Shortly after the US began its hasty withdrawal from northern Syria this month, Russia promptly moved in its own forces to fill the ensuing power vacuum in the northwest Syrian city of Manbij and other areas. Now, Moscow seems to be taking over the US role of de-conflicting these areas while helping Damascus reestablish its control over the region for the first time since the Syrian conflict began.
During upcoming talks in Sochi, Turkey and Russia are expected to discuss the removal of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) – the largest component of the anti-Islamic State (ISIS) Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which Turkey attacked earlier this month – from Manbij and Kobane.
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has reiterated Turkey’s stance that the YPG must be removed from all areas where the regime is deploying forces in northern Syria. Ankara wants every single YPG fighter to leave these areas – many of them Kurdish-majority regions.
Turkey views the YPG, and its political wing the Democratic Union Party (PYD), as nothing more than an extension of its arch-enemy the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it has fought for decades.
Russian Military Police are now patrolling along the line of contact between Syrian and Turkish forces in Manbij. Moscow has warned that any clash between these forces would be completely unacceptable.
The Russians have also said they will not accept a Turkish advance any deeper than 10 kilometers into Syria.
Ankara wants to push at least 32 kilometers into Syrian territory to remove the SDF/YPG and set-up a “safe zone” there. The US had planned to jointly establish such a safe zone with Turkey until US President Donald Trump took the unilateral decision to withdraw US troops from northern Syria early this month, which precipitated Turkey’s current cross-border offensive.
Russia has repeatedly called for the renewing of the Adana Agreement between Ankara and Damascus.
The 1998 accord authorized Turkey to pursue Kurdish fighters roughly 5 kilometers into Syrian territory but not to retain any military presence on its soil.
Shortly after Russian Military Police entered Manbij following the departure of US forces, Russian state media reported from an abandoned US base, where it was evident US troops there had left in a hurry.
One Russian correspondent noted: “It appears that US forces managed to evacuate only their weapons, ammunition and vehicles; they weren’t even able to set fire to the base.”
“However, it seems they understood perfectly well who would come to replace them. Across the base one finds messages for Russians.”
One such message was a drawing of a bald eagle. On its wings were written the words: “America is watching – always watching.” Others were left for comic effect, like one scribbling on a whiteboard that claimed whiskey is better than vodka.
Scenes like this demonstrate the rapid changes in territorial control taking place across northern Syria this month.
After the SDF removed ISIS from Arab-majority Manbij in 2016, following a costly, summer-long offensive, the US sought to prevent Turkey from attacking the city, sending troops to ensure no clashes broke out between the Turkish-backed militants and the SDF.
US forces in Manbij eventually began carrying out joint patrols with the Turkish military in an effort to placate Ankara, which had routinely threatened to attack the city.
The so-called Manbij Roadmap formulated by the US also aimed to appease Turkey by facilitating the complete and verifiable withdrawal of the YPG and by placing the military council governing the city solely into the hands of Manbij natives.
The roadmap ultimately made little to no headway aside from the series of joint patrols both sides conducted outside the city.
Russia also opposes any attack by Turkey or its militant proxies on Manbij and may take on a similar de-confliction role.
“I don’t think that Russia will be ready anytime soon to risk its positive dialogue with Turkey over Syria because of the PYD presence in Manbij,” Timur Akhmetov, an Ankara-based researcher for the Russian International Affairs Council, told Rudaw English.
“The long-term position of Russia on this matter is the eventual restoration of Damascus’ authority over all territories. I believe the same can be expected in Manbij.”
By taking this approach, he reasons: “Russia can show Turkey that Damascus can successfully replace the PYD in all other territories, contributing to efforts to restart dialogue between the Syrian and Turkish governments.”
Ankara has already said it has no objection to the Syrian regime redeploying its forces to the northeast if it means the YPG will be removed from those border areas.
Akhmetov also anticipates that “any specific political demands coming from the Syrian Kurds will be dealt with as well, but only as part of a domestic Syrian process, which in Russia’s view may effectively mean under a strong central government.”
Moscow, he added, may also “propose a scenario to Turkey in which the PYD is pressured into ceasing its political propaganda (with its military activity being fully stopped) in Damascus-controlled areas”.
It is not yet clear how exactly Russia could go about achieving this.
A “few things” that come to Akhmetov’s mind include “introducing alternative Kurdish parties, though weak ones” in place of the PYD, to satisfy Turkey, and then “luring the local population” to support them through financial incentives.
