By Wladimir van Wilgenburg

Reidar Visser is the editor of the Iraq website historiae.org, a member of the Gulf Research Unit at the University of Oslo and a research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs which is funded by the Norwegian Research Council and the Norwegian Ministry of Education. According to Iraq expert Reidar Visser, Galbraith's dual role in Iraq and Kurdistan appears to have broken no laws, but it does raise ethical questions.
 
Vissers works on a research project on federalism and centre-periphery relations in Iraq and has studied Iraq for more than 15 years. He is critical of the ideas of Galbraith to partition Iraq into a Sunnistan, Shiastan and Kurdistan. “I am concerned about Galbraith’s role in Iraq”. Recently he translated several articles to English from Norway's largest financial newspaper, the "Dagens Naeringsliv," that reported that Galbraith acquired a 5 percent share in an oil field in the Iraqi Kurdish region at a time when he was a leading voice in the U.S. debate over the structure of post-Saddam Iraq. This story was eventually picked by the international media like the New York Times and Foreign Policy, discrediting Peter Galbraith’s role in Iraq.

Some Kurds think Reidar Visser has an anti-Kurdish agenda, but Reidar Visser says this is outrageous, “I have suggested in the past that the Kurds would do themselves a great favour by concentrating more on their historical demands for self-rule”. Visser has worked with a group of Iraqi nationalists who proposed the Kurds should seek international guarantees for their existing autonomy so that they received an “autonomy plus” status in Iraq similar to the Åland Islands within Finland.

But Reidar Visser thinks Kurdish attempts to annex Kirkuk are too maximalist. “The whole idea would be to give the Kurds some kind of guarantee that could convince them to abandon some of their policies that are souring politics in the rest of Iraq, including their attempt to impose federalism outside Kurdistan and to annex Kirkuk. It is the maximalist policies of the PUK and the KDP I criticize, not the idea of a fully autonomous Kurdistan.”

Visser admits that his research institution, the Norwegian Research Council, receives support for some of their specialized programs from various Norwegian industry sources, including the Norwegian oil company Statoil that took part Iraq's second upstream oil field licensing round. “But that in itself does not mean that we automatically become their loyal servants!” He also emphasizes that he has publicly warned StatoilHydro against signing deals with Baghdad and the Kurds until the process of constitutional revision has come to an end.

“Shiites are Iraqi nationalists”

You studied ‘separatism’ and ‘federalism’ in Iraqi history. What’s the Shia position towards Federalism. Is there a strong tendency towards federalism among other non-Kurdish political groups in Iraq? Or are the Kurds alone in this?

The Shiites generally accept the idea of federalism for Kurdistan, but on the whole are more skeptical when it comes to federalism south of Kurdistan [Southern Iraq]. We saw this in the failure of the “Region of the South” project for a Shiite region and the general decline of ISCI. Also non-sectarian projects in the south, such as the “Region of Basra”, have failed.

Are the Iraqi Shia completely pro-Iran as some claim or are they also Iraqi nationalistic?

Most Shiites are probably Iraqi nationalists. Many resent the dominance of the pro-Iranian parties after 2003.

Maliki could lose support

You predict that the Odierno plan will weaken Maliki. Some analysts suggest that Maliki’s role will be over anyway, due to opposition of both the Kurds and Shia rivals. Do you think Maliki will still play a future role in Iraq?

It depends on what strategy he chooses. If he does what he did in early 2009 and increases his cooperation with secularists, then he could be a player in the future. But if he continues the path he has followed since August with strong anti-Baathism he will probably lose support, because the anti-Baathist electorate probably prefers ISCI anyway.

You argue that neither soft partition nor enduring civil war have any real basis in Iraqi history (for over the last 1400 years). Is this a historical claim (Iraq was created by the Brits)? Does it matter?

