Analysis
Supporters of Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr celebrate in Baghdad's Tahrir square on October 11, 2021 following the announcement of parliamentary election results. Photo: Ahmad al-Rubaye/AFP
The Sadrist movement became the biggest winner of the October 10 elections in Iraq, taking 73 seats, according to preliminary results. Its leader Muqtada al-Sadr gave a fiery speech on October 11: "Praise be to God who cherished the reform with its largest bloc, an Iraqi bloc, neither Eastern nor Western."
Its rival, the Fatih Alliance led by Hadi al-Amiri, lost two-thirds of its seats and only managed to secure 17. "We do not accept these fabricated results, whatever the cost," Amiri said in a written statement.
Significant surprises at the political level punctuated the early elections. The State of Law Coalition led by Nouri al-Maliki won 34 seats and the Taqadum party led by parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi won 37 seats. In comparison, the National State Forces Alliance led by Ammar al-Hakim and Haidar al-Abadi declined dramatically and only managed five seats. Gorran (Change Movement) in Kurdistan lost all its parliamentary seats. The Emtidad movement, emanating from the October demonstrations, succeeded in reserving nine parliamentary seats, followed by newcomer Ishraqat Kanon which won six seats. The number of independents may reach 30 seats.
Reasons for the decline and reactions
After the election, political parties have been divided into two categories. The first category, those who accept the results, include the Sadrists, State of Law, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Taqadum party, the Tasmim Movement led by Basra governor Asaad al-Edani, the Emtidad Movement, the Ishraqat Kanon, and the independent candidates who won in their districts. The second category is those who reject the results and believe there was a fundamental defect in the election process, accusing the electoral commission and external parties of tampering with the results. This category includes the Fatih Alliance, the National State Forces Alliance, the Azm Alliance, the al-Wafa Party, the Hilul Movement, and others.
If we put the accusations and scepticism about the election process aside, there is a new reality that no one can deny. These political forces need a serious self-review and an extensive study of the reasons why their voters were reluctant to participate or abstained from voting. The votes of these parties significantly decreased compared to the 2018 elections.
There are differences between the parties with respect to their poor performance. For example, the Hikma movement led by Ammar al-Hakim is a well-known and popular party with a solid support base. They lost seats due to the dispersal of their votes because of the diversity of candidates. And their late alliance with the Victory (Nasr) Alliance led to confusion in their electoral strategy. Furthermore, some of their young leadership members left the party to form their own movements, taking their voter bases with them.
While the Fatih Alliance relied on the language of resistance and victory over the Islamic State group (ISIS) as electoral propaganda and focused their electoral discourse on political and security matters, they neglected to focus on the service, economic and social issues that the public desires. The voters punished them by changing the direction of their votes to independents and the State of Law.
Gorran in the Kurdistan Region lost all their parliamentary seats. Their vote tally decreased to a tenth of their votes in the previous elections. They had turned from an opposition party to a party sharing power with the KDP and the PUK, but its voter base remained in opposition and they punished the leadership for the switch.
New Shiite political reality
The elections shocked most traditional Shiite parties that have dominated the political scene for nearly two decades. The traditional political parties lost their leadership roles, such as Fatih and Hikma, and cleared the way for both Sadrists and State of Law to take the lead. However, the road ahead is not entirely clear for these two.
Some observers believe that instead of the two poles – State of Law and Sadrists – that dominated the preliminary vote count, another two might emerge after the announcement of the final results.
The Sadrists have acted as winners and have a clear and straightforward message: "We are the largest bloc." They have been very subtle in their approach after the fiery message of October 11 by Sadr. Now they rely on his tweets to state their positions on events. They formed a negotiating team and contacted Kurdish and Sunni leaders to discuss opportunities for cooperation.
The second pole is the State of Law coalition. They moved quickly and sponsored meetings of the Shia Coordination Framework (SCF). Observers believe that State of Law participates in SCF meetings to attract disgruntled parties but don't share their view about election fraud. It aims to use them to form the largest bloc and prevent Sadrists from doing so.
