Analysis
Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi chairs a meeting of his Council of Ministers on October 27, 2020. Photo: handout/PM office
On May 6, 2020, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi was approved by parliament to become Iraq’s fifth prime minister since 2005. He came to power after the resignation of former Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi due to mass demonstrations in Baghdad and some southern cities demanding services, job opportunities, and social justice, and later calling for early elections and governmental change.
After six months, observers view Kadhimi’s government as both a success and a failure. It has succeeded in accomplishing very few of its goals, but not the majority. In addition, some crises have been exacerbated during this period, taking Iraq to the verge of collapse. Observers believe these failures are due to a combination of lack of strategy, reluctance to take important decisions, and a failure to deal firmly with some of the core issues plaguing Iraq.
The economy
Perhaps the most important achievement that the government can claim regarding the economy is the white paper for economic reform. It is considered a comprehensive view of Iraq's financial crisis, and it is a road map for the government to conduct reform. However, the government has not worked to start implementing its provisions. Finance Minister Ali Allawi stated on November 4 that the White Paper's implementation requires 450 decisions and legislations. Yet not a single decision has been made nearly a month after its publication. Furthermore, the White Paper was written in secrecy without much consultation with the Parliament, which leads to more opposition from its members.
The government chose not to submit the 2020 budget; one of its pledges when it was formed, instead opting for loans – introducing draft legislation for borrowing funds in June, approved by the parliament. It went back and submitted a draft budget on September 22 only to be withdrawn, and then proposed a new draft law for another loan of nearly $38 billion to fund the deficit. The parliament has no intention of approving it as it is. It is worth mentioning that the government's dithering on the budget has led to the inability to pay salaries regularly and it could face an uprising from the people soon.
The government programme included a good set of measures to improve Iraq’s economy, including "rationalizing government spending, stopping unnecessary spending and developing the tax and tariff system", forming a "Supreme Council for Reconstruction and Investment", "launching a project to encourage national industry and agriculture", and starting comprehensive administrative reform in state institutions and the judiciary."
All these critical steps, if they find their way to implementation, would revitalize the economy. The government must make informed decisions and engage the private sector in implementing some of these essential steps to be on the right path. Activating industrial and agricultural initiatives to revitalize the economic cycle is very important, and it should pay more attention to these two sectors.
Military and security issues
During Kadhimi’s tenure, we have witnessed relatively stable security. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces made several security leadership changes and created the Sumer Operations Command to maintain security in the governorates of Dhiqar, Muthanna, and Al-Maysan, and worked on re-equipping and training military forces in cooperation with the International Coalition and NATO.
One of the government’s security priorities was to "confine weapons in the hands of governmental and military institutions". However, weapons have remained in the hands of groups outside the security and military system. A wave of assassinations of well-known figures in the political and social milieu started, such as the assassination of Husham Al-Hashimi, an aide and personal friend of Kadhimi, on July 13. The assassination of Tahseen Osama al-Khafaji followed on August 14, and Reham Yaqoub five days later in Basra. The government has been helpless, unable to reveal the perpetrators’ identity and bring them to justice.
The prime minister was personally threatened twice; the first time was the night he was nominated to form the government on April 9, when a military force entered the Green Zone and threatened to assassinate him. The second time was on June 25, when Kataib Hezbollah entered the Green Zone surrounding the residency area of the PM and Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), demanding the release of 14 detainees arrested by the CTS, who were subsequently all released.
The government was unable to implement other items on its agenda, such as assuming the "security formations of the Ministry of the Interior the task of protecting internal security" and the army's non-interference in protecting cities.
The capital Baghdad has witnessed a noticeable deterioration in security after the diplomatic missions, especially the US embassy, were subjected to successive missile attacks. Targeting the international coalition's logistical support convoys has become a familiar sight, void of state deterrence. An attack on a British diplomatic convoy took place on September 15 in Baghdad. These attacks have led to strong reactions from the US-led coalition, with America threatening to close its embassy in Baghdad. Observers believe that the government cannot contain these armed groups and cannot control them or prevent them from carrying out such attacks.
