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Analysis
Smoke billows on the Syrian side of the border at Hassa near Hatay, southern Turkey on January 20, 2018, day one of Operation Olive Branch, as Turkish jets hit the People’s Protection Units (YPG) positions. File photo: Bulent Kilic / AFP
If Turkey invades Kurdish-controlled northern Syria (Rojava) in the coming weeks it will likely use its formidable air power to support its forces on the ground and bomb People’s Protection Units (YPG) targets across the region.
However, it is not yet clear whether the US and Russia will allow the Turkish Air Force to operate over Syria.
“We entered Afrin, Jarablus and Al-Bab, and now we’re going to enter east of the Euphrates,” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has declared.
“We shared this [information] with the US and Russia,” he went on to claim.
The United States is trying to dissuade Turkey from launching an invasion. However, if Ankara pushes ahead with an attack – disregarding the US military presence in Rojava – it is unclear how far Washington is willing to go to deter or interdict Turkish forces.
President Donald Trump, who wanted to pull all US forces out of Syria last December, might well choose to withdraw in the event of a Turkish invasion rather than risk becoming embroiled in a major Turkish-Kurdish conflict.
Russia previously authorized Ankara to use Syrian airspace throughout most of its invasion of Afrin in early 2018, much to the YPG’s consternation.
It is unclear whether it would do the same for a Turkish operation against the rest of Rojava, which, from Moscow’s strategic perspective, would be a good way to undermine and possibly remove Washington’s main foothold in Syria.
Russia has proven the most capable power in the Syrian conflict at deterring Turkey from violating Syrian airspace. After Turkey shot down a Russian bomber in November 2015, Russia deployed its S-400 air defence missiles to the country in a clear message to Turkey.
The following summer, after the two countries mended fences, Turkey was able to launch its first incursion into Syria – Operation Euphrates Shield – thanks to Russian assent. Tellingly, in November 2016, when Syria threatened to shoot down Turkish warplanes, Ankara halted airstrikes only to resume them after consulting with the Russians.
Just over a year later, during the invasion of Afrin, Syria again threatened to shoot down Turkish warplanes. This time Turkey was undeterred because Russia had authorized it to use Syrian airspace.
After Turkey captured the city of Afrin, Russia briefly closed Syrian airspace to Turkish jets. As a result of this March 18-24 window, several YPG forces were able to escape from Afrin to the neighbouring Kurdish-controlled Tal Rifaat region, where they remain to this day.
Turkish airpower played a major role in the Afrin operation. About a quarter of Turkey’s air force jets, which are predominately American-made F-16s along with some older F-4s, participated in the attack.
In the invasion’s first day alone 72 fighter-bombers struck 100 targets in Afrin.
However, even if Turkey is successfully deterred from using its air force in a Rojava invasion, it still has several other fire support options to back up its troops and Syrian militant proxies.
Most of Rojava’s major cities sit directly over the Turkish border and can be hit with artillery. Turkey has previously targeted Kurdish forces with cross-border artillery fire and will doubtlessly do so again.
In February 2016 – a time when Russia would most likely have seized the opportunity to shoot down any Turkish jet that entered Syrian airspace to avenge the loss of its bomber – the YPG, with Russian air support, seized Tal Rifaat and the disused Menagh Airbase from Turkish-backed Syrian Islamist fighters.
When they advanced near Azaz, Turkey used artillery to halt their advance, successfully enforcing its red-line there.
Such fire support could act as a substitute for air support if Turkey pushes ahead with its invasion in the face of Russian and US opposition.
Turkey also used its Bora-1 ballistic missile in combat for the first time in May during its latest campaign against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Iraqi Kurdistan and could well use them in Rojava. In addition to these ballistic missiles, Ankara possesses air-launched cruise missiles that could theoretically be fired from Turkish warplanes operating within Turkey’s airspace at targets deep inside Rojava.
If Turkey pushes beyond the border and, as Erdogan repeatedly declares, removes the YPG from all areas east of the Euphrates, rather than just from the immediate border regions, it will have to invade one-third of Syria, including Deir ez-Zor, and kill tens of thousands of entrenched battle-hardened Kurdish fighters.
Such an escalation could, the Kurds warn, see thousands of Islamic State (ISIS) prisoners escape from YPG detention and allow the jihadists to regroup. The Afrin operation also saw pressure eased on ISIS, enabling the group to reorganize and even recruit more members.
For Turkey, mounting a ground operation as far as 200 miles south of its border without air support would be incredibly risky.
The furthest Turkey advanced into Syria was roughly 20 miles during the Euphrates Shield operation, during which Turkey and its proxies, with air support, captured the city of Al-Bab from ISIS.
Some of the Turkish Army outposts around the Syrian province of Idlib are deeper inside Syria than Al-Bab. However, they were established through the Astana Agreement with Russia and Iran rather through conquest. In fact, when Turkey began establishing those 12 posts in October 2017, its troops were escorted into the province by the jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) that controls the province.
Even with air support, Turkey will likely find its battle with the YPG in Rojava’s heartland much more difficult than the Afrin operation. Total war, as the YPG has warned, could create an enormous and bloody battlefield spanning most of Syria’s lengthy border with Turkey.