Observers believe both Sadrists and State of Law have slim chances of forming the largest bloc easily and will require crafty negotiation skills to achieve it. The smaller parties will hold out before committing to either of them. They want to be treated as equals and not as small parties with a few seats. Ammar al-Hakim will hold out until he is treated as an effective leader, which he was before the election. He will give strong credibility and an image of Shiite unity to whatever side he joins. Hakim represents the voice of moderation in Shiite politics and both sides need that image. In addition, he has a strong base of voters regardless of their poor showing during the election.
The Fatih Alliance believes they have the legitimacy of Shiite leadership by being the guardians of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). They won 17 seats and funded several independents before the election, who will be joining them. They also have the seats of Christian minorities won by Rayan al-Kildani. This could propel Fatih close to 30 seats and with that they could become the third pole of Shiite politics. Siding with either State of Law or the Sadrists would be a big boost and they could become the kingmakers.
Parties born from the October protest movement who won in both Najaf and Nasiriyah began to meet and are looking to unite under one bloc. They hope to attract other independent winners to take their number to over 20 seats, which means they also could turn into kingmakers. Therefore they could be regarded as the fourth pole of the Shiite parties. However, their task is a difficult one in the face of the traditional ruling parties. The majority of these newcomers have no experience in the political and parliamentary arenas and they must learn at record speed.
Kurdish and Sunni political reality
The Kurdish political scene has not changed significantly. The KDP topped the list with 32 seats, including nine from Mosul, followed by the PUK with 17 seats, while the New Generation replaced Gorran with nine seats, and the Islamist parties remain on four.
The KDP celebrated its win as the biggest Kurdish party despite the fact that its total number of votes was significantly less than the previous election. The PUK found cause to celebrate after scraping through and only losing one seat despite the troubles that erupted on July 8 between the party's two co-chairs, which could have derailed the entire election for them. The New Generation had all reasons to celebrate becoming the opposition party.
Taqadum dominates the Sunni political scene. They harvested the majority of Sunni seats, 37, and expect to increase this to more than 42. Their closest rival, Azm Alliance, got a much smaller number of seats than they expected - 14. The election contributed to a centralization of Sunni politics in a small number of leaders and a significant decline for the traditional politicians who dominated the political scene in the past years.
Government formation, prospective alliances, and the presidencies
The Kurds and Sunnis are awaiting the outcome of the Shiite negotiations before entering into any alliances or negotiations regarding government formation. Accordingly, the wait may be long. They received clear and direct messages that they shouldn't interfere or influence the wrangling among the Shiites to select the largest bloc. They need to wait for the outcome of Shiite party negotiations.
The central dilemma for Kurds and Sunnis is the lack of a unifying body to deal with. The SCF was the entity that was negotiating and deciding what the Shiite political forces needed. This framework cracked after the election results. It took the role of opponents of the election after issuing statements opposing the results and refusing to recognize them.
The SCF was formed after the formation of the government of Mustafa al-Kadhimi in 2020. They held 38 meetings since its establishment and passed critical decisions related to the government and the political situation, including the decision to pass the election law, the Federal Court amendment law, and the agreement to hold early elections.
But the framework is no longer representative of the new reality after the election. The Sadrist movement left it and new political forces are absent. They need to reconsider this framework either by expanding its base or forming a new one. They need to make a decision urgently to bring the Shiite house together.
All negotiations for government formation and the appointment of the three presidencies remains on hold until the Shiite house reaches a settlement. All talk about bilateral or tripartite agreements between the different parties or naming candidates for the presidencies is pure speculation at this time.
The ball is now in the court of the leaders of the Shiite blocs. They are burdened with a great responsibility and facing a difficult test. The question that poses itself now is will they put self-interest before people and country. Do they fight it out to get the biggest piece of the pie or compete to provide the best service to the country?