Security is considered one of the pillars of governance; a breach will lead to the collapse of the government and the state. Kadhimi, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces must reconsider his security priorities and begin to confine weapons to the state and control armed groups.
Foreign affairs
The international and regional community welcomed the formation of Kadhimi’s government. They showed optimism about Iraq's return to the international community after a period of relative isolation. The PM enjoys personal relations with some nearby rulers, while the US, France, Germany, and Britain received him warmly. He intended to make his first foreign visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which was later cancelled, instead heading to Iran for his first foreign trip. He has also taken a European tour in which he visited France, Germany, and Britain. A large delegation of ministers and advisors accompanied him, with multiple memoranda of understanding (MoU) signed in several sectors. Talks also continued with Egypt and Jordan.
Many government visits do not result in any concrete, practical results that will strengthen bilateral relationships. Perhaps the visit to America is a clear example: nine MoUs were signed, but a month later the United States threatened to withdraw from Iraq completely. No MoU has been acted upon.
Human rights and fighting corruption
The PM was a human rights activist before taking office. His response to the treatment of Iraqi protesters is an excellent example of his background; he prohibited the use of weapons and live rounds during demonstrations on October 25, despite some violent acts carried out by certain groups. Instead, he pushed security forces to confront the demonstrators without carrying firearms, creating human barriers in front of them. Nonetheless, live rounds were used in Basra on Nov 6, killing a protestor.
Fighting corruption is one of the government's priorities. For that purpose, the Prime Minister set up the supreme committee to combat corruption and granted it broad powers. The committee began raiding homes of senior officials accused of corruption and arresting them. They are held in undisclosed locations that belong to the CTS. Observers are growing concerned about the violations of detainee rights, such as the denial of legal representation or meeting relatives. A brother of one of the detainees issued a statement alleging that his brother was detained for five weeks without the family knowing his whereabouts. They have learned that he has been subjected to physical and psychological torture.
Such claims are echoed by relatives of other detainees. Many of the detainees are held without being investigated for weeks. The Iraqi penal code is clear that no detainee should be held in custody without trial and any extension of detention must be by a court order. None of the detainees have been sent to court yet.
These practices are clear violations of the Iraqi penal code and a clear violation of human rights. Fighting corruption and eliminating it is a demand of all Iraqis. Still, respect for human rights and adherence to international, humanitarian, and legal standards necessitate transparency and securing free access to information, and informing public opinion of what is happening in this regard.
It is worth noting that the anti-corruption campaign did not target senior officials supported by influential parties. Likewise, none of the significant corruption cases are dealt with yet. For this campaign to gain credibility, they must go for notable corruption cases and treat corrupt officials equally.
The international community, for its part, monitors the government's performance in combating corruption, particularly regarding administrative and financial corruption; they make it clear in their official and nonofficial meetings with Iraqi officials, they often demand swift and strict measures to save the state and society from this scourge. The government must begin the anti-corruption campaign by strengthening regulatory bodies such as the Office of Financial Supervision and the Integrity Commission and supporting them, to enable them to perform their tasks instead of creating new structures without legal or constitutional frameworks.
Taking the right path
Observers believe that Kadhimi’s government still has an opportunity to correct the current path to recovery by adhering to their pledges and translating them into practical steps. It must now give priority to solving the financial crisis and better dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, which has been threatening the entire country while little is done about it. The government must become more open to civil society organizations, seek their experience and expertise in various fields, and prioritise the private sector to create real economic partnerships.
The government’s current strategies are not working, with Iraq gradually approaching imminent collapse. Prime Minister Kadhimi and his government must work diligently with the other presidencies, the members of parliament, civil society organizations, academic elites and the private sector to correct the course of action and address failures. A concrete action plan is needed that sets clear milestones to implement the government’s pledges. There is no time to waste; only a few months remain before everything collapses.
