The timeline of the Iraqi-American strategic dialogue

On January 10th, 2020, former Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi demanded a necessary dialogue with Washington to stop further escalation after the incident at Baghdad International Airport on January 3rd which killed Iranian general Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy commander of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). 

He added that they decided to establish unbiased international relations and not involve themselves in sanctions or dialogues. Abdul-Mahdi also said that Iraq has built good cooperative relations with neighboring countries and doesn’t want any hostilities with other countries, including the US, as well as wanting to preserve its own interests, sovereignty and control over internal affairs. 

On March 26th, the international community handed over joint camps and  military bases to the Iraqi authorities in Kirkuk and Nineveh in the north, Anbar in the west, north of Baghdad and Salahaddin, a step described by the international coalition as an attempt to relocate its forces in Iraq. 

8.956 military personnel are currently deployed in Iraq, 6,132 of which are US soldiers, according to a document issued by former PM Abdul-Mahdi on March 11th, 2019. However, the numbers significantly decreased by the end of March. As a precaution, the international coalition is working on sending back military trainers to their own countries in light of security threats and the outbreak of COVID-19. 

On April 5th, Abdul-Mahdi revealed that Washington had agreed to initiate strategic dialogue talks with Iraq to discuss the future relations of the two countries after the defeat of Daesh (the Islamic State). 

On April 8th, the US Ambassador to Iraq Mathew Tueller said that Iraq supports the dialogue and has previously suggested the initiative in many meetings and official correspondence to achieve the best for both countries. He confirmed his country’s proposal to form the negotiating team and the dates to start the discussions between the two countries was set as 10th-11th of June 2020.

On June 4th, Commander of Iran’s Quds Forces Esmail Qaani paid a visit to Baghdad, the second of its kind since he assumed his new post as Qasem Soleimani’s successor.  The leaks about this visit showed that Iran supports the concept of dialogue without imposing any additional conditions on Iraq.

On June 6th, parliament voted on the rest of Kadhimi’s cabinet. 

On June 7th, the Hezbollah brigades mentioned three prerequisites that the Iraqi dialogue team should have for the upcoming preparatory session.

The new threats from Shiite factions ahead of the dialogue talks don’t object the idea of a “dialogue.” The timetable has been set by Abdul-Mahdi, an ally, and they only had objections to the names mentioned in the list of participants.

Historically, Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs embodied similar dialogue, although it didn’t include non-Shiite politicians, but foreigner interlocutors. The discussions were considered “successful” at the time. Every skilled interlocutor is now trying to set those dialogues as a standard for success and something to be remembered throughout history. 

Although the threats have been repeated by the same parties, they should not be considered serious, especially after Qaani’s latest visit to Baghdad, which showed Iran’s intention to deescalate the situation. The visit didn’t offer any kind of covert or public message to Iraq, no Iranian objections on the concept of dialogue or even vetos on the names of Iraqi interlocutors. 

The Shiite parties and their factions' conditions  on the requirements of the Iraqi dialogue team are not new. The list has gone through party lobbies and the leaders of political blocs were fully aware of the preparations for the next dialogue. The threats therefore could be an indicator of a failure to include names on the list of the Iraqi team. 

The political escalation by Shiites has incited Kurds, Sunnis and minorities to actually check the names of the Iraqi team and impose their own due to fear of marginalization of their rights in such historic dialogues.

Article 4 of the 2015 law 35 on Signing Treaty Agreements stipulates: “The competent authorities present the draft of bilateral treaties before negotiating an appropriate period of time to the parties related to the treaty, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should study it and give opinion, and submit it to the State’s Council to provide legal advice in its regard. Afterwards, it should be presented to the Council of Ministers to give opinion as stated in article 17: The commitment of the Republic of Iraq to the treaties concluded in accordance with the provisions of this law is subject to the approval of the House of Representatives on the law ratifying the treaty or the law of accession by the absolute majority of the number of members of the Council (165). Except for the following treaties that must be approved by a two-thirds majority (220), including the upcoming dialogues of amending the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) with the US and reviewing it to be consistent with the higher national interests of Iraq, it must have the collective approval of the coalition government representing all components of the Iraqi people, and then give Parliament approval by a two-thirds majority (220 MPs) of the members of the Council of Representatives.”

Kadhimi’s team for the talks can understand the skepticism of Shiite parties and their military factions towards American intentions: the sessions are preparations to downgrade the SFA with Washington.

PM Kadhimi is aware of the anxiety and sensitivity of the pro-Iran factions and parties over this agreement that could allow the US to restrict and neutralize their influence in Iraq and the region. They continue communicating with the leaders of political blocs to assess the situation and ease their concerns.

Close associates of Kadhimi’s team have assured that the upcoming sessions are transitional, and that the US and Iraqi governments share the same point of view towards the ultimate goal, which is to stop the destruction of the state and its foundations, compounded by economic fallouts, COVID-19,  terrorism and rule of illegal arms.

According to reports, the channel for the dialogue will be within a closed televised circle which has been previously established, before the formation of Kadhimi’s cabinet.

Iraq has capable experts and interlocutors that are able to come up with good outcomes. I have high confidence about the skills of the Iraqi team and these dialogues, and that the agreement will improve Iraq’s situation. The agreement must take away their ability to make Iraq a deficient country that needs their tutelage.

The team is skilled and professional, not naïve, and aware as any other reasonable person that there is a huge need towards achieving a diplomatic success in a short space of time. Iranian allies have played the game very well and stipulated their conditions, and the Iraqi team should now ask for the chance to get to work. We are moderate patriots; this new agreement will be good if Iraq’s interests are put as a priority.

Husham al-Hashimi is a nonresident fellow with the Center for Global Policy (CGP). Dr Hashimi is a leading security expert focusing on Islamist movements who advised the US-led coalition to defeat the Islamic State. He is also a member of the Iraq Advisory Council, a group of experts based in Iraq. He tweets at @hushamalhashimi