Farhad Alaaldin is the chairman of the Iraqi Advisory Council. He was the political adviser to former Iraqi President Fuad Masum, the former chief of staff to the KRG prime minister from 2009 to 2011, and former senior adviser to the KRG prime minister from 2011 to 2012.
Its rival, the Fatih Alliance led by Hadi al-Amiri, lost two-thirds of its seats and only managed to secure 17. "We do not accept these fabricated results, whatever the cost," Amiri said in a written statement.
Significant surprises at the political level punctuated the early elections. The State of Law Coalition led by Nouri al-Maliki won 34 seats and the Taqadum party led by parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi won 37 seats. In comparison, the National State Forces Alliance led by Ammar al-Hakim and Haidar al-Abadi declined dramatically and only managed five seats. Gorran (Change Movement) in Kurdistan lost all its parliamentary seats. The Emtidad movement, emanating from the October demonstrations, succeeded in reserving nine parliamentary seats, followed by newcomer Ishraqat Kanon which won six seats. The number of independents may reach 30 seats.
Reasons for the decline and reactions
After the election, political parties have been divided into two categories. The first category, those who accept the results, include the Sadrists, State of Law, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Taqadum party, the Tasmim Movement led by Basra governor Asaad al-Edani, the Emtidad Movement, the Ishraqat Kanon, and the independent candidates who won in their districts. The second category is those who reject the results and believe there was a fundamental defect in the election process, accusing the electoral commission and external parties of tampering with the results. This category includes the Fatih Alliance, the National State Forces Alliance, the Azm Alliance, the al-Wafa Party, the Hilul Movement, and others.
If we put the accusations and scepticism about the election process aside, there is a new reality that no one can deny. These political forces need a serious self-review and an extensive study of the reasons why their voters were reluctant to participate or abstained from voting. The votes of these parties significantly decreased compared to the 2018 elections.
There are differences between the parties with respect to their poor performance. For example, the Hikma movement led by Ammar al-Hakim is a well-known and popular party with a solid support base. They lost seats due to the dispersal of their votes because of the diversity of candidates. And their late alliance with the Victory (Nasr) Alliance led to confusion in their electoral strategy. Furthermore, some of their young leadership members left the party to form their own movements, taking their voter bases with them.
While the Fatih Alliance relied on the language of resistance and victory over the Islamic State group (ISIS) as electoral propaganda and focused their electoral discourse on political and security matters, they neglected to focus on the service, economic and social issues that the public desires. The voters punished them by changing the direction of their votes to independents and the State of Law.
Gorran in the Kurdistan Region lost all their parliamentary seats. Their vote tally decreased to a tenth of their votes in the previous elections. They had turned from an opposition party to a party sharing power with the KDP and the PUK, but its voter base remained in opposition and they punished the leadership for the switch.
New Shiite political reality
The elections shocked most traditional Shiite parties that have dominated the political scene for nearly two decades. The traditional political parties lost their leadership roles, such as Fatih and Hikma, and cleared the way for both Sadrists and State of Law to take the lead. However, the road ahead is not entirely clear for these two.
Some observers believe that instead of the two poles – State of Law and Sadrists – that dominated the preliminary vote count, another two might emerge after the announcement of the final results.
The Sadrists have acted as winners and have a clear and straightforward message: "We are the largest bloc." They have been very subtle in their approach after the fiery message of October 11 by Sadr. Now they rely on his tweets to state their positions on events. They formed a negotiating team and contacted Kurdish and Sunni leaders to discuss opportunities for cooperation.
The second pole is the State of Law coalition. They moved quickly and sponsored meetings of the Shia Coordination Framework (SCF). Observers believe that State of Law participates in SCF meetings to attract disgruntled parties but don't share their view about election fraud. It aims to use them to form the largest bloc and prevent Sadrists from doing so.
