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The Syrian regime's latest offensive into Idlib has put unprecedented pressure on the Turkish army's southernmost observation posts in the province. This, coupled with Turkey’s failure to contain the jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group that rules Idlib, may well prove to be the beginning of the end for Turkey's presence in that strategically-important northwestern province.
The latest phase of Russian-backed Syrian regime offensive into Idlib has seen Damascus swiftly gain ground with its capture this month of the strategically-important town of Khan Sheikhoun – the same town where a suspected regime gas attack in April 2017 led the US to retaliate by firing cruise missiles at a Syrian airbase.
In the lead-up to capturing Khan Sheikhoun, a Syrian warplane dropped bombs near a Turkish army convoy. The convoy had been travelling to resupply the Morek observation post – one of 12 Turkey began establishing around the province from October 2017 to May 2018.
The Morek post is situated 70 kilometres from Turkey's borders. It’s also about 150 km away from the parts of Syria currently occupied by Turkey. These are nearby Afrin and the Euphrates Shield zone west of the Euphrates River, named after Turkey’s eponymous operation, which includes the Syrian cities of al-Bab and Jarablus. Therefore, Ankara's inability to resupply it puts its troops there in a precarious position.
The observation posts were established under the framework of the Russian-sponsored Astana Agreement, the ostensible aim of which was to bring peace to conflict zones across the country. Idlib was one of a total of four de-escalation zones. The other three zones covered part of the northern Homs province, eastern Ghouta near Damascus, and parts of the Deraa and Quneitra provinces in the south of the country.
Damascus has reconquered those three other zones in separate offensives since their establishment in 2017.
In retrospect, it’s clear that these zones were established to enable the Syrian regime to reconquer each area individually rather than become bogged down on multiple fronts simultaneously. This proved to be a highly effective “war management strategy” for it.
Today, with Turkey unable to resupply Morek, it's likely that Russia will give Ankara safe passage to withdraw its troops from that area, solidifying Damascus' recent territorial advances in the process.
Going forward, Russia might well help the regime gradually reconquer Idlib piecemeal, while applying pressure on Turkey to withdraw from more strategically-important areas around the province as its positions become encircled and increasingly vulnerable.
Turkey has vowed to retain all its posts in Idlib, but it’s unclear how long it can do so if more are cut off or encircled in the near future.
Russia and Turkey have to date failed to implement a sustainable long-term settlement over Idlib to stave off a regime offensive – something which Ankara reasonably fears would spark another mass influx of millions of Syrians currently from Idlib into Turkey itself. Many people from previously rebel-held territories in Aleppo and near Damascus have gathered in Idlib following evacuation agreements with the regime.
Russia and Turkey previously agreed to a ceasefire agreement that would prevent such an eventuality last September.
Under that agreement, Turkey was supposed to contain HTS through the establishment of a demilitarized zone and reopen the key M5 highway to Damascus.
It completely failed to live up to any of these obligations.
Turkey has a Syrian militia proxy force in Idlib, National Liberation Force (NLF), but they proved either unable or unwilling to contain HTS.
Last January, HTS was even able to go on the offensive, solidifying its control over Idlib and capturing parts of neighbouring Aleppo and Hama after the NLF promptly surrendered areas under its control after a mere nine days of fighting.
To make matters worse, after Damascus resumed attacking Idlib earlier in late April with supporting Russian airstrikes, the NLF, which Turkey resumed arming to counter regime advances, even joined forces with HTS.
Syrian regime forces also targeted Turkish observation posts in June, wounding and killing some Turkish troops in the process.
Ultimately, after Turkey fully withdraws from Idlib, it’s unclear how this might affect its control over the aforementioned areas it occupies. Russia may well support Turkey retaining these areas to use for resettling displaced Syrians from Idlib.
"The whole idea of Turkish observation posts being installed in Idlib was about the demarcation of opposition and HTS, reduction of violence and opening the highway," Timur Akhmetov, an Ankara-based researcher for the Russian International Affairs Council, told Rudaw English.
"Apparently, Turkish leadership miscalculated its ability to stabilize the situation in the province, although I guess its intention was benign like preventing further civilian losses, destruction of civil infrastructure and so forth."
Russia, he noted, also "made several statements where they were pretty clear that Turkish troops will not be stationed there forever."
Also, last year, Putin’s special envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, affirmed that “we have always said that after the operations and missions in these regions, Turkish troops should withdraw from these areas.”
In addition to this, Ankara also signed several documents at for the Astana Agreement which affirmed that "the ultimate goal of cooperation mechanism with Iran and Russia is the gradual restoration of Syrian sovereignty and to fight against terrorism."
Turkey may not be able to stop the regime takeover of Idlib due to this agreement.
"I don't think that Turkey will be capable of stopping Assad from regaining control over Idlib since implicitly Turkey recognized the legitimacy of such efforts," said Akhmetov. "On the other hand, Turkey may through its influence and diplomatic weight reduce the level of violence by introducing more predictability into the conflict."
There is also reasonable speculation that Moscow may also be pressuring Ankara in Idlib in response to its 'safe zone' agreement with the United States in northeast Syria's Kurdish-majority areas.
That agreement envisages American and Turkish military forces jointly patrolling a designated area east of the Euphrates River, from which the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) will withdraw all its forces and their heavy weapons in the near future.
Damascus opposes this arrangement, claiming it violates Syrian sovereignty. Moscow, which opposes the US military presence in Syria, may now help Damascus apply more pressure on Turkey in Idlib to reprimand Ankara for both failing to contain HTS and working with the US in northeast Syria.
