A new political coalition of 34 members was announced on December 9, taking the name of Azm Alliance, and aiming to share the Sunni high posts with their main competitor, the Sunni Taqadum Alliance, led by former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi.
The new coalition is an alliance between Azm, which is led by Khamis al-Khanjar, National Peoples’ Party, led by Abu Mazen al-Jabouri, the Hassm Movement for Reform, and three deputies from the Aqed al-Watani Alliance led by Falih al-Fayyadh, along with some independent deputies.
The formation of this alliance comes as a result of covert movement by the leaders of the Coordination Framework. They convinced the scattered Sunni parties and independents to get together to prevent Halbousi from becoming the speaker of parliament for the second term, and to prevent him from expanding his coalition and subsequently moving ahead to enter a political agreement with Muqtada al-Sadr to create the largest bloc.
Observers believe that the Coordination Framework aims to prevent the Kurds and the Sunnis from entering into alliance with the Sadrist Movement and forcing the hand of Sadrists to sit down with the framework to negotiate a power-sharing agreement.
The framework has succeeded in its first attempt. Mishaan al-Jabouri, a member of Azm Alliance, announced in an interview with Rudaw on December 5 that "The Azm Alliance [had] agreed with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) not to support any Shiite group against the other, pending the announcement of the formation of the largest bloc."
Federal Court between ratification and cancellation of elections
The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) sent the final election results to the Federal Court on December 1, with political pressure increasing on the members of the court. The framework brought a court case asking for the nullification of elections. The hearing of the Federal Court was attended by Fatih leader Hadi al-Amiri and representatives of the blocs affiliated with the Coordination Framework. The Federal Court set a new date of December 13 for the submission of evidence.
It is worth noting that the Federal Court in 2018 rejected a case for fraud and manipulation of elections, saying: "The Federal Supreme Court held its session today [May 28, 2018], and considered a case focused on electoral violations that accompanied the process of elections for membership of the House of Representatives… The issue concerns the Independent High Electoral Commission, which is responsible for accepting complaints and objections to alleged violations that occur during the electoral process. Its decisions are subject to appeal before a judicial body, the Federal Court of Cassation."
Some observers believe that the Federal Court might go to non-ratification, or even beyond that by approving electoral fraud, which calls for it to cancel its results. Some legal experts believe that the dissolution of Iraq's previous parliament was conditional. If this condition is not met, the previous parliament can reconvene.
To many political observers label this approach as a mistake, since the decision issued by the House of Representatives on March 31, 2021, is only conditional on holding the elections. Indeed, the resolution stipulates that "It was decided to dissolve the House of Representatives on 7/10/2021, provided that the general parliamentary elections take place on 10/10/2021."
The election did take place on October 10. Furthermore, parliament issued a decree on October 7 ending the tenure of its members, and meaning that its work has ended completely, which prevents the possibility of its return.
Any decision of the Federal Court to cancel the elections, therefore, will generate a constitutional vacuum that may lead to unexpected chaos, because all possibilities become possible without exception. Hence, the Federal Court has no choice other than ratification, but the issue of accelerating this so far remains intractable.
Many observers believe that the Federal Court will ratify the election results, but it may be delayed. An informed source said that the ratification will take place in the middle of January 2022, and indicated that the reason for the delay is "to allow the political blocs to negotiate and reach consensus before ratification."
The Sadrists are waiting, the Coordination Framework is preparing, and the independents are lost.
The first to start political formation after the elections was the leader of the Sadrist Movement on his first visit to Baghdad on November 4. He returned to Baghdad again to meet with the leaders of the framework at the house of Amiri on December 2, at the same time preventing any movement or discussions on the political body and the committee negotiating with other political blocs. The Sadrist Movement is waiting for the Federal Court to ratify the election results.
In contrast, the Coordination Framework continued its regular meetings, exerted pressure on the street, maintained the momentum of the demonstrations in front of the Green Zone, and made demands of the Federal Court through a lawsuit calling for the cancellation of the elections. At the same time, the framework announced its intention to send delegations to meet with the Kurdish and Sunni political parties amid talk of forming alliances or cutting off the road to their formation by others until a Shiite consensus is reached.
Meanwhile, the movement of independents and the new small and medium-sized blocs such as Emtidad, Ishraqat Kanon, and others were limited to side discussions, content with issuing brief statements expressing their positions not to enter into the formation of the largest bloc or any government emanating from it.
This negative stance by the new blocs demonstrates that they do not have sufficient political experience, as winning the elections is only the beginning of a complicated, lengthy and complex political work. That electoral goal is not achieved by sitting as spectators on the fringes of the political arena.
Changing political reality requires a positive and proactive political movement to impose the completion of the electoral process. The fact that these parties stay away from any effective movement and are satisfied with photo-shoots and their silence on what is happening in the arena constitutes a setback that will reduce their role and reflect a lack of vision for correcting the political track in Iraq.
The Sunni and Kurdish movements
The Kurdish and Sunni parties decided to standby and not enter into serious negotiations with the political blocs, especially the Shiites until negotiations between Shiite blocs was completed and a consensus reached. This passive posture has contributed to delaying the convening of parliament and forming a government that does not serve the interests of these political parties and the people they represent. At the same time, if the Shiite parties cannot agree, the political deadlock will continue and negatively affect the Iraqi people, including the Kurds and Sunnis.
In addition, the Kurdish and Sunni players’ choosing to stand as spectators is an acknowledgment that they are the weaker players and are playing second fiddle to the stronger Shiite player. They complain that the Shiites are not treating them as partners; however, when the occasion requires them to step up, they fail to exert their influence and fulfill the role they yearn to play.
The Kurdish and Sunni parties must become more interactive and responsive to the country's crises and move together on the path of establishing and strengthening the democratic process and its system in Iraq. They can resolve the differences between the Shiite blocs and encourage them to reach an agreement. They could form a joint delegation to negotiate with the Shiite blocs, bring views closer, propose solutions to conclude a political agreement, and form alliances that move towards completing the electoral process, convening the parliament, and forming the government.
If all routes are exhausted, they can choose to partner with one of the Shiite sides to create the largest bloc. Not doing anything and sitting on the sidelines is never an option.
Expected resolution
The road map towards a solution is almost transparent and does not need speculation and interpretation. The constitution requires the political forces to proceed with completing the electoral process by ratifying the election results, setting a date for the first session of the parliament, electing the speaker and his two deputies, electing the president and designating the candidate of the largest bloc to form a new government.
Procrastination and mulling around to delay the process is unjustified, and will take the country to the cliff of disaster amid significant challenges and dangers.
The pandemic is raising the alarm again with a variant that is spreading fast. Oil prices are declining; public spending is increasing. A suffocating water crisis is looming, and a new generation is graduating from universities, waiting for a labor market that is still paralyzed and crippled. The population is on the rise with an additional one million people per year, unemployment and poverty rates are at a frightening increase, and the deterioration and decay of infrastructure continues amid fears of threats of internal and regional armed conflicts.
Iraq needs political and economic stability to correct the course; stability will not be achieved by continuing the political impasse. It has become a duty and an obligation for political leaders to prioritize the interests of the country and society over self-interest to prevent the catastrophe that awaits Iraqis if the situation continues as it is now.
Farhad Alaaldin is the Chairman of the Iraqi Advisory Council. He was the political adviser to former Iraqi President Fuad Masum, the former chief of staff to the KRG prime minister from 2009 to 2011, and former senior adviser to the KRG prime minister from 2011 to 2012.
