Analysis
Iraqis demonstrate against rising prices of basic food items, in al-Haboubi Square in the Iraqi city of Nasiriyah on March 9, 2022. Photo: Asaad Niazi/AFP
Five months after Iraq’s October 10 election, the fire of political dialogue and negotiations have turned to ashes. The winners have failed to form either a national majority government or a consensus government, which they had promised their voters. Intolerance and rigidity of positions has replaced moderation and flexibility in the negotiating scene, with differences centering around self-interest rather than a new government program to serve the people.
The Federal Supreme Court of Iraq's interpretation of Article 70 of the constitution, requiring that two-thirds of members of parliament attend the presidential election session, forced the winning blocs to put the idea of forming a majority government on the shelves and think exclusively of a consensus approach that has become difficult to achieve. In such circumstances, a new government seems elusive.
Triple way split
The political arena is divided into three competing blocs: the tripartite alliance, the Coordination Framework (and their partners), and the independents.
The tripartite alliance - also known as the Save the Homeland Coalition - comprises around 148-160 members, including the Sadrist Movement, the Sunni Sovereignty Alliance, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).
Save the Homeland has not yet been able to attract any political bloc or independent parliamentarians. At the same time, the coalition has experienced internal convulsions for several reasons. Parliamentary speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi frequently complains about the ever-increasing powers of his first deputy, especially concerning holding meetings with the heads of the parliamentary blocs, official correspondence addressed to the executives, and forcing him to use the term presidency instead of the president and his deputies.
The KDP has expressed its own frustration about the lack of support from its coalition partners on the issuance of two decisions by the federal court against the party's interests. The first decision excluded its candidate, Hoshyar Zebari, for the post of president. The second constituted a fatal blow to the oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan Region.
Related: Federal court decision on Kurdish oil, gas industry ‘unconstitutional’: KRG
The head of the negotiating delegation, Fazel Mirani, vehemently blamed the coalition leaders at their tripartite meeting held in Baghdad on February 27. According to an informed source, Mirani called on the coalition leaders to express clear and frank support for his party. On their part, the Sadrists are becoming weary of the meetings held by his allies with the Coordination Framework, especially meetings between the KDP delegation and State of Law leader Nouri al-Maliki.
Muqtada al-Sadr, Shiite cleric and leader of the Sadrist Movement, has not hidden his frustration with the situation within the Save the Homeland Coalition - and indeed the entire political process. He has told his allies that he might go to the opposition side, and then they (the partners) would be free of all obligations to him. Rumors circulating in Najaf that Sadr is increasingly frustrated with his partners suggest that this coalition might not survive in the long run, particularly if the pressures continue to mount on him.
The Coordination Framework - and National Stability Coalition
Although not formally a coalition, the Coordination Framework acts as a united front for those parties opposing the tripartite alliance. State of Law spokesman Bahaa al-Nouri said in a televised statement that a National Stability Coalition would soon be announced. It is said to consist of the Coordination Framework, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Azm Alliance led by Muthanna al-Samarrai. However, no official response from the PUK or Azm about the proposed bloc has yet been issued. The new bloc supposedly consists of 133 deputies.
The Coordination Framework began its journey by casting doubt over the election results and rejecting them, filing lawsuits in the federal court, and then negotiating with the Sadrists to establish a footprint in the government formation process. Part of the framework was about to sign up with Sadr and only stopped after a message from Iran's Supreme Leader that asked them to stay united.
The federal court’s interpretation of Article 70 provided further support for the framework; it gave them the ability to disrupt the election of the President of the Republic in the event of a disagreement with the Sadrist Movement. As a result, the framework began to breathe a sigh of relief and canceled pre-planned meetings to discuss a possible deal on Sadr’s terms, which demanded the exclusion of the State of Law within the Coordination Framework from taking part. The last meeting between the framework leaders and the Sadrists was nearly two months ago.
Related: The political scene: Iraq’s Sadrists and Coordination Framework reach deadlock, Kurdish rivalry intensifies
The framework is confident that the Sadrist Movement will not form a government without its involvement; they even believe that they can impose appropriate conditions. If Sadr chooses to go to the opposition, the framework imagine they will be effortlessly able to form a government, and present a successful candidate for prime minister.
Role of Independents
Independents are believed to be between 36-55 deputies. The New Generation and Imtidad (9 members each) announced their alliance under a new coalition called For the People Coalition, on December 15. Joined by a further 15 independent members, they have formed a bloc of 33. For the People Coalition is on the face of it a vague grouping; it is not apparent what it stands for, and the programs and intentions of the two leading partners differ widely. They have not announced any tangible policies that lead to a united vision. However, they have both declared that they will be joining the opposition.