The Kurds themselves concede they are unlikely to win against their far larger and more technologically-advanced adversary. However, they will likely make an invasion of their homeland extremely costly for Turkey and its proxies.
However, it is not yet clear whether the US and Russia will allow the Turkish Air Force to operate over Syria.
“We entered Afrin, Jarablus and Al-Bab, and now we’re going to enter east of the Euphrates,” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has declared.
“We shared this [information] with the US and Russia,” he went on to claim.
The United States is trying to dissuade Turkey from launching an invasion. However, if Ankara pushes ahead with an attack – disregarding the US military presence in Rojava – it is unclear how far Washington is willing to go to deter or interdict Turkish forces.
President Donald Trump, who wanted to pull all US forces out of Syria last December, might well choose to withdraw in the event of a Turkish invasion rather than risk becoming embroiled in a major Turkish-Kurdish conflict.
Russia previously authorized Ankara to use Syrian airspace throughout most of its invasion of Afrin in early 2018, much to the YPG’s consternation.
It is unclear whether it would do the same for a Turkish operation against the rest of Rojava, which, from Moscow’s strategic perspective, would be a good way to undermine and possibly remove Washington’s main foothold in Syria.
Russia has proven the most capable power in the Syrian conflict at deterring Turkey from violating Syrian airspace. After Turkey shot down a Russian bomber in November 2015, Russia deployed its S-400 air defence missiles to the country in a clear message to Turkey.
The following summer, after the two countries mended fences, Turkey was able to launch its first incursion into Syria – Operation Euphrates Shield – thanks to Russian assent. Tellingly, in November 2016, when Syria threatened to shoot down Turkish warplanes, Ankara halted airstrikes only to resume them after consulting with the Russians.
Just over a year later, during the invasion of Afrin, Syria again threatened to shoot down Turkish warplanes. This time Turkey was undeterred because Russia had authorized it to use Syrian airspace.
After Turkey captured the city of Afrin, Russia briefly closed Syrian airspace to Turkish jets. As a result of this March 18-24 window, several YPG forces were able to escape from Afrin to the neighbouring Kurdish-controlled Tal Rifaat region, where they remain to this day.
Turkish airpower played a major role in the Afrin operation. About a quarter of Turkey’s air force jets, which are predominately American-made F-16s along with some older F-4s, participated in the attack.
In the invasion’s first day alone 72 fighter-bombers struck 100 targets in Afrin.
However, even if Turkey is successfully deterred from using its air force in a Rojava invasion, it still has several other fire support options to back up its troops and Syrian militant proxies.
Most of Rojava’s major cities sit directly over the Turkish border and can be hit with artillery. Turkey has previously targeted Kurdish forces with cross-border artillery fire and will doubtlessly do so again.
In February 2016 – a time when Russia would most likely have seized the opportunity to shoot down any Turkish jet that entered Syrian airspace to avenge the loss of its bomber – the YPG, with Russian air support, seized Tal Rifaat and the disused Menagh Airbase from Turkish-backed Syrian Islamist fighters.
When they advanced near Azaz, Turkey used artillery to halt their advance, successfully enforcing its red-line there.
Such fire support could act as a substitute for air support if Turkey pushes ahead with its invasion in the face of Russian and US opposition.
Turkey also used its Bora-1 ballistic missile in combat for the first time in May during its latest campaign against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Iraqi Kurdistan and could well use them in Rojava. In addition to these ballistic missiles, Ankara possesses air-launched cruise missiles that could theoretically be fired from Turkish warplanes operating within Turkey’s airspace at targets deep inside Rojava.
If Turkey pushes beyond the border and, as Erdogan repeatedly declares, removes the YPG from all areas east of the Euphrates, rather than just from the immediate border regions, it will have to invade one-third of Syria, including Deir ez-Zor, and kill tens of thousands of entrenched battle-hardened Kurdish fighters.
Such an escalation could, the Kurds warn, see thousands of Islamic State (ISIS) prisoners escape from YPG detention and allow the jihadists to regroup. The Afrin operation also saw pressure eased on ISIS, enabling the group to reorganize and even recruit more members.
For Turkey, mounting a ground operation as far as 200 miles south of its border without air support would be incredibly risky.
The furthest Turkey advanced into Syria was roughly 20 miles during the Euphrates Shield operation, during which Turkey and its proxies, with air support, captured the city of Al-Bab from ISIS.
Some of the Turkish Army outposts around the Syrian province of Idlib are deeper inside Syria than Al-Bab. However, they were established through the Astana Agreement with Russia and Iran rather through conquest. In fact, when Turkey began establishing those 12 posts in October 2017, its troops were escorted into the province by the jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) that controls the province.
Even with air support, Turkey will likely find its battle with the YPG in Rojava’s heartland much more difficult than the Afrin operation. Total war, as the YPG has warned, could create an enormous and bloody battlefield spanning most of Syria’s lengthy border with Turkey.
The Kurds themselves concede they are unlikely to win against their far larger and more technologically-advanced adversary. However, they will likely make an invasion of their homeland extremely costly for Turkey and its proxies.
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