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Analysis
Turkish soldiers stand guard in Mardin, southern Turkey, March 22, 2016. File photo: Ilyas Akengin / AFP
Since the Syrian regime resumed attacks on its adversaries in the country’s northwestern Idlib province its forces have targeted Turkish positions on at least seven occasions. Although Turkey suffered relatively few casualties, the attacks were clearly deliberate. If they persist they could result in an escalation between the two rivals in the volatile province.
On June 27, shelling and mortar fire killed a Turkish soldier and wounded three others in one of the Turkish Army’s 12 observation posts in the province. Turkey retaliated by shelling regime positions.
Turkey also warned Damascus, through Russia’s military attaché in Ankara, that any further Syrian shelling of its positions will be “punished most severely”.
On June 29, regime shelling once again hit Turkish positions, but did not cause any casualties.
These incidents in late June were two months in the making.
Turkey’s 12 observation posts in Idlib, which are located all along Idlib’s frontiers with the rest of Syria, were established between October 2017 and May 2018 under the framework of the Russia-sponsored Astana Agreement.
The ostensible goal of Astana was to de-conflict the war in Syria through the establishment of a series of de-escalation zones.
Idlib is the only such zone remaining since the regime conquered all other parts of the country nominally covered by such zones.
Turkey was tasked by Russia last September with containing the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) jihadist group that controls most of Idlib to prevent a regime offensive. HTS has since expanded its control and territory in northwest Syria to include parts of neighbouring Aleppo and Homs provinces.
The regime was not part of that deal and opposes Turkey’s military presence in Syria, which includes Idlib, the Kurdish enclave of Afrin, which Turkey invaded and occupies, and parts of northern Aleppo Turkey captured from the Islamic State group (ISIS) in its 2016-17 Operation Euphrates Shield and still holds.
When the regime began targeting HTS once again in late April, Turkey began supplying its Syrian proxies in the area, the National Liberation Force (NLF), with additional arms.
The NLF was previously supposed to help Turkey contain HTS in Idlib as part of the agreement with Russia, but instead, after a mere week of fighting in January, relinquished control over its areas to HTS, enabling the group to expand.
Turkey also avoided ever clashing with the HTS. Notably, in October 2017, when the Turkish Army first entered Idlib to establish its observation posts, its troops were escorted by HTS forces.
In May, the NLF actively fought alongside HTS to push regime forces out of the town of Kfar Nabuda, which they had recaptured the previous month.
Given the fact the NLF were wholly assembled, armed, and trained by Turkey, this was more likely than not interpreted by Damascus as direct support for HTS.
Before the clashes in late June, regime forces targeted Turkish troops in Idlib on April 29, May 4, 12, 31, and also June 8.
On May 4, two Turkish soldiers were wounded in Syrian shelling. Turkey did not retaliate but vowed it would not withdraw from any of its current positions, or elsewhere in Syria, in the face of regime attacks.
It has also reportedly fortified and reinforced its outposts, clearly in preparation for enduring further attacks.
On June 13, according to the Turkish Defense Ministry, Syrian regime forces “slightly injured” three Turkish soldiers in an attack on their position with 35 mortar shells.
On June 18, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem told reporters in Beijing that Syria does not want to fight Turkey, claiming this is the “principled stance” of Damascus. He nevertheless questioned Turkey’s aims in Idlib.
“Are they protecting the Nusra Front?” he asked, using the name of HTS’ earlier al-Qaeda-affiliated incarnation. He then cleverly followed up by asking whether Turkey was protecting other groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is opposed by China.
While Damascus might not want a war with Ankara it is clearly trying to make life difficult for the Turkish military in Idlib since it, alongside its aforementioned NLF proxy army, poses a significant obstacle to Damascus recapturing the strategic region.
The seven incidents in which it targeted Turkish forces in Idlib over the past two months were likely intentional.
“It is hard not to believe that this counter escalation is intentional,” Professor Joshua Landis, a noted Syria expert the head of Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, told Rudaw English.