The idea that Iraq was constructed by the British is impossible to maintain if one chooses to research primary sources from the pre-1914 period, where the notion of Iraq as a identity concept covering the three vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul is omnipresent, in Ottoman and Arabic sources alike. Additionally, before 1884, those three vilayets were frequently unified as a single entity ruled from Baghdad. I have written extensively about this in my book “Basra, the Failed Gulf State”. My main argument is that attempts to impose federal subdivisions south of Kurdistan are likely to create an artificial and unsustainable system – it is really the idea of a tripartite Iraq, and not Iraq itself, which is “artificial”. Kurdistan is a different matter, since the north always had more tenuous links with Baghdad.
 
Do you consider yourself a strong supporter and advocate of centralism in Iraq?

Federalism for Kurdistan and centralism for the rest of Iraq.

Galbraith’s subdivisions have no historical basis

Why did you start translating and publishing articles about Galbraith. Is this because you are against the ideas of both Galbraith and Biden to divide Iraq in central regions? Are you objective in this regard?

My writings on Galbraith, Biden and the soft partition idea began in 2006. These writings reflect my reactions after having studied the question of territorial integrity in Iraq in a historical perspective for more than fifteen years. Again, I first and foremost react to the idea of introducing federal subdivisions south of Kurdistan, which I find to have no historical basis or precedent whatsoever, and therefore think is unlikely to guarantee political stability in the long term.

Doesn’t Galbraith have a point that he was a ‘friend of the Kurds’ long before they even had any money, oil contracts or anything and formed his pro-federalism position. Isn’t Galbraith for the Kurds, something like Samantha Power of Harvard University once described him, "the friend beyond the mountains."?

There is no problem with him being a friend and supporter of the Kurds, but he should have realized he became disqualified to have anything to do with the Iraqi constitutional process in the second he acquired a business interest in DNO in June 2004.

Isn’t Galbraith inspired by his experiences in the Balkans? It’s his idea that communal self-governance is ideal in post-conflict regions and thus made the case that a post-Saddam Iraq should adopt a similar system.

Precisely. Comparing Balkans to Iraq is like comparing apples and oranges. Serbs and Croats want to have separate states; Shiite and Sunni Arabs in Iraq don’t share this aspiration.

Why are your critical of the Norwegian oil policy and their shares in companies with PCS in Kurdistan?

My general position is that foreign oil companies should remain on the sidelines in Iraq until the process of revising the constitution has been completed. For this reason I specifically warned StatoilHydro against signing deals with Baghdad in an op-ed in Norway’s leading business daily in July 2009.

You said that the Americans are ‘constantly harassed by strong Kurdish lobbies in Washington’ influencing their views in a negative way. Is the Kurdish lobby really so strong? Kurds in general do not have this idea.

My impression is that they are at least better organized abroad than most other Iraqis, with the possible exception of ISCI.

Trend towards negotiated solution for Kirkuk

You don’t see Kirkuk and parts of Mosul as part of “the Kurdistan region”. Why not?

I am talking here first and foremost about the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, which historically have closer ties to the Iraqi plains. Even a pro-Kurdish historian like David McDowall describe the Kurdish demand for Kirkuk as something that came to the forefront only in the 1960s. Additionally, I think it sets a bad precedent for the region to apply a strict “ethnic” principle in settling territorial disputes – this will lead to the same situation as the one we had in the Balkans.

You propose an international recognition of the autonomy of the three current Kurdistan governorates that would guarantee the safety of Kurdistan. But what will happen to the restoration of Saddam’s *Arabization policies and the regions inhabited with a majority by Kurds? Who will guarantee their safety? For instance Saddam Hussein recognized Khanaqin was Kurdish, but it’s now part of Iraq.

As said, I don’t have a problem with some of the rural areas in governorates outside Kurdistan being added to the federal region.

What do you think about the future of article 140? Did the Kurds give up? What will be the future of Kirkuk?

I am not aware that the Kurds have given up, but there are certainly an increasing number of non-Kurdish politicians that are skeptical to article 140. I think the trend is towards a negotiated solution instead of referendums.

