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Analysis
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) forces near Duhok, Kurdistan Region of Iraq. File photo: AFP
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has expressed an interest to both “modernize and professionalize” its forces in order to adequately combat Turkey. However, it is unclear whether it can do so in the face of far more technologically-advanced Turkish military.
“We want to fully modernize, reinvigorate and professionalize guerrillas who should be capable of prevailing over the enemy’s intelligence and techniques,” said senior PKK official Murat Karayilan in August.
Karayilan did not specify how exactly the group planned to do so.
It is understandable why the PKK wants a more modern and professional force in light of increasingly sophisticated and lethal Turkish attacks.
Over the past year, Turkey has upped the ante against the group in the Kurdistan Region by assassinating several of its senior officials – most notably Zaki Shingali, Serhat Varto and Diyar Ghareeb – in a series of air and drone strikes.
Shingali was killed in a Turkish airstrike in August 2018, the first time Turkey assassinated a senior PKK official in this way. The others were killed in similar targeted attacks, demonstrating that Ankara has more effective means of targeting and killing members of the PKK leadership.
Shortly after Shingali’s assassination, Turkish military analyst Metin Gurcan noted that such assassinations could spur more sophisticated and lethal PKK responses.
He pointed out that when Turkey first used armed drones against the PKK in Kurdish-majority southeast Turkey in late 2016 the PKK responded by using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) against Turkish military outposts in a clear bid “to overcome the advantage afforded to Ankara by drones”.
He, perhaps presciently, predicted that: “If Ankara continues with this type of targeted killings aboard, the PKK might revert to intense attacks using VBIEDs and drones, which could create a new dimension to the lengthy conflict between Turkey and the PKK”.
Analysts consulted by Rudaw English point out that the PKK has very limited means to modernize its forces to a level by which they could effectively counter the Turkish military.
“The PKK has no effective response to Turkey’s advanced military drone capabilities, except to turn back to urban warfare,” said Nicholas Heras, the Middle East Security Fellow for the Center for a New American Security.
“Turkish military commanders have become proficient in using intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance, and drone strikes, to decimate the PKK’s leadership,” he said.
“Turkey’s use of drone warfare has mauled the PKK severely, and drones are perfectly suited to the rural and mountainous terrain in eastern Turkey and northern Iraq where the PKK has chosen to use as both a battleground and safe haven.”
According to Heras, while the PKK cannot “match Turkey in drone warfare” the group could seriously challenge the Turkish military through the use of VBIEDs in urban areas.
While such a move “would be highly destructive to civilian areas it would also be the PKK’s last best hope for military relevance”.
“Otherwise, the path the PKK is on now is the one to being hunted down to extinction by Turkish drones,” Heras said.
Güneş Murat Tezcür, the Jalal Talabani Chair of Kurdish Political Studies at the University of Central Florida, pointed out that in the past “the most notable attacks conducted by the PKK involved raids against remote and isolated Turkish military outposts”.
“Such attacks, which used to result in significant Turkish casualties, sometimes several dozen fatalities, do not look very feasible for the insurgency given the changes in technology,” he said.
Today, PKK fighters risk exposing themselves to lethal drone attacks if they once again try attacking outposts as they have done in the past. Even today’s Turkish military outposts are “more like fortresses”.
Tezcür pointed out that the PKK has not successfully attacked an outpost for several years now.
“Moreover, the professionalization of the Turkish army means that mobile, small, and well-trained units supported by drones roam the rugged border areas and reduce the surprise factor,” he said.
While the PKK increasingly relied on IEDs in the 2015-16 urban clashes “such attacks require a network of logistical support, especially in more urban areas”.
“The PKK seems to have a lesser ability to cultivate such networks in Turkey at the moment,” Tezcür said.
It also “has a relatively limited number of options when it comes to technological advances”.
On top of that, the group lacks “the rocket capacity of Hamas and Hezbollah which face a static border situation with Israel”.