Observers believe that independent parliamentarians had a golden opportunity to change the political equation by aligning themselves with one of the competing parties and forcing them to complete the electoral process. However, they appear to have chosen to become observers of events without contributing to the making or changing of decisions. They chose this path due to their lack of experience, lack of awareness of parliamentary work, and lack of political maturity. Observers describe their performance during the past two months inside parliament as modest.
Parties happy with their spoils
All political parties are happy with what they have right now - a bird in the hand - and are therefore not much concerned for what could be further along the tree.
The Sadrist Movement is at the forefront of the political scene with its iron grip controlling almost all aspects of the ruling scene and political arena. Sadr boasted about this in a press conference on January 18, saying that "prolonging the term is not in anyone's interest at all, knowing that I am not affected" in response to a question about extending the government formation process.
Sadr is clear, confident, and possesses broad influence within the legislative and executive branches. His bloc within parliament is the largest and, thus, dictates the agenda. The speaker and his two deputies are members of his coalition and can push through any reforms he wants or target the political competitors through new legislation. In addition, the prime minister cooperates with Sadrists, and its leader fully responds to his proposals and orientations, which made the Sadrist leader publicly declare his support for Mustafa al-Kadhimi to be re-elected for a second term. This explicit support was reflected in his reception of Kadhimi in Hanana twice in a short period.
Furthermore, the Sadrists enjoy a large circle of influence inside the government; they have appointed several deputy ministers, director generals, and other positions, including the appointment of Najaf’s governor. As a result, the Sadrists are happy to carry on with the current situation.
The political forces under the Coordination Framework control eight ministries, have vast influence within the Council of Ministers and enjoy the prime minister's support. Furthermore, many political parties within the framework have their economic interests fully protected and have not lost any influence in this interim period. A new government formation process can only ensure 4-6 ministries for the Coordination Framework if they agree with the Sadrists. Therefore, the status quo could be a better alternative than forming a new government which might see the reduction of influence for some former players.
The Sovereignty Alliance and its leaders have also achieved their political objectives: Halbousi managed to renew his speakership, and the alliance controls six ministries in the current government, compounded by the growing influence they have within Iraq’s Sunni areas. At the same time, they are maintaining a close relationship with the current prime minister, who ensures that their requirements are met. Therefore the Sovereignty Alliance is also content with the status quo and not in a hurry to change anything.
The PUK is still on the throne of the presidency and currently has the Ministry of Justice. It must negotiate with difficulty to get the presidency again and lose its only ministry if the new government is formed while retaining the presidency. Hence, the current situation is also highly suitable for them.
The KDP has retained the second deputy speaker of parliament and has two ministries. It also enjoys strong relations with the current prime minister and such a relationship is not guaranteed in the event of a change of government. Especially after the federal court issued its decision on the unconstitutionality of the Kurdistan Region exporting oil and gas. In other words, the current stalemate is also in the interest of the KDP.
Alarms sound again
The Russia-Ukraine war is in its third week, and its consequences could prove disastrous for the world. Iraq is not immune to these consequences, as the continuation and development of this war could put Iraq on the brink, especially concerning the prices of food, goods, and services. The economies of the major powers enable them to rein in the repercussions of the war on their markets.
At the same time, Iraq continues to reel under a constrained rentier economy, with a concerning decline in the agricultural and industrial sector and its lack of minimum food security. If imports stop, Iraq will face real famine. Iraq is also likely to lose Russian energy companies operating at several oil sites in the south and north of the country if forced to implement any international sanctions aimed at striking Russian interests.
Related: What the war in Ukraine means for the Middle East
Political forces should abide by the legal and constitutional timings, observe electoral entitlements, respect their commitment to their voters, and not be content with taking the constitutional oath and electing the parliament’s speaker while failing to elect the country’s president and form a new government.
Political parties should be well aware that they will face their voters sooner or later. They must beg for their votes again despite their failure to achieve their legal, national, and moral obligations, as well as their failure to complete their programs and electoral promises. The Iraqi voter will not forgive the parties that have failed to provide services, secure jobs, and provide food.
The ruling parties are gambling with their history and existence by seeking selfish privileges and gains at the expense of the suffering of the people and the future of an entire country, forgetting the possibilities of violent reactions that can turn the table on their heads. The fire of the street uprising turned to ashes but may flare up again, and then everyone will lose without exception, and the results will be disastrous, and it is difficult if not impossible to remedy.