You say Iran supports sectarian politics in Iraq. Does this also mean they support the Kurdish demands on Kirkuk and article 140?

I think the basic Iranian motive is to have an Iraq defined by ethno-sectarian identities which can secure a Shiite majority. What this means with respect to Kirkuk is unclear. It is noteworthy that the Shiites and the Kurds were unable to agree on the oil law and Kirkuk back in 2007, when the climate was very sectarian. This is a reason I think they Kurds should ask themselves whether it really is in their best interest to promote an Iraq defined on the basis of three ethno-sectarian identities. Maybe it would be better to go back to the old formula of an Arab-Kurdish partnership in a bilateral federation.

You say Kurds in Kirkuk are fed up with the attempts by the PUK and the KDP to dominate the city and instead prefer to focus on local Kirkuki identity (rather than Kurdish ethnicity) and the concomitant prospect of a more harmonious relationship with Baghdad. How did you get this idea?

Based on conversations with researchers who worked in Kirkuk. An example of an interpretation roughly along such lines is presented in  “The Kirkuk Conundrum” by Denise Natali in the Ethnopolitics journal.

Kurds should give up Kirkuk

International Crisis Group (ICG) vice-director Joost Hilterman says Turkey is the alternative for Iraqi Kurds for Baghdad, if Iraq collapses. He says Turkey fears the growing Iranian influence and might want to become the ‘midwife of Kurdish independence’. What do you think about his analysis?

It is well known that Turkey is supporting economic investment in Kurdistan, and that it may be interested in some kind of special, separate arrangement for Kirkuk. I don’t think this is necessarily in conflict with Iranian interests.

Did you read the ICG report Oil for Soil. Do you think it will be a solution? It would mean Kurds will export the oil in the three provinces they control and the disputed regions will remain under the sovereignty of Iraq.

I think this is an interesting idea. I agree that it is important for the international community to come up with some kind of proposal that can give the Kurds a reward for abandoning the claims to Kirkuk. However, in my own view, perhaps the best thing would be a strong international guarantee for Kurdish autonomy within Iraq, so that Kurds would never have to fear Baghdad anymore. This used to be a Kurdish demand in the past.

Kurds will not be Iraqi kingmakers

Some analysts say Kurds will be the kingmakers in Iraq and will probable walk away with around 40 seats and perhaps 50, if the Kurdish opposition list doesn’t follow through. But there are 323 seats in the Iraqi parliament. Is this true?

The Kurdish position is strengthened by the fact that they are behaving in a more disciplined fashion than most other Iraqi factions, but the numbers suggest that this time they will be one among several medium-sized entities.

There are some centralist and non-sectarian blocs. Why they do not unite themselves?

Some of them have united, such as Mutlak and Allawi. But personality issues sometimes prevent greater unity in this camp. The logical thing for them in the long run would be to seek moderate Kurdish partners who share their secularism. That kind of partnership could form the basis of a viable, bi-national federation, as had been discussed before 2003.

Do you think the centralist politicians can overcome Iranian supported federalist parties?

I think this is what we are seeing south of Kurdistan [South-Iraq]. It is important to note that the centralists primarily are interested in keeping the non-Kurdish parts of Iraq centralized. They have no desire to re-impose central control on Kurdistan.

How did you get the idea that the Kurdish opposition party Change is reaching out to Iraqi parties like those of Maliki? Do you get the idea the Kurdish opposition group is allying itself with other Iraqi parties?

What we can say is that Iraqi parties are watching these developments towards a more complex party structure in Kurdistan with great interest. Baghdad newspapers often write positive articles about the Change party. But this tendency also relates to the biggest parties: Many find Barham Salih to be much more constructive than Barzani and Talabani. These tendencies make me hopeful that there are movements towards moderation and compromise in both camps (Photo: Cover of Reidar Visser’s book: Basra, the failed oil state).

© Rudaw