Farhad Alaaldin is the Chairman of the Iraqi Advisory Council. He was the political adviser to former Iraqi President Fuad Masum, the former chief of staff to the KRG prime minister from 2009 to 2011, and former senior adviser to the KRG prime minister from 2011 to 2012.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
After six months, observers view Kadhimi’s government as both a success and a failure. It has succeeded in accomplishing very few of its goals, but not the majority. In addition, some crises have been exacerbated during this period, taking Iraq to the verge of collapse. Observers believe these failures are due to a combination of lack of strategy, reluctance to take important decisions, and a failure to deal firmly with some of the core issues plaguing Iraq.
The economy
Perhaps the most important achievement that the government can claim regarding the economy is the white paper for economic reform. It is considered a comprehensive view of Iraq's financial crisis, and it is a road map for the government to conduct reform. However, the government has not worked to start implementing its provisions. Finance Minister Ali Allawi stated on November 4 that the White Paper's implementation requires 450 decisions and legislations. Yet not a single decision has been made nearly a month after its publication. Furthermore, the White Paper was written in secrecy without much consultation with the Parliament, which leads to more opposition from its members.
The government chose not to submit the 2020 budget; one of its pledges when it was formed, instead opting for loans – introducing draft legislation for borrowing funds in June, approved by the parliament. It went back and submitted a draft budget on September 22 only to be withdrawn, and then proposed a new draft law for another loan of nearly $38 billion to fund the deficit. The parliament has no intention of approving it as it is. It is worth mentioning that the government's dithering on the budget has led to the inability to pay salaries regularly and it could face an uprising from the people soon.
The government programme included a good set of measures to improve Iraq’s economy, including "rationalizing government spending, stopping unnecessary spending and developing the tax and tariff system", forming a "Supreme Council for Reconstruction and Investment", "launching a project to encourage national industry and agriculture", and starting comprehensive administrative reform in state institutions and the judiciary."
All these critical steps, if they find their way to implementation, would revitalize the economy. The government must make informed decisions and engage the private sector in implementing some of these essential steps to be on the right path. Activating industrial and agricultural initiatives to revitalize the economic cycle is very important, and it should pay more attention to these two sectors.
Military and security issues
During Kadhimi’s tenure, we have witnessed relatively stable security. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces made several security leadership changes and created the Sumer Operations Command to maintain security in the governorates of Dhiqar, Muthanna, and Al-Maysan, and worked on re-equipping and training military forces in cooperation with the International Coalition and NATO.
One of the government’s security priorities was to "confine weapons in the hands of governmental and military institutions". However, weapons have remained in the hands of groups outside the security and military system. A wave of assassinations of well-known figures in the political and social milieu started, such as the assassination of Husham Al-Hashimi, an aide and personal friend of Kadhimi, on July 13. The assassination of Tahseen Osama al-Khafaji followed on August 14, and Reham Yaqoub five days later in Basra. The government has been helpless, unable to reveal the perpetrators’ identity and bring them to justice.
The prime minister was personally threatened twice; the first time was the night he was nominated to form the government on April 9, when a military force entered the Green Zone and threatened to assassinate him. The second time was on June 25, when Kataib Hezbollah entered the Green Zone surrounding the residency area of the PM and Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), demanding the release of 14 detainees arrested by the CTS, who were subsequently all released.
The government was unable to implement other items on its agenda, such as assuming the "security formations of the Ministry of the Interior the task of protecting internal security" and the army's non-interference in protecting cities.
The capital Baghdad has witnessed a noticeable deterioration in security after the diplomatic missions, especially the US embassy, were subjected to successive missile attacks. Targeting the international coalition's logistical support convoys has become a familiar sight, void of state deterrence. An attack on a British diplomatic convoy took place on September 15 in Baghdad. These attacks have led to strong reactions from the US-led coalition, with America threatening to close its embassy in Baghdad. Observers believe that the government cannot contain these armed groups and cannot control them or prevent them from carrying out such attacks.
Security is considered one of the pillars of governance; a breach will lead to the collapse of the government and the state. Kadhimi, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces must reconsider his security priorities and begin to confine weapons to the state and control armed groups.