The latest phase of Russian-backed Syrian regime offensive into Idlib has seen Damascus swiftly gain ground with its capture this month of the strategically-important town of Khan Sheikhoun – the same town where a suspected regime gas attack in April 2017 led the US to retaliate by firing cruise missiles at a Syrian airbase.
In the lead-up to capturing Khan Sheikhoun, a Syrian warplane dropped bombs near a Turkish army convoy. The convoy had been travelling to resupply the Morek observation post – one of 12 Turkey began establishing around the province from October 2017 to May 2018.
The Morek post is situated 70 kilometres from Turkey's borders. It’s also about 150 km away from the parts of Syria currently occupied by Turkey. These are nearby Afrin and the Euphrates Shield zone west of the Euphrates River, named after Turkey’s eponymous operation, which includes the Syrian cities of al-Bab and Jarablus. Therefore, Ankara's inability to resupply it puts its troops there in a precarious position.
The observation posts were established under the framework of the Russian-sponsored Astana Agreement, the ostensible aim of which was to bring peace to conflict zones across the country. Idlib was one of a total of four de-escalation zones. The other three zones covered part of the northern Homs province, eastern Ghouta near Damascus, and parts of the Deraa and Quneitra provinces in the south of the country.
Damascus has reconquered those three other zones in separate offensives since their establishment in 2017.
In retrospect, it’s clear that these zones were established to enable the Syrian regime to reconquer each area individually rather than become bogged down on multiple fronts simultaneously. This proved to be a highly effective “war management strategy” for it.
Today, with Turkey unable to resupply Morek, it's likely that Russia will give Ankara safe passage to withdraw its troops from that area, solidifying Damascus' recent territorial advances in the process.
Going forward, Russia might well help the regime gradually reconquer Idlib piecemeal, while applying pressure on Turkey to withdraw from more strategically-important areas around the province as its positions become encircled and increasingly vulnerable.
Turkey has vowed to retain all its posts in Idlib, but it’s unclear how long it can do so if more are cut off or encircled in the near future.
Russia and Turkey have to date failed to implement a sustainable long-term settlement over Idlib to stave off a regime offensive – something which Ankara reasonably fears would spark another mass influx of millions of Syrians currently from Idlib into Turkey itself. Many people from previously rebel-held territories in Aleppo and near Damascus have gathered in Idlib following evacuation agreements with the regime.
Russia and Turkey previously agreed to a ceasefire agreement that would prevent such an eventuality last September.
Under that agreement, Turkey was supposed to contain HTS through the establishment of a demilitarized zone and reopen the key M5 highway to Damascus.
It completely failed to live up to any of these obligations.
Turkey has a Syrian militia proxy force in Idlib, National Liberation Force (NLF), but they proved either unable or unwilling to contain HTS.
Last January, HTS was even able to go on the offensive, solidifying its control over Idlib and capturing parts of neighbouring Aleppo and Hama after the NLF promptly surrendered areas under its control after a mere nine days of fighting.
To make matters worse, after Damascus resumed attacking Idlib earlier in late April with supporting Russian airstrikes, the NLF, which Turkey resumed arming to counter regime advances, even joined forces with HTS.
Syrian regime forces also targeted Turkish observation posts in June, wounding and killing some Turkish troops in the process.
Ultimately, after Turkey fully withdraws from Idlib, it’s unclear how this might affect its control over the aforementioned areas it occupies. Russia may well support Turkey retaining these areas to use for resettling displaced Syrians from Idlib.
"The whole idea of Turkish observation posts being installed in Idlib was about the demarcation of opposition and HTS, reduction of violence and opening the highway," Timur Akhmetov, an Ankara-based researcher for the Russian International Affairs Council, told Rudaw English.
"Apparently, Turkish leadership miscalculated its ability to stabilize the situation in the province, although I guess its intention was benign like preventing further civilian losses, destruction of civil infrastructure and so forth."
Russia, he noted, also "made several statements where they were pretty clear that Turkish troops will not be stationed there forever."
Russian President Vladimir Putin, for example, has said that the creation of the Idlib de-escalation zone was a temporary arrangement.
Also, last year, Putin’s special envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, affirmed that “we have always said that after the operations and missions in these regions, Turkish troops should withdraw from these areas.”
In addition to this, Ankara also signed several documents at for the Astana Agreement which affirmed that "the ultimate goal of cooperation mechanism with Iran and Russia is the gradual restoration of Syrian sovereignty and to fight against terrorism."
Turkey may not be able to stop the regime takeover of Idlib due to this agreement.
"I don't think that Turkey will be capable of stopping Assad from regaining control over Idlib since implicitly Turkey recognized the legitimacy of such efforts," said Akhmetov. "On the other hand, Turkey may through its influence and diplomatic weight reduce the level of violence by introducing more predictability into the conflict."
There is also reasonable speculation that Moscow may also be pressuring Ankara in Idlib in response to its 'safe zone' agreement with the United States in northeast Syria's Kurdish-majority areas.
That agreement envisages American and Turkish military forces jointly patrolling a designated area east of the Euphrates River, from which the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) will withdraw all its forces and their heavy weapons in the near future.
Damascus opposes this arrangement, claiming it violates Syrian sovereignty. Moscow, which opposes the US military presence in Syria, may now help Damascus apply more pressure on Turkey in Idlib to reprimand Ankara for both failing to contain HTS and working with the US in northeast Syria.
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