Observers believe both Sadrists and State of Law have slim chances of forming the largest bloc easily and will require crafty negotiation skills to achieve it. The smaller parties will hold out before committing to either of them. They want to be treated as equals and not as small parties with a few seats. Ammar al-Hakim will hold out until he is treated as an effective leader, which he was before the election. He will give strong credibility and an image of Shiite unity to whatever side he joins. Hakim represents the voice of moderation in Shiite politics and both sides need that image. In addition, he has a strong base of voters regardless of their poor showing during the election.
The Fatih Alliance believes they have the legitimacy of Shiite leadership by being the guardians of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). They won 17 seats and funded several independents before the election, who will be joining them. They also have the seats of Christian minorities won by Rayan al-Kildani. This could propel Fatih close to 30 seats and with that they could become the third pole of Shiite politics. Siding with either State of Law or the Sadrists would be a big boost and they could become the kingmakers.
Parties born from the October protest movement who won in both Najaf and Nasiriyah began to meet and are looking to unite under one bloc. They hope to attract other independent winners to take their number to over 20 seats, which means they also could turn into kingmakers. Therefore they could be regarded as the fourth pole of the Shiite parties. However, their task is a difficult one in the face of the traditional ruling parties. The majority of these newcomers have no experience in the political and parliamentary arenas and they must learn at record speed.
Kurdish and Sunni political reality
The Kurdish political scene has not changed significantly. The KDP topped the list with 32 seats, including nine from Mosul, followed by the PUK with 17 seats, while the New Generation replaced Gorran with nine seats, and the Islamist parties remain on four.
The KDP celebrated its win as the biggest Kurdish party despite the fact that its total number of votes was significantly less than the previous election. The PUK found cause to celebrate after scraping through and only losing one seat despite the troubles that erupted on July 8 between the party's two co-chairs, which could have derailed the entire election for them. The New Generation had all reasons to celebrate becoming the opposition party.
Taqadum dominates the Sunni political scene. They harvested the majority of Sunni seats, 37, and expect to increase this to more than 42. Their closest rival, Azm Alliance, got a much smaller number of seats than they expected - 14. The election contributed to a centralization of Sunni politics in a small number of leaders and a significant decline for the traditional politicians who dominated the political scene in the past years.
Government formation, prospective alliances, and the presidencies
The Kurds and Sunnis are awaiting the outcome of the Shiite negotiations before entering into any alliances or negotiations regarding government formation. Accordingly, the wait may be long. They received clear and direct messages that they shouldn't interfere or influence the wrangling among the Shiites to select the largest bloc. They need to wait for the outcome of Shiite party negotiations.
The central dilemma for Kurds and Sunnis is the lack of a unifying body to deal with. The SCF was the entity that was negotiating and deciding what the Shiite political forces needed. This framework cracked after the election results. It took the role of opponents of the election after issuing statements opposing the results and refusing to recognize them.
The SCF was formed after the formation of the government of Mustafa al-Kadhimi in 2020. They held 38 meetings since its establishment and passed critical decisions related to the government and the political situation, including the decision to pass the election law, the Federal Court amendment law, and the agreement to hold early elections.
But the framework is no longer representative of the new reality after the election. The Sadrist movement left it and new political forces are absent. They need to reconsider this framework either by expanding its base or forming a new one. They need to make a decision urgently to bring the Shiite house together.
All negotiations for government formation and the appointment of the three presidencies remains on hold until the Shiite house reaches a settlement. All talk about bilateral or tripartite agreements between the different parties or naming candidates for the presidencies is pure speculation at this time.
The ball is now in the court of the leaders of the Shiite blocs. They are burdened with a great responsibility and facing a difficult test. The question that poses itself now is will they put self-interest before people and country. Do they fight it out to get the biggest piece of the pie or compete to provide the best service to the country?
Farhad Alaaldin is the chairman of the Iraqi Advisory Council. He was the political adviser to former Iraqi President Fuad Masum, the former chief of staff to the KRG prime minister from 2009 to 2011, and former senior adviser to the KRG prime minister from 2011 to 2012.
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