas that conventionally were the old parties' stomping ground.  They will form a competitive force that cannot be underestimated, which means that the competition will be most intense if the new parties receive popular support according to expectations. It is worth noting that these new parties exist in the Shiite electorate areas and compete with Shiite forces, and they do not exist in the Sunni and Kurdish regions.

As a result, not all traditional political parties in parliament are keen to hold an early election.

We may add the security, financial and economic situation as other factors to delay the elections. However, I  will discuss these factors in a series of subsequent articles.

With their open pursuit of the election’s first postponement, Iraq's political parties have proven that they are not serious about holding early elections. In addition, the pressure factors for holding early elections are no longer in place. Therefore, they see themselves as under no obligation to hold an election unless the conditions are in their favor. A clear sign of this is the delay of the removal of the obstacles mentioned above. As a result one can conclude that the end of the spring of 2022 is more likely to be the date of the next election.

Farhad Alaaldin is the Chairman of the Iraqi Advisory Council. He was the political adviser to former Iraqi President Fuad Masum, the former chief of staff to the Kurdistan Region prime minister from 2009 to 2011, and former senior adviser to the Kurdistan Region prime minister from 2011 to 2012.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.