WASHINGTON DC – Turkey has been pushing for what it calls a “no fly zone” or “free zone” in northwestern Syria. However, contradicting statements -- not just between senior American and Turkish officials but inside the Turkish government itself -- indicate deep fault-lines as well as miscommunication between Washington and Ankara.
Since NATO Turkey allowed US warplanes the use of its Incirlik air base in the southeast, Turkish officials have come out claiming a deal between the two countries for a free zone in Syria.
But every Turkish claim has been rejected by US officials.
Turkey argues that a protected enclave in Syria would serve as a lynchpin for moderate Syrian forces to launch attacks against regime troops and the Islamic State (ISIS). They say it would also allow thousands of refugees to be returned to Syria, lightening social and economic costs on Turkey from more than 1.8 million war refugees from across the border.
Yet, many disagree with Turkish reasoning. They believe Ankara’s ultimate goal is to ensure that Kurdish YPG forces are unable to capture the ISIS-controlled town of Jarablus. This is the only town on the border with Turkey in ISIS hands, after it was defeated in Gire Spi in late June by Kurdish fighters.
The idea of a safe zone has been troubling for American officials for good reason: Ankara wants the US-led coalition to establish and protect the enclave with its air power. Most of Jarablus is controlled by ISIS, which considers the United States to be its sworn enemy.
In addition, according to media reports, Ankara is not interested in Kurdish forces entering the area, where American officials say that Turkish forces were shelling Kurdish fighters who attempted to march towards Jarablus.
The question is, how can US and coalition forces dislodge ISIS and al-Qaeda’s Jabhat al-Nusra from the proposed safe zone, even if they agree to Turkish terms? On the ground, which force can defeat ISIS in the area?
The 60 fighters that the United States has so far trained is too small a force to pose a real challenge to ISIS. The capabilities and willingness of the other moderate Syrian forces -- except the Kurds – are questionable: ISIS has defeated most of them in the past, including some of the most powerful jihadist groups.
Would Turkey itself risk sending ground troops to push ISIS and the al-Nusra Front out of the area? Last month’s deadly bombing in the Turkish town of Suruc is good evidence that ISIS sleeper cells or sympathizers can harm and destabilize Turkey.
Thus, despite the rhetoric by Turkish officials that Ankara would take on ISIS, the risks outweigh the benefits of seriously going after ISIS, at least at the moment.
From a Turkish national security point of view, an ISIS-controlled area that keeps Kurdish-controlled territories separated from each other in Syria makes total sense, at least in the short run.
But the question is whether Washington wants to potentially and unintentionally use its air force to protect a “free zone” inside Syria, where it can be a safe haven for ISIS and other groups with jihadist affiliations.