“Hundreds of Syrian soldiers have been killed by Idlib rebel militias, who have been freshly supplied with top of the line Turkish weapons,” he said.
“It is hardly surprising that the Syria Army would respond and escalate.”
On June 27, shelling and mortar fire killed a Turkish soldier and wounded three others in one of the Turkish Army’s 12 observation posts in the province. Turkey retaliated by shelling regime positions.
Turkey also warned Damascus, through Russia’s military attaché in Ankara, that any further Syrian shelling of its positions will be “punished most severely”.
On June 29, regime shelling once again hit Turkish positions, but did not cause any casualties.
These incidents in late June were two months in the making.
Turkey’s 12 observation posts in Idlib, which are located all along Idlib’s frontiers with the rest of Syria, were established between October 2017 and May 2018 under the framework of the Russia-sponsored Astana Agreement.
The ostensible goal of Astana was to de-conflict the war in Syria through the establishment of a series of de-escalation zones.
Idlib is the only such zone remaining since the regime conquered all other parts of the country nominally covered by such zones.
Turkey was tasked by Russia last September with containing the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) jihadist group that controls most of Idlib to prevent a regime offensive. HTS has since expanded its control and territory in northwest Syria to include parts of neighbouring Aleppo and Homs provinces.
The regime was not part of that deal and opposes Turkey’s military presence in Syria, which includes Idlib, the Kurdish enclave of Afrin, which Turkey invaded and occupies, and parts of northern Aleppo Turkey captured from the Islamic State group (ISIS) in its 2016-17 Operation Euphrates Shield and still holds.
When the regime began targeting HTS once again in late April, Turkey began supplying its Syrian proxies in the area, the National Liberation Force (NLF), with additional arms.
The NLF was previously supposed to help Turkey contain HTS in Idlib as part of the agreement with Russia, but instead, after a mere week of fighting in January, relinquished control over its areas to HTS, enabling the group to expand.
Turkey also avoided ever clashing with the HTS. Notably, in October 2017, when the Turkish Army first entered Idlib to establish its observation posts, its troops were escorted by HTS forces.
In May, the NLF actively fought alongside HTS to push regime forces out of the town of Kfar Nabuda, which they had recaptured the previous month.
Given the fact the NLF were wholly assembled, armed, and trained by Turkey, this was more likely than not interpreted by Damascus as direct support for HTS.
Before the clashes in late June, regime forces targeted Turkish troops in Idlib on April 29, May 4, 12, 31, and also June 8.
On May 4, two Turkish soldiers were wounded in Syrian shelling. Turkey did not retaliate but vowed it would not withdraw from any of its current positions, or elsewhere in Syria, in the face of regime attacks.
It has also reportedly fortified and reinforced its outposts, clearly in preparation for enduring further attacks.
On June 13, according to the Turkish Defense Ministry, Syrian regime forces “slightly injured” three Turkish soldiers in an attack on their position with 35 mortar shells.
On June 18, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem told reporters in Beijing that Syria does not want to fight Turkey, claiming this is the “principled stance” of Damascus. He nevertheless questioned Turkey’s aims in Idlib.
“Are they protecting the Nusra Front?” he asked, using the name of HTS’ earlier al-Qaeda-affiliated incarnation. He then cleverly followed up by asking whether Turkey was protecting other groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is opposed by China.
While Damascus might not want a war with Ankara it is clearly trying to make life difficult for the Turkish military in Idlib since it, alongside its aforementioned NLF proxy army, poses a significant obstacle to Damascus recapturing the strategic region.
The seven incidents in which it targeted Turkish forces in Idlib over the past two months were likely intentional.
“It is hard not to believe that this counter escalation is intentional,” Professor Joshua Landis, a noted Syria expert the head of Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, told Rudaw English.
“Hundreds of Syrian soldiers have been killed by Idlib rebel militias, who have been freshly supplied with top of the line Turkish weapons,” he said.
“It is hardly surprising that the Syria Army would respond and escalate.”
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