The Federal Supreme Court of Iraq's interpretation of Article 70 of the constitution, requiring that two-thirds of members of parliament attend the presidential election session, forced the winning blocs to put the idea of forming a majority government on the shelves and think exclusively of a consensus approach that has become difficult to achieve. In such circumstances, a new government seems elusive.
Triple way split
The political arena is divided into three competing blocs: the tripartite alliance, the Coordination Framework (and their partners), and the independents.
The tripartite alliance - also known as the Save the Homeland Coalition - comprises around 148-160 members, including the Sadrist Movement, the Sunni Sovereignty Alliance, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).
Save the Homeland has not yet been able to attract any political bloc or independent parliamentarians. At the same time, the coalition has experienced internal convulsions for several reasons. Parliamentary speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi frequently complains about the ever-increasing powers of his first deputy, especially concerning holding meetings with the heads of the parliamentary blocs, official correspondence addressed to the executives, and forcing him to use the term presidency instead of the president and his deputies.
The KDP has expressed its own frustration about the lack of support from its coalition partners on the issuance of two decisions by the federal court against the party's interests. The first decision excluded its candidate, Hoshyar Zebari, for the post of president. The second constituted a fatal blow to the oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan Region.
Related: Federal court decision on Kurdish oil, gas industry ‘unconstitutional’: KRG
The head of the negotiating delegation, Fazel Mirani, vehemently blamed the coalition leaders at their tripartite meeting held in Baghdad on February 27. According to an informed source, Mirani called on the coalition leaders to express clear and frank support for his party. On their part, the Sadrists are becoming weary of the meetings held by his allies with the Coordination Framework, especially meetings between the KDP delegation and State of Law leader Nouri al-Maliki.
Muqtada al-Sadr, Shiite cleric and leader of the Sadrist Movement, has not hidden his frustration with the situation within the Save the Homeland Coalition - and indeed the entire political process. He has told his allies that he might go to the opposition side, and then they (the partners) would be free of all obligations to him. Rumors circulating in Najaf that Sadr is increasingly frustrated with his partners suggest that this coalition might not survive in the long run, particularly if the pressures continue to mount on him.
The Coordination Framework - and National Stability Coalition
Although not formally a coalition, the Coordination Framework acts as a united front for those parties opposing the tripartite alliance. State of Law spokesman Bahaa al-Nouri said in a televised statement that a National Stability Coalition would soon be announced. It is said to consist of the Coordination Framework, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Azm Alliance led by Muthanna al-Samarrai. However, no official response from the PUK or Azm about the proposed bloc has yet been issued. The new bloc supposedly consists of 133 deputies.
The Coordination Framework began its journey by casting doubt over the election results and rejecting them, filing lawsuits in the federal court, and then negotiating with the Sadrists to establish a footprint in the government formation process. Part of the framework was about to sign up with Sadr and only stopped after a message from Iran's Supreme Leader that asked them to stay united.
The federal court’s interpretation of Article 70 provided further support for the framework; it gave them the ability to disrupt the election of the President of the Republic in the event of a disagreement with the Sadrist Movement. As a result, the framework began to breathe a sigh of relief and canceled pre-planned meetings to discuss a possible deal on Sadr’s terms, which demanded the exclusion of the State of Law within the Coordination Framework from taking part. The last meeting between the framework leaders and the Sadrists was nearly two months ago.
Related: The political scene: Iraq’s Sadrists and Coordination Framework reach deadlock, Kurdish rivalry intensifies
The framework is confident that the Sadrist Movement will not form a government without its involvement; they even believe that they can impose appropriate conditions. If Sadr chooses to go to the opposition, the framework imagine they will be effortlessly able to form a government, and present a successful candidate for prime minister.
Role of Independents
Independents are believed to be between 36-55 deputies. The New Generation and Imtidad (9 members each) announced their alliance under a new coalition called For the People Coalition, on December 15. Joined by a further 15 independent members, they have formed a bloc of 33. For the People Coalition is on the face of it a vague grouping; it is not apparent what it stands for, and the programs and intentions of the two leading partners differ widely. They have not announced any tangible policies that lead to a united vision. However, they have both declared that they will be joining the opposition.
Observers believe that independent parliamentarians had a golden opportunity to change the political equation by aligning themselves with one of the competing parties and forcing them to complete the electoral process. However, they appear to have chosen to become observers of events without contributing to the making or changing of decisions. They chose this path due to their lack of experience, lack of awareness of parliamentary work, and lack of political maturity. Observers describe their performance during the past two months inside parliament as modest.