That said, Tezcür also believes that any potential Turkish military incursion into northeast Syria’s Kurdish majority regions, which are controlled by the PKK-affiliated PYD, “may change the dynamics of the conflict and creates more incentives for the PKK to pursue more ambitious operations in Turkey”.
“We want to fully modernize, reinvigorate and professionalize guerrillas who should be capable of prevailing over the enemy’s intelligence and techniques,” said senior PKK official Murat Karayilan in August.
Karayilan did not specify how exactly the group planned to do so.
It is understandable why the PKK wants a more modern and professional force in light of increasingly sophisticated and lethal Turkish attacks.
Over the past year, Turkey has upped the ante against the group in the Kurdistan Region by assassinating several of its senior officials – most notably Zaki Shingali, Serhat Varto and Diyar Ghareeb – in a series of air and drone strikes.
Shingali was killed in a Turkish airstrike in August 2018, the first time Turkey assassinated a senior PKK official in this way. The others were killed in similar targeted attacks, demonstrating that Ankara has more effective means of targeting and killing members of the PKK leadership.
Shortly after Shingali’s assassination, Turkish military analyst Metin Gurcan noted that such assassinations could spur more sophisticated and lethal PKK responses.
He pointed out that when Turkey first used armed drones against the PKK in Kurdish-majority southeast Turkey in late 2016 the PKK responded by using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) against Turkish military outposts in a clear bid “to overcome the advantage afforded to Ankara by drones”.
He, perhaps presciently, predicted that: “If Ankara continues with this type of targeted killings aboard, the PKK might revert to intense attacks using VBIEDs and drones, which could create a new dimension to the lengthy conflict between Turkey and the PKK”.
Analysts consulted by Rudaw English point out that the PKK has very limited means to modernize its forces to a level by which they could effectively counter the Turkish military.
“The PKK has no effective response to Turkey’s advanced military drone capabilities, except to turn back to urban warfare,” said Nicholas Heras, the Middle East Security Fellow for the Center for a New American Security.
“Turkish military commanders have become proficient in using intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance, and drone strikes, to decimate the PKK’s leadership,” he said.
“Turkey’s use of drone warfare has mauled the PKK severely, and drones are perfectly suited to the rural and mountainous terrain in eastern Turkey and northern Iraq where the PKK has chosen to use as both a battleground and safe haven.”
According to Heras, while the PKK cannot “match Turkey in drone warfare” the group could seriously challenge the Turkish military through the use of VBIEDs in urban areas.
While such a move “would be highly destructive to civilian areas it would also be the PKK’s last best hope for military relevance”.
“Otherwise, the path the PKK is on now is the one to being hunted down to extinction by Turkish drones,” Heras said.
Güneş Murat Tezcür, the Jalal Talabani Chair of Kurdish Political Studies at the University of Central Florida, pointed out that in the past “the most notable attacks conducted by the PKK involved raids against remote and isolated Turkish military outposts”.
“Such attacks, which used to result in significant Turkish casualties, sometimes several dozen fatalities, do not look very feasible for the insurgency given the changes in technology,” he said.
Today, PKK fighters risk exposing themselves to lethal drone attacks if they once again try attacking outposts as they have done in the past. Even today’s Turkish military outposts are “more like fortresses”.
Tezcür pointed out that the PKK has not successfully attacked an outpost for several years now.
“Moreover, the professionalization of the Turkish army means that mobile, small, and well-trained units supported by drones roam the rugged border areas and reduce the surprise factor,” he said.
While the PKK increasingly relied on IEDs in the 2015-16 urban clashes “such attacks require a network of logistical support, especially in more urban areas”.
“The PKK seems to have a lesser ability to cultivate such networks in Turkey at the moment,” Tezcür said.
It also “has a relatively limited number of options when it comes to technological advances”.
On top of that, the group lacks “the rocket capacity of Hamas and Hezbollah which face a static border situation with Israel”.
That said, Tezcür also believes that any potential Turkish military incursion into northeast Syria’s Kurdish majority regions, which are controlled by the PKK-affiliated PYD, “may change the dynamics of the conflict and creates more incentives for the PKK to pursue more ambitious operations in Turkey”.
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