Foreign affairs
The international and regional community welcomed the formation of Kadhimi’s government. They showed optimism about Iraq's return to the international community after a period of relative isolation. The PM enjoys personal relations with some nearby rulers, while the US, France, Germany, and Britain received him warmly. He intended to make his first foreign visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which was later cancelled, instead heading to Iran for his first foreign trip. He has also taken a European tour in which he visited France, Germany, and Britain. A large delegation of ministers and advisors accompanied him, with multiple memoranda of understanding (MoU) signed in several sectors. Talks also continued with Egypt and Jordan.
Many government visits do not result in any concrete, practical results that will strengthen bilateral relationships. Perhaps the visit to America is a clear example: nine MoUs were signed, but a month later the United States threatened to withdraw from Iraq completely. No MoU has been acted upon.
Human rights and fighting corruption
The PM was a human rights activist before taking office. His response to the treatment of Iraqi protesters is an excellent example of his background; he prohibited the use of weapons and live rounds during demonstrations on October 25, despite some violent acts carried out by certain groups. Instead, he pushed security forces to confront the demonstrators without carrying firearms, creating human barriers in front of them. Nonetheless, live rounds were used in Basra on Nov 6, killing a protestor.
Fighting corruption is one of the government's priorities. For that purpose, the Prime Minister set up the supreme committee to combat corruption and granted it broad powers. The committee began raiding homes of senior officials accused of corruption and arresting them. They are held in undisclosed locations that belong to the CTS. Observers are growing concerned about the violations of detainee rights, such as the denial of legal representation or meeting relatives. A brother of one of the detainees issued a statement alleging that his brother was detained for five weeks without the family knowing his whereabouts. They have learned that he has been subjected to physical and psychological torture.
Such claims are echoed by relatives of other detainees. Many of the detainees are held without being investigated for weeks. The Iraqi penal code is clear that no detainee should be held in custody without trial and any extension of detention must be by a court order. None of the detainees have been sent to court yet.
These practices are clear violations of the Iraqi penal code and a clear violation of human rights. Fighting corruption and eliminating it is a demand of all Iraqis. Still, respect for human rights and adherence to international, humanitarian, and legal standards necessitate transparency and securing free access to information, and informing public opinion of what is happening in this regard.
It is worth noting that the anti-corruption campaign did not target senior officials supported by influential parties. Likewise, none of the significant corruption cases are dealt with yet. For this campaign to gain credibility, they must go for notable corruption cases and treat corrupt officials equally.
The international community, for its part, monitors the government's performance in combating corruption, particularly regarding administrative and financial corruption; they make it clear in their official and nonofficial meetings with Iraqi officials, they often demand swift and strict measures to save the state and society from this scourge. The government must begin the anti-corruption campaign by strengthening regulatory bodies such as the Office of Financial Supervision and the Integrity Commission and supporting them, to enable them to perform their tasks instead of creating new structures without legal or constitutional frameworks.
Taking the right path
Observers believe that Kadhimi’s government still has an opportunity to correct the current path to recovery by adhering to their pledges and translating them into practical steps. It must now give priority to solving the financial crisis and better dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, which has been threatening the entire country while little is done about it. The government must become more open to civil society organizations, seek their experience and expertise in various fields, and prioritise the private sector to create real economic partnerships.
The government’s current strategies are not working, with Iraq gradually approaching imminent collapse. Prime Minister Kadhimi and his government must work diligently with the other presidencies, the members of parliament, civil society organizations, academic elites and the private sector to correct the course of action and address failures. A concrete action plan is needed that sets clear milestones to implement the government’s pledges. There is no time to waste; only a few months remain before everything collapses.
Farhad Alaaldin is the Chairman of the Iraqi Advisory Council. He was the political adviser to former Iraqi President Fuad Masum, the former chief of staff to the KRG prime minister from 2009 to 2011, and former senior adviser to the KRG prime minister from 2011 to 2012.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
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