Parties happy with their spoils
All political parties are happy with what they have right now - a bird in the hand - and are therefore not much concerned for what could be further along the tree.
The Sadrist Movement is at the forefront of the political scene with its iron grip controlling almost all aspects of the ruling scene and political arena. Sadr boasted about this in a press conference on January 18, saying that "prolonging the term is not in anyone's interest at all, knowing that I am not affected" in response to a question about extending the government formation process.
Sadr is clear, confident, and possesses broad influence within the legislative and executive branches. His bloc within parliament is the largest and, thus, dictates the agenda. The speaker and his two deputies are members of his coalition and can push through any reforms he wants or target the political competitors through new legislation. In addition, the prime minister cooperates with Sadrists, and its leader fully responds to his proposals and orientations, which made the Sadrist leader publicly declare his support for Mustafa al-Kadhimi to be re-elected for a second term. This explicit support was reflected in his reception of Kadhimi in Hanana twice in a short period.
Furthermore, the Sadrists enjoy a large circle of influence inside the government; they have appointed several deputy ministers, director generals, and other positions, including the appointment of Najaf’s governor. As a result, the Sadrists are happy to carry on with the current situation.
The political forces under the Coordination Framework control eight ministries, have vast influence within the Council of Ministers and enjoy the prime minister's support. Furthermore, many political parties within the framework have their economic interests fully protected and have not lost any influence in this interim period. A new government formation process can only ensure 4-6 ministries for the Coordination Framework if they agree with the Sadrists. Therefore, the status quo could be a better alternative than forming a new government which might see the reduction of influence for some former players.
The Sovereignty Alliance and its leaders have also achieved their political objectives: Halbousi managed to renew his speakership, and the alliance controls six ministries in the current government, compounded by the growing influence they have within Iraq’s Sunni areas. At the same time, they are maintaining a close relationship with the current prime minister, who ensures that their requirements are met. Therefore the Sovereignty Alliance is also content with the status quo and not in a hurry to change anything.
The PUK is still on the throne of the presidency and currently has the Ministry of Justice. It must negotiate with difficulty to get the presidency again and lose its only ministry if the new government is formed while retaining the presidency. Hence, the current situation is also highly suitable for them.
The KDP has retained the second deputy speaker of parliament and has two ministries. It also enjoys strong relations with the current prime minister and such a relationship is not guaranteed in the event of a change of government. Especially after the federal court issued its decision on the unconstitutionality of the Kurdistan Region exporting oil and gas. In other words, the current stalemate is also in the interest of the KDP.
Alarms sound again
The Russia-Ukraine war is in its third week, and its consequences could prove disastrous for the world. Iraq is not immune to these consequences, as the continuation and development of this war could put Iraq on the brink, especially concerning the prices of food, goods, and services. The economies of the major powers enable them to rein in the repercussions of the war on their markets.
At the same time, Iraq continues to reel under a constrained rentier economy, with a concerning decline in the agricultural and industrial sector and its lack of minimum food security. If imports stop, Iraq will face real famine. Iraq is also likely to lose Russian energy companies operating at several oil sites in the south and north of the country if forced to implement any international sanctions aimed at striking Russian interests.
Related: What the war in Ukraine means for the Middle East
Political forces should abide by the legal and constitutional timings, observe electoral entitlements, respect their commitment to their voters, and not be content with taking the constitutional oath and electing the parliament’s speaker while failing to elect the country’s president and form a new government.
Political parties should be well aware that they will face their voters sooner or later. They must beg for their votes again despite their failure to achieve their legal, national, and moral obligations, as well as their failure to complete their programs and electoral promises. The Iraqi voter will not forgive the parties that have failed to provide services, secure jobs, and provide food.
The ruling parties are gambling with their history and existence by seeking selfish privileges and gains at the expense of the suffering of the people and the future of an entire country, forgetting the possibilities of violent reactions that can turn the table on their heads. The fire of the street uprising turned to ashes but may flare up again, and then everyone will lose without exception, and the results will be disastrous, and it is difficult if not impossible to remedy.
Farhad Alaaldin is the chairman of the Iraqi Advisory Council. He was the political adviser to former Iraqi President Fuad Masum, the former chief of staff to the KRG prime minister from 2009 to 2011, and the former senior adviser to the KRG prime minister from 2011 to 2012.
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