On April 27, suspected ISIS gunmen attacked the office of the Iraqi directorate for counter-terrorism and intelligence in Kirkuk, engaging in a firefight with security forces before detonating suicide vests. This was the fourth attack in Kirkuk in less than a month.
Earlier in April, ISIS militants killed two Peshmerga fighters in the Garmiyan region.
On May 2, ISIS attacked Hashd al-Shaabi militiamen, also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), in Saladin province, killing at least ten.
Five days later, Iraq launched a fresh military campaign against ISIS in Diyala and Kirkuk.
In light of this recent uptick in ISIS violence, Iraqi officials are once again discussing joint security coordination with the Peshmerga against the militants.
The present security gaps between Iraqi and Kurdish lines were brought about after Iraq militarily seized Kirkuk from the Peshmerga in October 2017. For a fortnight, both sides engaged in skirmishes along the Iraq-Kurdistan Region frontiers, which ended in a ceasefire by the month’s end. ISIS was able to capitalize on the subsequent security gaps that have remained since.
“Many of the disputed areas of Iraq, especially in Diyala, are being exploited by the Islamic State mainly because there are large sections of no man’s land in between the federal and regional government’s forces,” Joel Wing, author of the Musings on Iraq blog, told Rudaw English.
According to Jabar Yawar, the chief of staff of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, there is 1,000 km of territory stretching from Khanaqin to Rabia in which ISIS has been able to operate. From these areas the group has mounted attacks, terrorized locals, and imposed taxes to fund its activities. ISIS has also taken shelter in caves around the Qarachogh Mountains of Makhmour (60 km southwest of Erbil), where it killed two US soldiers assisting Iraqi forces in an operation there in March.
Cooperation between Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga could, in theory, apply more pressure on the militants and deny them sanctuary in these areas. However, all of this is much easier said than done.
“There have been mild talks between Baghdad and Erbil to work out some kind of cooperation between the Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga to close this gap,” Wing said.
“Even if they agree to joint operations, there are two main hindrances to this being successful.”
The first hindrance Wing identified is the fact that many of the disputed territories between Baghdad and Erbil are presently controlled by Hashd al-Shaabi brigades who are only “nominally under the control of Baghdad.”
Some of these Hashd units have bad relations with the Kurds, meaning that if the government were “to order them to work with the Peshmerga, there’s no telling how cooperative they would actually be.”
The second hindrance is that neither the Iraqi forces nor the Peshmerga have demonstrated they are capable of mounting effective counterinsurgency campaigns.
“Most of the times they [the Iraqi forces] will mount a large operation that can be detected beforehand, sweep through an area, find some weapons caches and very few insurgents because most have left, declare a success, and then leave while the militants infiltrate back in,” he said.
While close cooperation between the Iraqis and Peshmerga might reduce the freedom of movement ISIS presently enjoys “the bigger picture is that their operations in the disputed areas will likely continue largely as they have been.”
Alex Mello, a security analyst at energy consultancy Horizon Client Access, who follows the security situation in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, also doubts we’ll see close cooperation between Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga in the near future.
“The withdrawal of the US advisory cells from K1 [base in Kirkuk], Makhmour, and the NiOC [Nineveh Operations Command] headquarters that were coordinating between federal and Kurdish security forces in those areas is likely going to reduce cooperation in the short to medium term,” Mello told Rudaw English.
“Without the US pushing things forward I think there’s very little political will in either Baghdad or Erbil to improve security cooperation right now,” he said.
On the political front, any potential cooperation in the future will depend on the type of tone that Iraq’s new Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi sets going forward.
Mello noted that Iraq’s last prime minister, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, had good ties with Erbil until the recent spat over oil revenues. However, these cordial relations did not have “a big impact at the ground level in places like Kirkuk and Khanaquin where coordination between the Kurdish and federal security forces was still poor to nonexistent.”
“To a large extent this [prospect of cooperation] also depends on who’s the Iraqi operations command head in the province, the relationship between local divisional and brigade commanders with the guys on the Kurdish side, whether the local Iraqi unit is the army, Federal Police, or PMF,” he said.
“If the security situation in Kirkuk or northern Diyala gets really bad, there’ll be more pressure on Baghdad and Erbil to cooperate,” he added.
Even if Iraq and the Peshmerga do successfully cooperate and mount joint offensives, with US-led coalition air support, it’s still unclear if they could decisively rout ISIS.
Mello noted that there have already been several US-coordinated operations involving both Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga along the border zone in places like the Qarachogh Mountains in Makhmour.
“The issue is with the gap between the Kurdish control line and the federal Iraqi FLOT [forward line of own troops],” he said. “Covering that gap is going to require things like working the boundaries of unit AOs [Area of Operations], manning of joint checkpoints, joint patrols, and so forth, not just temporary clearance sweeps or airstrikes in those areas.”
Peshmerga cooperation with Iraq and increased Peshmerga deployment in the disputed areas could prove advantageous. Mello pointed out that the Peshmerga “in general just tend to be tougher and more professional” than their Iraqi counterparts.
“So, for example, they’re more willing to go out on patrols if the weather’s bad instead of just sitting in their little outposts,” he said.
“In a lot of places along the frontline, they’ll know the local terrain better than the Iraqi unit, which might be Federal Police brigade from southern Iraq or an army battalion moved up from Baghdad,” he added.
Cooperation and the building of trust between the Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga in the disputed territories could potentially pave the way for the resolution of other contentious issues between Baghdad and Erbil, such as the federal budget and oil-sharing arrangements.
“Potentially you could see US-driven, bottom-up process where improved coordination between federal and Kurdish security forces in places like Kirkuk creates the climate for broader settlement between Baghdad and Erbil,” Mello said.
However, he believes this would be highly unlikely without the US overseeing and pushing such a process forward. Washington is unlikely to do so anytime soon “since, even with Kadhimi coming in, the US looks like it’s generally trying to step back from managing day to day security arrangements.”
“It’s more likely that a high-level political settlement between the KRG and Baghdad leads to improved coordination at the local level, though I think that’s not particularly likely either right now,” Mello added.
